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1 The problem with mutual knowledge 
 
 Various terms have been used to refer to the information shared and drawn 
upon by people when they communicate with each other.  Some of these terms are: 
shared knowledge, mutual knowledge, common knowledge, background knowledge, 
common ground, mutual beliefs, shared beliefs, mutual suppositions, presuppositions,  
etc.  The plethora of terms used reflects the current state of interest expressed by 
various scholars in this "common knowledge/belief" which people seem to draw upon 
in helping them to express themselves as well as to understand each other.  The 
plethora of terms used also reflects a general confusion of the terminology.  As we 
will see later in Chapter 2, some of these terms have been used interchangeably with 
each other.  This, in our view, is symptomatic of not only a terminological confusion 
but a conceptual one as well.  In order to help us get a hold on some of these terms, 
we shall define some of these key terms later in Section 3 of the current chapter.  
Hopefully with these initial attempts at defining some of the key terms and concepts, 
we will be able to provide a common basis for further discussion. 
 One of the key notions arising from the literature is that of mutual knowledge.  
This can be seen, for example, in the early influence of Grice's (1957) and Schiffer's 
(1972) writings on the notions of mutual knowledge and meaning.  One of the key 
issues arising from this is the problem of the Mutual Knowledge Paradox which 
basically addresses the question of how an infinite regression of knowledge can be 
processed in a finite amount of processing time, which most people seem to be able to 
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do in everyday conversation.  Schiffer (1972) tries to address this paradox by arguing 
that the regression is quite harmless because a set of conditions can be defined within 
a finitely describable situation to infer mutual knowledge.  This solution, as we shall 
argue in Chapter 2, is inadequate. 
 More recent work addressing this paradox comes largely from outside 
philosophy, in particular the writings of psychologists Clark and his colleagues (see, 
for example, Clark and Marshall, 1981; Clark and Carlson, 1982).  Clark's et al 
solution is similar to Schiffer's and, as we shall argue in Chapter 2, suffers from much 
of the same criticisms of Schiffer's solution.  The major difference lies in the way 
discussions of mutual knowledge in Clark's et al solution is couched in psycho-speak 
which seems to suggest that in spite of the exacting processing demands of 
establishing mutual knowledge, mutual knowledge can still in established on a routine 
basis in finite processing time.  Many important papers related to common ground 
and communication in psychology, to the best of our knowledge, assume Clark's 
stance on mutual knowledge (see, for example, Horton et al, 1996; Greene et al, 
1994). 
 We believe that the answer to the question of how people seem to be able to 
establish common understanding in apparently effortless day to day interactions in 
rapid conversation lies elsewhere in the notion of shared belief, rather than mutual 
knowledge.  Shared belief, as we shall define later, involves a finite number (no more 
than a few) of steps, and it is this notion which explains how people are able to 
communicate effectively in everyday rapid conversation.  In Chapter 2, we shall draw 
support for this notion in a recent empirical account offered by Brown (1995).  Note 
however that Brown's account, like all of the other accounts, is based on spoken data.  
The significance of Brown's account lies in the fact that it draws from authentic data 
and that this fact lends greater credibility to her account as a plausible explanation of 
the role of shared belief (rather than mutual knowledge as in other accounts) in 
successful communication. 
 Related to the issue of the "mutual knowledge - shared belief" debate in 
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successful communication, is the notion of common ground (se Chapter 2 for a 
detailed discussion).  One of the central concerns arising from the literature, as you 
will see later, is the nature of common ground.  Is it the same as mutual knowledge, 
shared belief or something else?  What is the role of this common ground in 
successful communication?  Various answers of different levels of sophistication 
have been put forward, and there is still as yet no general consensus amongst scholars 
working in the diverse disciplines of linguistics, philosophy, psychology and 
Artificial Intelligence.  In most of these studies, little attention has been paid to 
authentic data - the careful study of which, we believe, will reveal what ordinary 
people actually do in real speech situations to establish common ground.  The present 
study is an attempt to bridge this gap between theory and behaviour. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2 The research question 
 
 Our discussion so far raises several important issues: the current 
terminological confusion, the Mutual Knowledge Paradox and the notion of common 
ground.  We also highlight the dearth of study involving authentic written data in 
addressing the above issues.  Most of the studies done so far involve invented 
examples, and even when authentic data has been used, written discourse has been 
neglected. 
 In our current study, we hope that by looking more closely at authentic data, 
we will be able to find a psychologically plausible explanation of what it means for 
an individual to accept in his mind that he has obtained an adequate interpretation of 
an utterance, and the actual process in which that interpreted utterance becomes part 
of the individual's notion of his state of beliefs and his perception that that belief is 
shared by the other party in the discourse.  Much of the earlier work also focuses on 
tracking referents in spoken discourse.  For the current study, it is hoped that an 
examination of written discourse involving the tracking of propositional content 
instead may offer further valuable insights into the process of establishing common 
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ground. 
 In looking closely at authentic written data, our aim is not only to show that it 
is shared belief, rather than mutual knowledge, which is involved in establishing 
common ground in written discourse, but also to offer an empirically motivated 
conceptualisation of common ground (to be defined in Section 3).  We hope to 
demonstrate empirically the actual number of steps involved in the regression of 
beliefs by configuring the beliefs (to be defined in Section 3) in a systematic way.  In 
doing this, we shall highlight, for the first time, generic patterns of configurations 
associated with the various states of shared beliefs (or disbeliefs or doubts; to be 
defined in Chapter 6), thus allowing for the postulation of a taxonomy of common 
ground configurations.  Our final goal is to offer a "cognitive" model of the 
processing of common ground in written discourse. 
 In order to reach the above goals, we have to first provide an account of how 
utterances in our data are interpreted by the readers.  For the purpose of offering a 
more complete account of our data (which, you shall see later, is a case study), we 
explore the writer's point of view as well by examining the connection between 
information structure and common ground. 
 Finally, since we are offering a detailed account of written discourse for the 
first time, we are able to make some initial but important observations of the 
difference between written and spoken discourse in relation to the notion of shared 
belief and in relation to the question of how common ground come to be established 
in communication.  In Chapter 2, we shall highlight some of the more general 
differences between spoken and written discourse which are relevant to our purpose.  
This will make the comparison later between our findings and those of other studies 
(largely based on spoken data) more meaningful.  In Chapter 5 (on Information 
structure) and Chapter 6 (on Configuring shared beliefs), we explore in more specific 
details the nature of the difference between written and spoken discourse. 
 In Section 5 below, we provide an overview of the dissertation where we will 
spell out in greater detail how and when we intend to address the above issues in our 
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current study. 
 Before we explain our data which is drawn from a set of eight letters 
exchanged between two interactants, we should define some of the key terms we will 
use in the current study 
 We should also point out from the outset that throughout this study, we shall 
refer to the generic writer/speaker as she and the generic reader/listener as he. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3 Defining some key terms 
 
 In this section, we define some of the key terms we intend to use in the current 
study.  Most of the terms we plan to use are best defined and explained at the 
beginning of the relevant chapters.  In this section, we define some of the more 
general and crucial terms which we shall make use of right from the beginning of our 
study.  Some of these terms have already been mentioned in the preceding sections. 
 The first pair of terms we wish to distinguish is that of belief and knowledge.  
They differ in terms of how securely the individual holds them.  For example, John 
may believe that his primary school science teacher is Spiderman in disguise.  On the 
other hand, he believes that his teacher lives near school, having seen him walk, 
rather than drive, out of the main gate every week-day after school to, presumably, 
his home.  Furthermore, John believes with greater conviction that his science teacher 
was educated in South Africa (even though he can't locate the country on the world 
map) because his teacher has announced it one day in class.  And John knows that his 
teacher's son is called Harry, having talked and played with him in the school 
playground on several occasions.   
 Depending on the nature of the evidence (whether based on hearsay, 
observation, second-hand information or direct experience) John holds his 
beliefs/knowledge about his science teacher with different degrees of certainty.  His 
knowledge and beliefs may also be unique to him since his classmate, Peter, with a 
separate (although similar) set of world/school experiences may hold the same set of 
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information related to their science teacher with dissimilar degrees of certainty.  Only 
an omniscient observer will be able to tell the relative degrees of certainty with which 
each boy treats the same piece of information and why.  For the rest of us, without 
prior contact with either of the boys, we can only guess. 
 When Richard Nixon, then President of the United States of America, 
declared on national television, "I am not a crook" in the wake of the Watergate 
scandal, certain sections of the general public interpreted his denial as possible 
evidence of his 'misdemeanour' (a weak belief); while other sections of the public, 
especially those sympathetic to the opposition party, took his denial as practically an 
admission of guilt (a strong belief) - after all, there can be no smoke without fire.  The 
different sections of the general public, barring the enterprising journalist or FBI 
agent, are likely to have very similar prior but second-hand experiences of Nixon 
based on whatever information they may get from television.  Yet, they seem quite 
capable of holding different degrees of certainty of the "truth" of Nixon's denial.  
 (We should add the caveat that we are aware of the vast amount of 
philosophical literature in the field of epistemology.  However, our concern here is 
not with the nature of the relation between our sensory perception of, say, objects in 
the world and the intrinsic nature of these objects whose existence may or may not be 
independent of our sensory perception.  See Russell (1912) for a discussion of this 
issue.) 
 The next set of notions which we wish to distinguish is that of knowledge (or 
belief) which is either common, shared or mutual.  Common/background knowledge 
is that information which members of a particular community assume to be held 
common by virtue of the fact they have very similar background or up-bringing.  For 
example, I accept the information that London is in the south of Britain while 
Edinburgh is to the north to be common knowledge between my brother (who has 
never been to Britain) and me, even though we have never talked about the relative 
locations of the two cities before.  The reason is because we have very similar 
childhood and school experiences.  But once we have talked about taking a possible 
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holiday together to the two cities and about whether we should rent a car or take the 
train up and down Britain, then that information about the locations of the two cities 
becomes part of our shared knowledge.   
 Kreckel (1981; cited in Hinds, 1985:7) makes a similar distinction between 
common and shared knowledge.  She defines common knowledge as "that knowledge 
which two or more people have in common as a result of being brought up under 
similar conditions such as culture, subculture, region and education", while shared 
knowledge refers to "the negotiated common knowledge [based on mutual 
interaction] used for future interaction".  This conception of shared knowledge, we 
believe, approximates the notion of belief spaces/environments, as developed in 
Artificial Intelligence research (e.g., Wilks, 1986), which are "temporary structures, 
created in real time during human communication, and not maintained permanently" 
(p. 277).  And it is this notion of shared knowledge (or belief) which is negotiated 
that we are particularly keen to explore in our current study. 
 (As an informal aside, note that Kreckel's notion of common knowledge 
appears to parallel that of Joshi's (1982) notion of general knowledge.  Similarly, 
Kreckel's shared knowledge parallels that of Joshi's mutual knowledge in that both 
shared and mutual knowledge are discerned by participants only as a result of 
interaction at a particular point in time and place (Joshi, 1982: 182).  We prefer 
Kreckel's terminology.) 
 As opposed to common and shared knowledge, mutual knowledge refers to 
the type of knowledge which two (or more) persons hold to be common with 100% 
certainty.  This 100% certainty is based, technically speaking, on an infinite 
regression of statements.  It is a technical notion which has been discussed 
extensively in the philosophical and psychological literature.  Mutual knowledge has 
also been used interchangeably, and regrettably so, with the other notion of common 
ground, and confused with the notion of shared belief.  
 Based on our definitions of 'shared' and 'belief' above, a shared belief is 
therefore a belief which is held to be true (by virtue of indirect 
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information/experience) as a result of a prior discussion and interaction with another 
interactant regarding the belief.  Such a belief is held to be true by an interactant not 
because she is certain of its truth, but because she believes (with varying degrees of 
certainly) it to be true based on hearsay, observation or second-hand information 
(rather than based on direct experience).   
 In contrast, mutual knowledge refers to something which an interactant holds 
to be true with great certainty (since it arises from direct rather than second-hand 
experience), and which the interactants knows for sure that the other interactant she is 
communicating with also knows for sure.  Such a certainty of holding something in 
common is based on an infinite regression of statements in the Schifferian sense,  For 
a detailed discussion of Schiffer's position on the role of mutual knowledge in an 
instance of S-meaning, see Chapter 2, Section 1. 
 The Mutual Knowledge Paradox is a philosophical puzzle arising from the 
need to postulate an infinite series of statements (of the kind I know that we mutually 
know that x because I know that you know that I know that you know that I know ...  
and so on ... that x).  The classic example cited concerns A's and B's mutual 
knowledge of the candle between them (see Chapter 2, Section 1 for an account).  
This infinite series of statements is also referred to a "regressive series of intentions 
[or knowledge]" by Schiffer (1972: 30), and it is in this sense that we use the term 
regression in our study. 
 Note that in spite of the difficulties with the notion of mutual knowledge, it is 
still used extensively in many studies as the basis for successful communication, even 
in accounts which claim to be psychologically viable.  
 The term common ground has been used by various scholars to mean different 
things (see Chapter 2, Section 4 for a detailed discussion).  For our purpose, we shall 
use common ground as a larger umbrella term to refer to all the knowledge/beliefs 
which an interactant holds to be mutual/shared with another interactant.  Based on this 
definition, we would be compelled to include mutual knowledge as well as shared 
beliefs under the larger term of common ground.  Since we do not believe that mutual 
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knowledge is psychologically viable and since we can't find instances of mutual 
knowledge established in our written data anyway, we shall exclude the notion of 
mutual knowledge in our discussion of common ground in the current study.  Because 
of this exclusion, we are thus able to use shared belief interchangeably with common 
ground (see Chapter 2 for an extended discussion of the different "categories" of 
common ground). 
 There are many other terms we shall use in the discussion of our data in 
relation to establishment of common ground.  Most of these terms are novel and refer 
to complex concepts/phenomena identified for the first time as a result of our detailed 
analyses of the written data  We shall leave their definitions for later at the beginning 
of the respective chapters in which the terms are first used. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4 The data 
 
 The data consists of a complete set of eight letters exchanged between two 
interactants a and b  (see Appendix 1 for the set of eight letters).  a is a prospective 
candidate (whom we will refer to as he) of the M.A. in Linguistics programme 
offered by the Linguistics Department of the Faculty of Languages.  (We have 
modified the names of the departments, faculties and university to preserve the 
anonymity of our informants.)  He writes to b, a lecturer/supervisor (whom we will 
refer to as she) of another department, the Applied Linguistics Department of the 
Faculty of Education.  The Applied Linguistics Department offers another M.A., the 
M.A. in Applied Linguistics.  a writes to b, asking her if she could be his supervisor.  
Note that there is a third party, c, mentioned in the letters but who is not directly 
involved in the correspondence. c is the Head of the Linguistics Department.  Note 
that a and b have never met prior to the exchange of letters.  They have not 
communicated on the telephone or Internet either. 
 There appears to us to be three sets of inter-related "main topics" or Base 
Propositions  (BPs) negotiated in the series of letters.  The first BP pertains to a's 
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departmental affiliation.  The second set of BPs pertains to the Linguistics 
Department's position on the general issue of across-department supervision and the 
specific issue of letting b supervise a.  The third set of BPs pertains to b's positions on 
the same issues raised above.  The BPs are: 
 
 BP 1:  a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
 
 BP 2a:  Linguistics Department is permitted to let b  supervise a 
 BP 2b:  Linguistics Department is willing to let b  supervise a 
 
 BP 3a:  b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 
 BP 3b:  b is interested in supervising a 
 BP 3c:  b will continue to be interested in supervising a 
 BP 3d:  b has time and so on to supervise a 
 BP 3e:  b is willing in principle to supervise a 
 BP 3f:  b is willing in fact to supervise a 
 
Note that BPs 2a and 3a are very similar.  The main difference is that BP 2a is written 
from the Linguistics Department's point of view, while BP 3a is written from b's point 
of view. 
 It should be pointed out that there is a lot of background knowledge we can 
deem the two interactants to have in common (i.e., assumed common ground; see 
Chapter 2, Section 4 for a definition) even prior to their correspondence.  This 
constitutes the sort of world knowledge an analyst may reasonably be justified to 
assume that the two interactants will share.  This background knowledge may include 
the following (see Table 1.1 below): 
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Table 1.1: Assumed common ground (background beliefs/knowledge) of a and b 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. X University (British) offers two linguistics-related taught MA's in two 
departments of two different faculties. 
2. The Linguistics Department of the Faculty of Languages offers a taught 
M.A. in Linguistics, which comprises core courses, optional electives and 
a research project; whereas the Applied Linguistics Department of the 
Faculty of Education offers a taught M.A. in Applied Linguistics, which 
comprises core courses, optional electives and an end-of-year 
examination.  One of the pre-requisites of the M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics programme (not shared by the Linguistics programme) is that 
only applicants with a minimum of four years of teaching experience will 
be considered. 
3. The M.A. programmes of both departments are not modular although it is 
possible for students to sit in on an unofficial basis on courses offered by 
the other department.  Therefore it is not generally possible for students 
to read courses in both departments at the same time in order to fulfil the 
course work required for either M.A. 
4. Hence, across-department supervision, although constitutionally 
permissible,  is not generally practised.  The respective departments will 
prefer to supervise their own students unless an internal supervisor cannot 
be found. 
5. Protocol dictates that a student who wishes to be supervised by an 
external supervisor should first seek the consent of the head of his 
department directly about his intention.  It would be inappropriate for an 
external supervisor to approach the head of department first as this may 
be misconstrued as an attempt to "poach" students from another 
department. 
6. The Applied Linguistics Department, being the relatively younger 
department, is also understandably careful not to cause any 




 The problem of miscommunication arises, as you will see later on, precisely 
because the knowledge listed above is not entirely shared by both interactants.  In the 
following pages, we will walk you through the data to give you a feel of the data and 
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the issues involved in analysing and interpreting the utterances in the eight letters: 
A1, B1, A2, B2, A3, B3, A4 and B4.  A1 refers to a's first letter, B1 refers to b's first 
letter, A2 refers to a's second letter, and so on.  (Detailed discussions of the data, 
methodology, analyses and results are found in Chapters 3 - 7.)  The data is presented 
in the middle column of the page.  The left column indicates the paragraph number, 
hence for example, A1P2 means a's first letter, second paragraph.  The right column 
offers comments on the data and directs the reader to the relevant chapters in this 
dissertation which elaborate on the issues raised. 
 
(We apologise for the fine print; we don't know how else to present each letter and 
















































 For two years I studied English, French, American Studies, 
Education and Foreign Language Teaching at Y University (Germany) 
and at this moment I am doing the 'licence' in French and German 
Studies at Z University (France).  During this time I have taken part in 
twelve courses of linguistics and my studies of Foreign Language 
Teaching cover applied linguistics to a great extent. 
 
 To extend my knowledge on this field, I applied through the 
German National Scholarship Foundation scheme to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics in the academic year 1993/94.  Within this one-year course 
I would like to follow my interest in sociolinguistics, especially in 
critical linguistics.  Accordingly, I will submit a title on critical 
language study in educational contexts for the thesis.  This educational 
aspect is rooted in my interest in foreign language teaching and in my 
desire to enter the teaching profession.  Besides, I have a two-month 
teaching experience in English at a German Waldorf school. 
 
 Therefore I would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in 
addition, 'Meaning in English' and 'Methods and Materials in English 
Language Teaching'.  Furthermore, I wish to take part in the  Research 
Design Course because I want to go on to undertake research. 
 
 b, I certainly share your interest for sociolinguistics and 
discourse analysis.  In fact, one of the main reasons why I want to 
study at X University [Britain] is because I would like to have the  
opportunity to benefit from your expertise.  I really hope that you can 
be my supervisor, if it is at all possible. 
 
 
 I should be happy to get a positive reply at your convenience 
and I thank you very much in advance for your help. 
 
      Yours sincerely, a 
Opening.  These are the opening words of a's first letter to b.  
 
Education Background.  In the opening paragraph, a offers b a brief description of his education background.  The focus seems to 
be on the fact that he has covered a substantial amount of studies related to applied linguistics.  The reason for this line of 





Recent Action.  This opening sentence reports on a's most recent action - his application to take the M.A. in Linguistics.  The reason 
he gives for his application is to extend his knowledge on this field, by which he means, presumably, his interest in applied 
linguistics.  This statement may strike the reader b as odd because a expresses his interest in applied linguistics but applies to study 
linguistics instead.  b is probably wondering why a writes to her, the Director of the M.A. in Applied Linguistics programme, about 
his interest in applied linguistics but applies for the Linguistics programme. 
Future Action.  In the rest of this paragraph starting from Within this one-year course ... , a offers largely details of his most 




Future Action Continued.  In this paragraph, a offers more information about his future plans in applied linguistics.  This time, his 
plans involve reading specific courses offered in b's Applied Linguistics programme.  Note a's use of the underspecified the M.A. to 
refer to a new referent 'the M.A. in Applied Linguistics', resulting in confusion later (see Chapters 4 & 5 on Information Structure 
for details). 
 
Request.  In reading this paragraph, b begins to understand the reason for the above details of a's training in applied linguistics and 
his future plans for more training in applied linguistics.  a seems to be trying to establish the ground that both b and he have a lot in 
common in terms of their academic interests.  It is on this assumption that a frames his request that b consents to being his 
supervisor.  However, b remains confused about a's future departmental affiliation, as the evidence of b's reply in B1 shows.  b is 
probably not sure which of the following two scenarios best describes a's situation: (1) a applies for the M.A. in Linguistics 
programme but may have confused it with the Applied Linguistics programme; (2) a has applied or intends to apply to the M.A. in 
Applied Linguistics programme, but to date, the Applied Linguistics Department has not received the application. 
Pre-closure Courtesy .  a thanks b for her help and anticipates b's reply.  It becomes clear by now that a's main goal in writing the 
letter is to ask b to be his supervisor.  From hindsight, b realises now what the earlier paragraphs about a's background and future 










































 Thank you for your letter of 17 November 1992, in which you 





 I cannot quite work out from your letter exactly what you  are 
going to be doing here during 1993/4;  you say you have  applied to 
take the M.A. in Linguistics, and I presume that that means what it 
says, i.e., that you will be a student of the Linguistics Department.  If 
that is the case, I am afraid that it would not really be the done thing 
for me to supervise you, since the Applied Linguistics Department is a 
separate department in a different faculty (Education). 
 
 Of course that doesn't mean that I would not be happy to talk to 
you from time to time, and you might also be able to follow some 
courses here, provided that your Linguistics timetable allowed it. 
 
 Or, do you mean that you have applied to take the M.A. in 
Applied Linguistics here in the Applied Linguistics Department?  If so, 
we have not received your application yet.  However, if such an 
application were successful (and competition for places is severe), then 
I see no reason why I shouldn't supervise you, provided that our 
interests continue to coincide. 
 
 Please don't hesitate to contact me again if you want any more 
information. 
 




Opening Courtesy.  b starts by thanking a for his letter.  b also acknowledges a's request in his previous letter, suggesting that this is 
what b believes is a's primary purpose in writing his previous letter.  What follows appears to be b's perception of the situation at 
hand.  Before b can give a a definite answer as to whether she is willing, in principle and in fact, to supervise a, she addresses the 
issue of a's future university affiliation, and depending on which department a is going to be affiliated to, b's response will be 
different.  In b's mind, there are two possible scenarios, as the following paragraphs reveal. 
 
b's Response to Scenario 1.  b starts by expressing her confusion over a's departmental affiliation.  She entertains two possible 
situations.  The first possible scenario is that a has applied to the Linguistics Department, and in which case, it would be against 
department protocol for her to agree to supervise him in another department.  You will notice later in A2 that a takes this as 





b's Response to Scenario 1 continued.  After turning down a's request, b offers the consolation that she would still be available for 
consultation.  Again, she is careful to qualify her interest by stating the condition that their future interaction should not interfere 
with a's studies in the Linguistics Department. 
 
b's Response to Scenario 2.  The second possible scenario is that a has applied (or at least intends to apply) to the Applied 
Linguistics Department, and in which case, she would be willing to supervise him if his application is successful.  But to date, she 
has no evidence that a has indeed applied to her department.  Again, b is careful to add the further condition that their interests 





















































 Thank you very much for your letter of 25 November, in which 
you tell me that I may follow some courses at the Applied Linguistics 
Department.  I am very glad that you are willing to see me occasionally 
during 1993/4. 
 
 For one point, I would like to clear up a possible 
misunderstanding:  As you presume I have applied to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics at the Faculty of Languages.  Lacking the  teaching 
experience of four years I am not eligible for the M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics anyway. 
 
 As to the problem of supervision I hoped that my belonging to 
a different department of the University would not be an obstacle for 
you to supervise me with the prospectus of the M.A. in Linguistics 
stating on page 2: 
" ... Students taking the M.A. in Linguistics benefit from this 
interdisciplinary environment.  They ... may in some cases be 
supervised for the research components of the degree by a specialist 
from outside the Department." 
 
 Since your academic work covers my field of interest to the 
full, I should really be happy, if I could benefit from your supervision.  




 In any case I am going to visit X University during my Easter 
holiday in April where I hope to settle this question on the spot. 
 
 
 I thank you very much in advance for any benevolence and I 
am looking forward to your reply at your convenience. 
 
      Yours sincerely, a 
Opening. 
Opening Courtesy.  a thanks b for her letter, and acknowledges b's consent that he may follow courses in b's department and b's  




Clarification of Confusion.  a clears b's confusion by stating immediately that it is Scenario 1, i.e., he has applied to take the M.A. 
in Linguistics, which is applicable to him.  Notice that a is careful to term the confusion as a possible misunderstanding in order to 
avoid causing offence (to be discussed in Chapter 3).  a also rules out a Scenario 2 interpretation by stating his ineligibility for the 
Applied Linguistics programme. 
 
 
Regarding the Permissibility of Supervision.  In this paragraph, a refutes b's claim in B1P2 that it would not really be the done thing 
for me to supervise you by quoting from the Linguistics prospectus.  The misunderstanding here is that a thinks that b's reluctance 
to supervise him is due to b's ignorance (or possibly, lapse of memory) of the official regulation which permits across-department 
supervision.  In reality, b is fully aware of this official regulation, but is only being careful to observe protocol by expressing her 
reservations.  An enthusiastic response from b may otherwise be misconstrued by the Linguistics Department as indicating that she 
trying to 'poach' students from their department.  After all, the Linguistics Department may prefer to supervise their own students 
even if the official regulation may in some cases permit across-department supervision. 
 
 
Regarding b's Willingness to Supervise a.  a opens this paragraph by stating and assuming that b's academic work covers his field of 
interest to the full.  In writing this, a appears to be responding to and hence fulfilling b's condition in B1P4 provided that our 
interests continue to coincide.  Recall that this is b's condition for why I see no reason why I shouldn't supervise you.  In fact, a goes 
beyond merely suggesting an overlap of interest by reasoning and arguing that since b's work covers his field of interest to the full, 
he would be happy if b could supervise him (see Chapter 3 on a's reasoning schema and "argumentative" style of writing). 
 
Regarding a's Future Visit.  This paragraph appears to be inappropriately direct/demanding as in the expression I hope to settle this 
question on the spot.  This may be due to cross-cultural differences between a and b .  What seems to be clear is that a is driven by 
his goal of asking and persuading b to be his supervisor. 
 

























 Thank you for your letter of 3 December in which you clarify 
your future affiliation in the University. 
 
 I would really have nothing against supervising you, provided I 
have the time and so on; I merely think that it might be felt by the 
linguistics department that they are well able to provide supervision in 
your areas of interest themselves. 
 
 Anyway, I am sure that you will be able to discover their 
preference when you visit in April. 
 
      Yours sincerely, b 
 
Opening. 
Opening Courtesy.  b thanks a for his letter and acknowledges a's clarification of his departmental affiliation.  This is an indication 
to a that she is satisfied that common ground has been established (see Chapters 6 & 7 on Shared Beliefs). 
 
Regarding b's Willingness to Supervise a.  b appears to be willing, at least in principle, to supervise a, but lays down the further 
condition provided I have the time and so on.  b also alludes to the Linguistics Department's preference for internal supervision.  b 
does this, presumably, to counteract a's persuasive tone in his previous letter which argues that b is both permitted (as stated in the 
prospectus) and qualified (as evidenced in their common research interest) to supervise him. 
 
Regarding a's Future Visit and Regarding Linguistics Department's preference.  b ends the letter with the suggestion that a will 



























 Thank you very much for your letter of December in which you 





 I already told you that I intend to visit X University during my 
Easter holiday in April.  I should be happy to talk things over with you 
on this occasion.  So, would it be possible to see you within the period 
from 13 to 16 April? 
 
 I thank you very much in advance for your help and I am 
looking forward to your reply at your convenience. 
      Yours sincerely, a 
 
Opening. 
Opening Courtesy  and Regarding b's Willingness to Supervise a.  a thanks b for her letter and confirms his understanding that b is 
willing to supervise him.  Our impression here is that a seems to be assuming that b is willing both in principle and in fact to 
supervise him, which we believe is not the case (see Chapter 3).  You will notice again the repeated use (by both interactants) of 
acknowledgement of previously agreed propositions as a strategy for establishing common ground.  This will be discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Regarding a's Future Visit:  Appointment to See b.  In this paragraph, a tries to establish b's availability and willingness to talk to 





























 Thank you for your letter of 7 February. 
 
 Unfortunately I shall be away from the university at a  
conference (TESOL) between the 13th and 17th of April, so I'm afraid 
I won't be able to meet you then. 
 
 I hope you have a pleasant visit to X University and useful 















Pre-closure Courtesy and Regarding Linguistics Department's Preference.  As in b's previous letter B2, b once again reminds a of 
his need to find out Linguistics Department's preference first by writing I hope you have ... useful discussions with ... .  It is 
interesting to note that this matter crops up in b's letter only and not in a's letters, suggesting that what b views to be important 
differs from that of a.  This difference in their goals has ramifications on the organisation of subjectively salient content and on the 

























 Thank you for your letter of 10 February.  Considering the fact 
that neither you nor c [Head of Linguistics Department] will be 
available from 13th-16th April, I decided to postpone my visit to X 
University to 19th-23rd of April. 
 
 I hope that I'll be able to see you at your convenience during 
this period. 
 


































 Thank you for your letter of 10 March. 
 
 I'm glad that it looks as if we'll be able to meet after all in 
April.  I suggest you try to visit c before you come to see me.  You can 
telephone or visit the Applied Linguistics Department to find a suitable 
time. 
 






Regarding Appointment to See b and Regarding Linguistics Department's Preference.  Note that by suggesting that a visits c first, b 
is in fact suggesting that a should find out Linguistics Department’s preference first.  This is a pre-condition which b repeatedly 













5 Overview of dissertation 
 
 What the above letters and comments show is that in order to offer an 
explanation of how the two interactants establish common ground of certain 
propositions in the set of correspondence, several levels of analysis need to be done.  
The different levels of analysis involve: 
 
- Interpreting the meaning of key utterances related to the Base 
Propositions by appealing to a mechanism for generating inferences.  
(Discussed in Chapter 3) 
- Tracking how these BPs are established in accordance with certain 
pragmatic reasoning schemas; these reasoning schemas are in turn 
driven by the interactants' goals.  (Chapter 3) 
- Examining how the writer aids the process of interpretation and 
understanding by packaging her referring expressions as 
definite/indefinite to reflect her perception of her reader's information 
needs.  (Chapter 4) 
- Showing how the information status of the referents is linked to the 
information status of their related propositions.  (Chapter 5) 
- Clarifying the process by which the reader comes to realise in his mind 
that the writer's intended meaning of an utterance/proposition matches 
the reader's actual interpretation of the same utterance/proposition; this 
process is clarified by configuring the status of the two interactants’ 
beliefs (about the same proposition) separately and solipsistically.  
(Chapter 6) 
- Demonstrating the process in which new propositions/beliefs are 
established as shared and then built upon each other into an edifice of 
common ground.  (Chapter 6) 
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- Developing a cognitive model of the process in which common ground 
is established.  (Chapter 7) 
 
 The initial level of analysis would have to offer an account of the 
interpretation of the key utterances in the letters.  The analysis is complicated by the 
fact that many things are said indirectly.  Taking a systematic consideration of the 
context into account, certain indirect pragmatic inferences of the utterances are 
generated.  The further complication to our analysis is that the semantic and 
pragmatic "meaning" of the utterances is not static, given that with each subsequent 
letter received, the context of the discourse is enlarged, and that this enhanced context 
often sheds further light on how previous utterances ought to be re-interpreted.  This 
is especially so when one interactant detects that the other interactant has misread or 
misinterpreted her previous letter.   
 For example, when b writes in B1P2 I am afraid that it would not be the done 
thing for me to supervise you, since the Applied Linguistics Department is a separate 
department in a different faculty , a doesn't seem to understand the phrase it would 
not really be the done thing and infers that b thinks that across-department 
supervision is not permissible.  This inference made by a is wrong, as b points out 
later in her reply that although she is aware that across-department supervision is 
permissible, she merely thinks that it might be felt by the linguistics department that 
they are well able to provide supervision ... themselves (B2P2).  This means that a 
will now have to go back to b's previous letter B1 and reinterpret the affected parts in 
the light of this clarification.   
 The above example also shows that in interpreting b's utterance, a has to infer 
the underlying reasoning and thinking which seems to motivate b's utterance as well.  
We shall call this underlying reasoning the pragmatic reasoning schema.  b's 
underlying reasoning schema, like a's, is ultimately motivated by her main goal in the 
exchange which is to determine if she has sufficient reason to agree to supervise a.  
a's complementary goal, on the other hand, is to ask and persuade b to supervise him.  
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Any point raised by b which seems to obstruct a's goal is actively refuted.  Although 
we acknowledge the importance of the interactants' goals in driving the exchange of 
letters, we are more interested, for our current purpose, in the reasoning schemas 
which help the interactants to achieve their goals.  As such, we shall focus on 
describing the reasoning schemas.  The above issue (and others) is the point of 
Chapter 3, Interpreting Utterances in Interactive Extended Written Discourse. 
 So far, we have only examined the meaning of the utterances from the reader's 
point of view.  In order to arrive at a more complete account of how the reader arrives 
at his interpretation, we need to consider the writer's role in this interpretative process 
as well.  In Chapter 4, Information Structure and Common Ground I, we offer an 
account of how the writer facilitates this process of interpretation and understanding 
by the way she packages the new/"given" information in her choice of 
definite/indefinite expressions.  In order to do this, she has to first consider what her 
reader's existing state of information is so that she can customise her packaging of 
information in the referring expressions. 
 Chapter 5, Information Structure and Common Ground II, takes this 
analysis of the information status of the referents in the expressions a step further by 
exploring the nature of the interaction of the information status of two particular 
referents in the letters and the information status of the propositions related to these 
two referents.  As a point of further interest, we highlight and discuss the difference 
between written and spoken interactions in relation to the degree of the attenuation of 
the expressions used to refer to the referents and their corresponding information 
status. 
 Having made clear the process in which the key utterances are packaged and 
interpreted, it becomes possible to offer a detailed account of how the above results in 
the establishing of common ground (successful communication) or the failure to do so 
(unsuccessful communication) in Chapter 6, Configuring Shared Beliefs.  This is 
done by modelling the beliefs of the reader as he progresses in the exchange of letters.  
Based on Brown's (1995) method of belief representation, we further develop a way 
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of configuring the status of each belief in terms of its truth and sharedness.  Our 
analysis of the configuration of the beliefs shows that beliefs are solipsistic, i.e., they 
are located in the heads of individuals.  As such the process in which shared beliefs 
are established is unique for each individual.  Each interactant arrives at his own 
notion of sharedness : 1st Party Common Ground (CG) for the 1st person to achieve 
CG for a particular belief, vs. 2nd Party CG for the 2nd person to achieve CG for that 
same belief.   
 1st and 2nd Party CGs differ slightly in their configurations, but they have 
very similar demands for establishing a sense of sharedness and for establishing a 
sense of truth of the beliefs.  Some configurations are found to be potentially stable 
(based on a desirable and resolved state of affairs), while others are potentially 
unstable (based on a non-desired and unresolved state of affairs), depending on 
whether truth has been established in addition to sharedness.  As a further point of 
interest, we highlight and discuss the difference between written and spoken 
interactions in relation to the configurations of the beliefs. 
 Finally in Chapter 7, Describing and Characterising CG Configurations, we 
take a closer look at the configurations of the various shared beliefs/doubts in order to 
identify generic patterns of configurations.  A taxonomy of these configurations, 
classified according to the dual criteria of whether the configurations represent a 
resolved/unresolved state of affairs and of Party-type, is offered and the chapter ends 
with a cognitive model of the process in which potentially stable CG is established.  
The dissertation then closes with a summary of the main claims/contributions of the 









Mutual Knowledge, Background Knowledge,  
Shared Beliefs, Common Ground  





By adopting a God's eye view we think we can see what Ralph's real 
beliefs are even if he can't.  But what we forget when we try to construct a 
belief that is not entirely in Ralph's head is that we have only constructed 
it in our head. 
        Searle, 1983: 227 
 
 In the last chapter, we brought to your attention the need for further research 
on how common ground is established in written correspondence.  We observed that 
the notion of common ground is far from clear, judging by the current confusion of 
the term with the related notions of mutual knowledge, shared belief and 
common/background knowledge.  We also observed that most of the studies 
addressing these related issues so far deal either with spoken data or invented data.  
Little attention has been paid to authentic written data.   
 In this chapter, we offer a critical review of selected studies which have 
addressed some of the above issues in the past.  We shall focus in particular on the 
more important studies dealing with mutual knowledge, the Mutual Knowledge 
Paradox, shared belief and common ground.  We shall also make some general 
observations about the distinction between conversation and written correspondence.  
The purpose is to provide some form of background to our subsequent discussion of 
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the distinction between interactive spoken and written discourse in relation to 
information structure (Chapter 5) and shared belief (Chapter 6). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Early treatments of mutual knowledge 
 
 One of the earliest and important hints at the problems associated with mutual 
knowledge was probably expressed in Grice's (1957) seminal paper Meaning.  A 
restatement of the final version of Grice's original account of S-meaning is found in 
Schiffer (1972: 12 & 13): 
 
S meant something by (or in) uttering x iff S uttered x intending 
 
(1) that x have a certain feature(s) f ; 
(2) that a certain audience A recognise that x is f ; 
(3) that A infer at least in part from the fact x is f that S uttered x intending 
  (4) ; 
(4) that S's utterance of x produce a certain response r in A ; 
(5) that A's recognition of S's intention (4) shall function as at least part of  
  A's reason for his response r. 
 
 This account has been attacked by Strawson (1964) as unsatisfactory.  Schiffer 
(1972) expands on one of Strawson's counter-examples by showing how S can get A 
to believe that the house A is thinking of buying is rat-infested.  S does this by 
sneaking a big rat into the house in full view of A but A does not know that S intends 
A to watch S.  It is S's intention that A should (wrongly) infer that the house is rat-
infested.  In addition, Schiffer (1972: 17-18) claims that 
 
S further intends A to realise that given the nature of the rat's arrival, the 
existence of the  rat cannot be taken as a genuine or natural evidence that 
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the house is rat-infested; but S knows that A will believe that S would not 
so contrive to get A to believe the house is rat-infested unless S had very 
good reasons for thinking that it was, and so S expects and intends A to 
infer that the house is rat-infested from the fact that S is letting the rat 
loose with the intention of getting A to believe that the house is rat-
infested. 
 
 The above constitutes a counter-example because it shows that a minimum 
further condition of S's trying to communicate with A is that "he should not only 
intend A to recognise his intention to get A to think that p, but that he should also 
intend A to recognise his intention to get A to recognise his intention to get A to think 
that p" (Strawson, 1964: 447; cited in Schiffer, 1972: 18).  This suggests that a further 
condition needs to be  added and the condition is that S has the intention 
 
(6) that A should recognise S's intention (3). 
 
 Further counter-examples (e.g., the singing of "Moon over Miami") have been 
put forward to show that with further complications to the communication situation, 
other conditions need to be added, i.e., that S intends: 
 
(7) that A should recognise S's intention (5); 
(8) that A recognise S's intention (7). 
 
 In principle then, an infinite number of counter-examples can be constructed, 
requiring the addition of an infinite number of conditions to reflect the infinitely 
increasing number of S's intentions. 
 It is at this juncture that Schiffer (1972) offers a solution to the problem of 
infinite regression of intentions in the notion of mutual knowledge.  (See also Lewis 
(1969), who uses the term common knowledge for mutual knowledge; but note that we 
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use the term common knowledge differently.)  According to Schiffer, mutual 
knowledge provides "a necessary condition for performing an act of communication 
and a condition which will eliminate these counter-examples... without ... entailing a 
regressive series of intentions" but entailing "a quite harmless regress of the sort 
involved in knowing one knows that p" (p. 30).  In other words, Schiffer replaces the 
infinite regression of intentions with one of knowledge.  Hence, Schiffer defines 
mutual knowledge as such (pp. 30-31): 
 
  (Taking 'K*SAp' = df. 'S and A mutually know* that p') 
 
  K*SAp  iff 
  KSp   [S knows that p] 
  KAp 
  KSKAp 
  KAKSp 
  KSKAKSp 
  KAKSKAp 
  etc. 
 
 The now classic example cited by Schiffer (1972: 31) concerns A and B's 
mutual knowledge of the candle between them.  As the example goes, sitting at 
opposite ends of a table, A and B can see each other and the candle between them on 
the table.  A knows that there is a candle between them.  A also knows that B knows 
about the candle, since he can see B gazing at it.  Likewise, A knows that B knows 
that he knows about the candle between them, and so on. 
 Like Grice's original account of S-meaning, Schiffer's account of mutual 
knowledge has been criticised heavily as well (see Smith (1982) for a discussion).  
The chief reason has to do with Schiffer's assumption that his version of infinite 
regression is quite harmless.  According to Schiffer, the regression is harmless 
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because a set of conditions, F and G, can be defined within a finitely describable 
situation in order to infer mutual knowledge, where F and G is the quality/condition 
of being "normal" as a human being of average vision and intelligence.  The 
immediate problem that arises here is what constitutes "normality" as a human being.  
Are F and G the only two necessary conditions?  Notwithstanding this objection, 
Schiffer maintains that his proposed regression of knowledge does "not preclude us 
from providing sufficient conditions for an instance of S-meaning" (p. 41). 
 Another objection has to do with the use of knowledge as opposed to belief.  
Schiffer's formulation of mutual knowledge is based on the premise that there is an 
omniscient observer who knows what A and B know separately and what they know 
about each other's knowledge.  In reality, an external observer can never be able to 
know for sure whether mutual knowledge between two interactants is ever 
established.  All the observer can do is to infer from the interaction what he believes 
A and B believe.  It will do us well here to pay heed to Searle's remarks cited earlier. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2 Resolving the Mutual Knowledge Paradox 
 
 In this sub-section, we concentrate on Clark's and his colleagues' views and 
their solution to the Mutual Knowledge Paradox.  The reason for this focus on Clark's 
et al views is because they have written extensively on mutual knowledge and 
common ground over the past decade or so, making their position virtually the most 
developed in psychology to date.  According to Smith (1982), Clark and Carlson 
(1982) adopt a quasi-Schifferian position in which mutual belief is inferred via a finite 
induction schema.  This position represents a refined version of an earlier paper by 
Clark and Marshall (1981).  What is most notable, in our view, is the postulation of a 
finite induction schema similar to Schiffer's finite set of conditions which constrains 
the infinite regression of knowledge. 
 Clark et al (1981) reject other attempts at resolving the Mutual Knowledge 
Paradox, most notably those who argue that the infinity of statements made is in fact 
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only limited to a few statements (see also Clark, 1992, 1996).  For example, Bach and 
Harnish (1979: 309) limited mutual beliefs to three levels; Harder and Kock (1976: 
62) argue that "probably not even the most subtle mind ever makes replicative 
assumptions ... involving more levels than, say, six"; and Kaspar (1976: 24) doubted 
the need to go beyond "the first four or five orders" (cited in Clark, 1996: 100).  
 Clark's objection is understandable, considering that the above studies are 
based on introspective arguments arising from invented examples.  Harder and Kock 
(1976: 41), for example, admit that they "have chosen - arbitrarily - to include four 
levels in each series" (bold/emphasis added) of various situations of language use.  
Most notably, they (p.67) argue that in deceptive speech (as in their analysis of 
Grice's (1969) 'Tipperary' example), the "cut-off" point to the regression may be up to 
six levels.  We note, however, that such deceptive speech is hardly typical of normal 
day to day conversation.  Notwithstanding these objections, it seems to us that the 
problem here lies not so much with the principle that the infinity of statements can be 
limited to a few steps, but with the arbitrary way this has been done so far.  In Section 
3, we shall argue that this constraint on the infinite regression need not be done in an 
arbitrary way, as Brown's (1995) empirical study amply shows.  In fact, the whole 
point of Chapter 6 of our current study is to demonstrate in a systematic way that this 
regression is limited to a few steps in authentic written discourse.  Before we develop 
our arguments further, let us return to our discussion of Clark's solution to the Mutual 
Knowledge Paradox.  
 According to Clark et al (1981: 27), the Mutual Knowledge Paradox rests on 
two debatable assumptions (note that they are speaking about the relation between 
mutual knowledge and definite reference): 
 
Assumption 1:  A tries to make definite references that are felicitous 
Assumption 2: To make a felicitous reference, A must assure herself of each of 




In order to establish mutual knowledge, Assumptions 1 and 2 must first be met.  The 
objection to early attempts at cutting off statements beyond the first few levels is that 
these proposed truncation heuristics (p. 28-32) will result in the violation of 
Assumption 1.  Clark et al (1981) argue that by cutting off the statements beyond the 
first few levels, full mutual knowledge of the referent will be impeded, making it 
impossible to guarantee felicitous definite reference.  They argue further that even if 
they allow for additional levels to be incorporated in order to secure mutual 
knowledge, the "recursive statements about propositional attitudes are [still] ... 
difficult to grasp", because "their content appears to be inherently hard to keep track 
of" (ibid. p. 31).  In contrast, they argue that their co-presence heuristics offer a way 
to securing mutual knowledge without violating Assumptions 1 and 2, and without 
recourse to recursive statements, thus guaranteeing felicitous definite reference (i.e., 
there is no possibility of the hearer misunderstanding the intended referent of the 
definite referring expression since the reference is made on the infallible basis of 
mutual knowledge). 
 The following equation (Clark, 1992: 35; modified) (originally Clark and 
Marshall, 1981) best summarises Clark's et al position: 
 
   Evidence       + 
 
   Assumptions   +    Induction 
Schema 
=   Mutual Knowledge 
Co-presence 
Heuristics 
1.  Physical 
2.  Linguistic 
3.  Community 
     Membership 
 
1.  Simultaneity 
2.  Attention 
3.  Rationality 
4.  Locatability 
5.  Recallability 
       etc. 
A mechanism for 
inferring mutual 
knowledge based on 
G 
 
  Ground (G) 
 
The above equation shows that mutual knowledge is determined based on the 
interaction of evidence, assumptions and the Mutual Knowledge Induction Schema.  
The three types of evidence constitute the co-presence heuristics from which mutual 
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knowledge is inferred via the Induction Schema.  The three types of evidence are:  
physical co-presence, linguistic co-presence and community membership.  With 
physical co-presence, what is needed is evidence of "triple co-presence" of A, B and 
the object of their mutual knowledge (as in Schiffer's candle-on-the-table example).  
With linguistic co-presence, evidence of A, B and the linguistic positing of the object 
of mutual belief is needed.  An example of this is when A tells B, "I bought a candle 
today", such that "each is aware that A has posited the existence of the candle by 
linguistic means", and that "each is aware that the other was attending to the speech 
act" (Clark et al, 1982: 7).  Finally, physical and linguistic co-presence are themselves 
"submerged in a sea of mutual belief based on community membership" (ibid. p.7).  
Their use of the term community membership is similar to our use of the term 
background/common knowledge. 
 They also claim that different assumptions (1-3) are made depending on the 
state of the interlocutors' minds, arising from physical co-presence, as in the candle-
on-the-table example: 
 
1. Simultaneity (A and B are looking at each other and the candle  
   simultaneously) 
2. Attention (A assumes that B is not just looking at the candle and her, but  
   attending to them as well) 
3. Rationality (A assumes that B is rational like him in drawing the same  
   conclusions) 
 
Other assumptions (like 4 and 5 below) are made depending on the status of the 







 The balance of the evidence and assumptions form the basis or ground G on 
which mutual knowledge is established.  And based on this ground G, it is claimed 
that by applying the Mutual Knowledge Induction Schema, we will then be able to 
infer whether mutual knowledge (and its infinity of conditions) has been established.   
 Clark (1992: 33-34) states the Mutual Knowledge Induction Schema as: 
 
A and B mutually know that p if and only if some state of affairs G holds such that: 
 
1. A and B have reason to believe that G holds. 
2. G indicates to A and B that each has reason to believe that G holds. 
3. G indicates to A and B that p. 
 
where G is the ground (triple physical co-presence + assumptions), and p is the 
proposition/belief that there is a candle between them.  Note that Condition 2 is 
reflexive. 
 By using this Induction Schema, Clark (1992: 34) argues that mutual 
knowledge can then be treated as "a single mental entity instead of an infinitely long 
list of even more complex mental entities", thereby satisfying Assumption 1 
(regarding the felicity of definite expressions) and easing the demand of Assumption 
2 (regarding the need for an infinite list of statements in order to make a felicitous 
definite reference).  (Recall that Clark et al claim that the truncation heuristics 
proposed by others failed on both counts.)   
 Hence, following Harman (1977), Clark argues that the infinite number of 
statements involved in mutual knowledge can now be represented as a single self-
referential statement, a "mental primitive[s] of the form A and B mutually know that 
p" along with "the inference rule: If A and B mutually believe that p, then: (a) A and 
B believe that p and believe that (a)" [bold added], by-passing the first two steps in 
Schiffer's definition of mutual knowledge, and allowing the speaker and addressee to 
infer mutual knowledge (see also Cohen, 1978, for a similar representation).  The 
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treatment of mutual knowledge as a mental primitive also makes redundant the need 
for postulating recursive statements which are inherently difficult to keep track of 
anyway.  All that is needed now for inferring that mutual knowledge has been 
established is to make sure that a proper basis/ground G which satisfies all three 
requirements of the Induction Schema is established (Clark, 1992: 33). 
 However, Clark (1992: 6) also maintains that mutual knowledge can be held at 
varying degrees of conviction, depending on the nature of the evidence available.  
Note the contradiction between his claim that the Mutual Knowledge Induction 
Schema can be used to infer mutual knowledge, thus satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, 
and guaranteeing definite reference, and the claim that mutual knowledge is variable.  
How can something that is in itself variable "guarantee" something else from varying?  
In a review of Clark's book, Arenas of Language Use, Brown (1994: 212) expresses a 
similar skepticism of Clark's rejection of the truncation heuristics in favour of the co-
presence heuristics.   
 We should add, in Clark's defence, that he (1992: 5-6) categorically denies 
that a person's mental representation of mutual knowledge or mutual beliefs (his 
terminology) is based on "an infinitely long list of statements or even a truncated list".  
Rather, a person "can represent mutual knowledge or mutual beliefs fully and 
accurately in an elementary form", which we have seen above is the mental primitive 
he proposes.  However, Clark's continued use of the term 'mutual knowledge' (up to 
his 1992 book) only confuses the situation even though he claims he doesn't use it in 
the philosophical sense.  But note the similarity of his induction schema with 
Schiffer's finite set of conditions which is used to address the Mutual Knowledge 
(philosophical sense) Paradox.  Note too Clark's et al (1981) interest in "guaranteeing" 
felicitous definite reference and the process of inferring mutual knowledge, 
reminiscent of Schiffer's proposal.   
 Because of all this confusion with the term 'mutual knowledge', Clark (1996) 
abandons the term in favour of the term 'common ground' in his lastest book (but see 
discussion below of CG-iterated in Section 4).  However, it appears to us that for 
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Clark to exonerate himself of the terminological confusion entirely, he needs to do 
more than just switch labels.  He has to, in our view, rework his concepts of the 
Mutual Knowledge Induction Schema, the mental primitive and its associated 
inference rule as well (see Chapter 7, Section 4 for further discussion of this point). 
 For example, although Clark's et al solution to the Mutual Knowledge Paradox 
is elegant and powerful, it is fraught with several difficulties.  We highlight some of 
these difficulties below. 
 One criticism is that Clark and Carlson's analysis is essentially concerned with 
"situations of actual or potential co-presence, as when two people observe an object 
lying between them or go to a cinema together" (Wilks, 1986: 268).  The problem is 
that not many real situations require assumptions of real co-presence.  And as Wilks 
(ibid.) observes further, 
 
For all other cases, belief is a matter of cognitive solipism [sic]:  I truly 
believe that you believe the world is round (rather than flat) just as I do.  
But this is my belief, not yours, and I am unlikely to have or have ever had 
any direct evidence of the matter. 
 
In the above quotation, Wilks argues that situations involving actual or potential co-
presence are hardly typical of many speech situations.  The above quotation also 
shows that in the everyday solipsistic world, we have no guarantees that interlocutors 
know what each other knows, especially in situations without physical co-presence.  
Such assumptions about interlocutors' knowledge about each other are fallible and 
hence, "ex hypothesi, are not 'mutual knowledge'" (ibid.).  Therefore, the more 
appropriate term to use is shared belief, being the more realistic goal in day-to-day 
communication than mutual knowledge (see Section 3 below for further comments). 
 Even if we do concede that physical co-presence (+ certain assumptions) may 
act as the secure ground on which mutual knowledge is to be inferred in certain 
limited situations, we are still wary of Clark's et al use of the notion of physical co-
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presence. Surely, the outcome of physical co-presence, using Clark's et al notion of 
mutual knowledge, is in itself the result of a potentially infinite series of gazes and 
counter-gazes at the candle and at the other person gazing at the same candle.   
 In looking at the candle between them, A knows that there is a candle.  He 
knows that B knows that there is a candle because he can see B looking at it.  He 
knows that B knows that he knows that there is a candle between them because he is 
aware that B can see him and is equally able, like him, to track the direction of his 
gaze, and so on.  In other words, there is a covert interaction (of eye gazes) here.   
 The question then is how far this awareness of each other's awareness of the 
candle is embedded.  Technically speaking, they may well gaze at each other and the 
candle forever, if establishing mutual knowledge of the candle is indeed the goal of 
each other's gazing.  Therefore, what Clark et al postulate to be the ground (physical 
co-presence) for mutual knowledge is in itself embroiled in a paradoxically infinite 
series of gazes and counter-gazes.  Using this as the ground for inferring mutual 
knowledge of the candle only embeds a paradox within another.  Therefore Clark's 
solution cannot be correct. 
 Clark is also aware of the pitfall of his reflexive conceptualisation of mutual 
knowledge which includes circular self-reference (see, for example, Condition 2 of 
the Induction Schema, and the inference rule of his proposed mental primitive above).  
But he argues that self-reference is only a problem if we subscribe to the brand of 
traditional logic where self-reference is said to lead to "such paradoxes as the liar's 
paradox and Russell's paradox".  On the contrary, he argues further that self-reference 
is now "a legitimate part of certain logics and is no longer an issue" (see, for example, 
Barwise (1989) and Barwise et al (1986); cited in Clark (1996: 100)).  However, we 
remain to be convinced that these two instances of self-reference have no effect on 
Clark's goal of "guaranteed" felicitous definite reference. 
 By introducing an Induction Schema and the inference rule associated with the 
mental primitive to resolve the Mutual Knowledge Paradox, Clark is in fact 
introducing another uncertainty/paradox into his  argument, as Carroll ([1895] 1995) 
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argued in his thought-provoking paper What the Tortoise said to Achilles a hundred 
years ago - the topic of which is still warmly debated amongst philosophers today 
(see, for example, a recent issue of Mind, October 1995).  Similarly, in invoking an 
induction schema to explain away a paradox, Clark et al have in fact invoked an 
homunculus (the little person in the head) to explain thinking.  As Haugeland (1981: 
4) rightly points out, invoking such an homunculus begs its own question because 
"the homunculus itself has to think, and that thinking has not been explained".  We're 
of course not suggesting that there are easy explanations of the Tortoise's puzzle, nor 
of that little person's thinking; we're merely pointing out the obstacles to any attempt 
at developing an account of communication as risk-free, as Clark's account seems to 
suggest.  Brown (1995: 219) expresses a similar sentiment regarding this difficulty 
with Clark's position. 
 It seems to us then that, forced to choose between the reflexive 
conceptualisation of Clark's argument and the replicative assumptions of adherents of 
limited regression of knowledge/beliefs, the latter may well be the lesser of the two 
"evils".  The choice seems to be between a view of communication which regards 
mutual knowledge as a basic goal of people (in Clark's case, mutual knowledge is to 
be inferred) and a view of communication which does not regard mutual knowledge, 
whatever its attraction of guaranteed success may be, as the goal of people.  We don't 
think that the notion of mutual knowledge is necessary in an account of successful 
communication.  We believe that the weaker notion of shared knowledge or beliefs 
may be more helpful.  But how are we to reconcile this weak view with the apparent 
ease with which people seem to be able to communicate successfully on a routine 
basis? 
 So far, we have only been theorising about the mutual knowledge problem and 
the current impasse.  Perhaps, a more productive way of exploring this issue is to look 
at authentic data, specifically at what ordinary people do in every day communication.  
In the next sub-section, we shall examine one such attempt at exploring how people 




3 Limited recursion of knowledge/beliefs 
 
 Drawing from her Map Task data, Brown (1995) attempts to shed light on the 
above problem.  In the Map Task, two subjects, A and B, are given slightly different 
maps.  They are both told that A's map is the correct one and that A's task is to guide 
B through the landscape on the map.  During the task, they sit at opposite ends of a 
table.  A low partition divides the table such that they are able to see each other but 
not each other's map.  They are to communicate orally.  The following extract is taken 
from two lines of one such pair's interaction (Brown's (1995: 224-225) example 7g, 
here renamed/renumbered as (Eg. 1)).  For this particular example, we have added the 
configurations based in part on Brown's account.  The system of configuring the 
beliefs is Brown's (1995; see pp. 48-49 for a detailed explanation of her system). 
 
 (Eg. 1) 
        B B/A B/A/B 
 1 A: you start below the palm beach right +   + 
 2 B: +  right    +   +     + 
 
In the text, as opposed to the configuration matrix, a '+' indicates a short pause of 
about half a second.  In the configuration matrix, a '+' in the first column indicates that 
B believes that the referent referred to (in this case, 'palm beach') is on her map.  A '+' 
in the second column (B/A) indicates that B believes that A believes that the palm 
beach is on B's map.  A '+' in the third column (B/A/B) indicates that B believes that 
A believes that B believes that the palm beach is on B's map.  By configuration, we 
mean the particular arrangement or pattern of values of the regression of a particular 
belief (in the above case, the belief that B believes that the palm beach is on her map).  
This is indicated by a single row of values (see above, either line 1 or 2).  By 
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configuration matrix, we refer to the whole set of configurations.  In the above, this 
is depicted by all the values indicated on both lines. 
 Let us consider the above data from B's point of view.  In line 1, when A  
refers to the referent 'palm beach' for the first time, B believes that A believes (or 
takes for granted) that she has it on her map (B/A +).  B of course knows whether or 
not she has it on her own map since she has the map in front of her.  We know B has 
it on her map because she says so in line 2 (hence, the first column is configured B +).  
When B says right in line 2, she is in fact telling A that she has located the palm 
beach.  The result is that she now believes that A believes (or has good reason to 
believe) that she believes that she has the palm beach on her map (B/A/B +).  In other 
words, for B to concede that the palm beach is shared information, there has to be 
three steps in the recursion of beliefs.  This example and several others in Brown 
(1995) lend support to the view that a limited recursion of three steps is necessary 
for establishing shared beliefs.  It is on this basis that Brown (1995: 227) concludes 
that "participants do constantly use steps 1-3 in their interpretations".  She cites only 
one example in which a participant utilises step 4, and declares that "it seems quite 
impossible, in this data, to find evidence that speakers are utilising any further depth 
of recursion" (p. 227). 
 Brown is of course acutely aware of the possible limitations of the findings 
arising from the restricted nature of her Map Task data.  Her conclusion is also based 
solely on the tracking of reference.  But in the absence of contradictory empirical 
evidence, it is hard to dispute her claim that a limited recursion of belief does indeed 
take place.  Brown's finding also suggests that mutual knowledge is not an issue at all 
for her subjects.  Their primary concern seems to be with establishing shared beliefs.  
Therefore, the issue of how an individual processes the infinite recursion of 
statements involved in mutual knowledge in human-size memory is not an empirical 
issue.  Neither is there a need to postulate a heuristic to account for how people infer 
mutual knowledge.  Therefore, Brown's account contradicts Clark's view which is 
based on mutual knowledge. 
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 The pressing concern now is the need to analyse more data, particularly those 
of naturally occurring every day speech.  There is also the need to look at interactive 
written data.  In order to facilitate this process, the configuration technique pioneered 
by Brown can be enriched and developed further in order to analyse propositional 
content (in addition to tracking reference).   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4 Common ground 
 
 The term common ground has been used interchangeably with other related 
concepts by various scholars in order to facilitate their respective preference of use 
and expedience of argumentation.  Sometimes, common ground is equated with 
mutual knowledge.  For example, Clark (1992: 6) himself writes that he uses the term 
common ground in place of mutual knowledge to avoid the confusion (i.e., the infinite 
regression debate) associated with mutual knowledge (see also, Clark and Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986).  Horton and Keysar (1996: 94) too use common ground 
interchangeably with mutual knowledge.  Note that they use the term mutual 
knowledge to refer to that which is made known by physical co-presence (cf. Clark et 
al, 1981).  It is not immediately clear to us if this "loose" use of mutual knowledge, 
common ground and physical co-presence in such an interchangeable way reflects a 
general "laxness" with terminological precision or a more fundamental and deeper 
conceptual confusion (see discussion below). 
 Common ground has also been used as a larger umbrella term to cover various 
combinations of related concepts.  For example, Greene et al (1994) practically equate 
it with the three sorts of ground: community membership, physical co-presence and 
linguistic co-presence - covering just about everything Clark mentions in his co-
presence heuristics.   
 Clark also uses it as an all-inclusive term.  In Clark (1992: 6), he writes that 
common ground "covers mutual knowledge, mutual beliefs, mutual assumptions, and 
other mutual attitudes" (see also Clark et al, 1983).  Elsewhere, he offers another but 
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similar definition: "Two people's common ground is, in effect, the sum of their 
mutual, common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions" (Clark, 1996: 93).  
Note that here, he subsumes mutual knowledge under the larger term common 
ground, whereas previously, mutual knowledge is equated and used interchangeably 
with common ground.  As we have also argued earlier, mutual knowledge is an 
idealised state which is not attainable even by his own Induction Schema.  Note that 
Clark uses the term mutual instead of shared, to reflect the certainty which he ascribes 
to some of the notions on his list.   
 Having listed the key items to be included under the umbrella term common 
ground, he expands on his exposition by adding the further dimension of 
representations of common ground.  The three representations postulated appear to be 
three stages in the development of common ground, where each higher stage is 
derived from the previous one (see Clark (1996: 94-95) for a discussion of this).  In 
fact, if we look closely at his three representations of common ground (CG-shared 
basis, CG-reflexive and CG-iterated), they are really recast versions of his own 
Mutual Knowledge Induction Schema, the inference rule associated with the mental 
primitive, and the philosophical notion of mutual knowledge respectively.  (Note that 
CG is short for common ground.)  The implication here is that there are three levels of 
attainment of common ground.  Level 1 is attained if the Induction Schema is applied.  
Level 2 can only be attained by applying the inference rule associated with the mental 
primitive.  Level 3 is the ultimate level whose "attainment" can only be inferred from 
the first two levels.  If we accept the conceptualisation of common ground in such 
progressive steps, does it mean too that we can conceptualise background knowledge, 
mutual belief and mutual assumption (and other related terms used interchangeably 
with common ground so far) in progressive steps as well?  Such a conceptualisation 
will only lead to further proliferation of terms and confusion. 
 We believe our discussion above depicts accurately the current situation with 
the use of the term common ground.  This lack of precision with the use of the term 
reflects, in our view, a fundamental confusion at the conceptual level of the notion of 
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common ground and the other notions associated with it.  This conceptual confusion 
lies in part in the lack of the distinction between knowledge and belief, and between 
that which is shared, common or mutual (see Chapter 1, Section 3 for a discussion).   
 In all the papers cited above in this section, anything which has a vague sense 
of 'something being held in common' (whatever this means) is considered common 
ground.  As such, background/common knowledge arising from community 
membership (part of Clark's co-presence heuristics) is common ground or is part of 
common ground.  Recall my example (in Chapter 1, Section 3) about my background 
knowledge that my brother and I know the relative locations of London and 
Edinburgh even though we have never discussed their locations before.  Going by the 
use of the term common ground in the above papers, this background knowledge is 
therefore part of our common ground.  If my brother and I discuss the relative 
locations of the cities one day, then that background knowledge becomes a shared 
belief, which is also part of our common ground.  Surely both background knowledge 
and shared belief, whatever their similarities may be to the non-expert, must be 
treated as information with very distinct cognitive status.  This distinction becomes all 
the more important to us (as linguists or psychologists) if our claims about how 
common ground affects communication are to be taken seriously.  We must be careful 
not to confuse the distinct cognitive status of various pieces of information which 
appear to be held vaguely in common with common ground.  What is needed is a 
more precise and consistent use of the term common ground and its related notions.  
We shall proceed to address this concern below. 
 As we have argued above, we remain to be convinced that common ground, if 
used as an all-embracing term, can be conceptualised in terms of progressive steps of 
attainment as well.  We are, however, perfectly happy with merely listing the types of 
information which may be included under this cover term.  But we are concerned that 
this all-embracing term should not be used to cover just about any related notion, 
especially that which we have argued to be psychologically untenable.  The following 
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is a list of the types of information we think may be included under the term common 
ground (the list is not meant to be exhaustive): 
 
 1. Established CG : shared belief/knowledge 
 2. Assumed CG  : background/common knowledge/belief 
 
 We offer two "categories" of common ground.  The first category includes 
those beliefs and knowledge which are established in the course of the interaction, 
whether verbal or written.  These beliefs/knowledge are considered shared, and are 
therefore considered part of the established common ground  The second "category" 
is, strictly speaking, not common ground since they have not been established during 
the discourse.  However, such background knowledge, for example, is often assumed 
by people to be held in common by virtue of other sources of evidence, apart from 
that arising from interaction.   
 We reiterate that the distinction between established and assumed common 
ground is important, as our London-Edinburgh example shows.  We have excluded 
mutual knowledge from our list because we do not believe it is attainable.   
 Later in Chapter 5 on Information structure and common ground, we shall 
argue that there is another "category" to our list above, i.e., 
 
 3. As though CG : new belief 
 
This refers to a new belief which the writer treats as though it is part of the reader's 
background knowledge or shared belief even though it is clearly a new belief to the 
reader.  Once again, the third "category" is, strictly speaking, not common ground, but 
is treated as though it is part of the reader's common ground.  We shall return to this 
issue in Chapter 5, Section 3. 
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 In the next and last section, we move from our discussion of knowledge and 
beliefs to a general discussion of the difference between conversation and written 
correspondence. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
5 Conversation and written correspondence 
 
 We are concerned, in this section, with the distinction between spoken and 
written interaction, and not so much with the more basic phonemic-graphemic 
distinction of the language code.  Writing from an educational context, Alderson et al 
(1984) state that the standard view of the relationship between spoken and written 
language abilities is often described in terms of a monologue situation, as the 
following table shows. 
 

















     (Adapted from Alderson et al, 1984: 227) 
 
 Alderson's et al view of language as monologue is of course outdated even in 
1984, but it has, as they point out, at least the virtue of singling out the similarity 
between listening and reading, in that both are receptive skills.  Their view of 
language leaves out a significant realm of language use arising essentially from 
interaction.  Note that in standard philosophical accounts, although this interaction is 
taken into consideration, the "canonical situation of utterance", as Lyons (1977) calls 
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it, is one in which a single speaker addresses a single addressee whose main role 
seems to be to take in the information passively.  The speaker plays the dynamic 
prime agent in the interaction.  However, in many situations, the listener may well be 
the "prime mover" of the interaction, as Brown (1994: 213) points out (e.g., a 
discussion between a client and a travel agent).  Therefore in our view, the 
relationship between spoken and written language use has to be considered in the light 
of this expanded view of communication which is dynamic and interactive. 
 There are important differences between spoken and written language.  
Spoken language, whether in everyday conversation or in making a speech, differs 
from written language in that it , in varying degrees, has recourse to prosody and 
paralinguistic cues like facial expressions, gestures and gait not normally available to 
written language.  On the other hand, written language offers the opportunity for 
visual persistence in that it allows the reader to read, linger on and re-read the text 
more deeply in a way the listener can't with spoken language, unless someone records 
the speech on tape. 
 There are of course complications to these basic observations when we allow 
for additional circumstances.  For example, visual persistence normally available to 
written text may be hampered by situations where reading has to be done under strict 
time control, as in reading the credits at the end of a film or under more bizarre 
psycholinguistics experimental conditions.  Or, consider the increasingly popular use 
of the Email system to "talk" on the Internet, when in fact only writing and reading is 
involved.  Or indeed, multi-media packages on the computer involving the use of the 
four skills of reading, listening, writing and speaking in a single speech event.  In fact, 
people have been doing this for a long time in more modest and commonplace speech 
situations like when a teacher conducts a tutorial in class.  All four skills are involved. 
 For our purpose here, we are primarily interested in the difference between 
spoken and written discourse in interactive situations - in particular the difference 
between conversation and written correspondence.  Both conversation and written 
correspondence often involve goal-driven production of discourse directed at an 
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equally non-passive goal-centred addressee who not only listens/reads purposefully 
and selectively, but also offers pointed feedback which further shapes this 
collaborative enterprise.  However, several differences between the two come to 
mind. 
 Firstly, whereas in conversation, the feedback (both oral feedback and 
paralinguistic cues) is immediate, in written correspondence, it can be delayed from 
several days to weeks (or more).  Although it is true that the long time lag can affect 
memory of the propositional content negotiated, the visual permanence of the letters 
compensates for a need to hold in memory large chunks of information for prolonged 
period.  The permanent record of texts makes it possible for the reader to call to mind 
the propositions expressed in the utterances of the letters written some time ago so 
that they can be considered again with the expanding context without the effects of 
lapses in memory.  This virtual memory is an important factor in considering the 
difference between processing spoken and written texts. 
 On the other hand, although this permanence of record allows for the virtual 
memory of previous utterances in written correspondence, it does not mean that the 
reader of the letters will necessarily pay attention to all available information.  In 
conversation, if the speaker asks for a particular piece of information during her turn 
of speaking, she would expect an answer from the hearer when the hearer takes his 
turn to speak.  Otherwise, the hearer may be deemed to be uncooperative in Gricean 
terms.  In written correspondence, each letter, as in our case, can be long and often 
raises several issues.  The reader, in his reply, can and often does choose to respond to 
only some of these issues, while ignoring others without appearing uncooperative.   
 This is not to suggest that in conversation it is not possible for the hearer to 
ignore the communicative demands of the speaker.  Rather, the need for an immediate 
response in conversation makes the uncooperative gesture more glaring.  In writing, 
the lack of this face-to-face confrontation makes the omission on the reader's part 
less immediate and obvious, especially since the reader has already attended to the 
other issues raised in the previous letter, giving the illusion of "total" co-operation.  In 
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other words, the writer, in responding to a previous letter, can appear to be co-
operative when in fact, he is evasive and only "sufficiently co-operative" for his 
current purpose.  (This brings to mind a similar practice in spoken interaction - that of 
politicians giving long and largely irrelevant answers to questions raised by reporters 
so as to use up any remaining time for other questions rapidly, while giving the 
illusion that they have been fully co-operative during the entire interview.) 
 Thirdly, because letters written are often long and cover several points at a 
time, we can construe each letter as being a lengthy turn in the exchange.  This mega-
turn often covers several points which would normally take several turns to 
accomplish in conversation.   
 In writing an extended text, Widdowson (1984: 220) envisages the situation as 
one in which the writer can be said to conduct "a covert interaction whereby he 
anticipates the likely reactions of an imagined reader and negotiates with him as it 
were by proxy, by the vicarious assumption of the second person role" [bold added].  
He cites the following constructed example of "the beginning of a discussion on the 
relevance of role in the understanding of social behaviour" (pp. 220-221): 
 
A: The basic psychological function of roles is to provide the individual with a 
fairly specific model of interaction. 
B: Why do you say it's a model? 
A: It is a model in the sense that any role is defined in terms of its relation to other 
roles. 
B: I'm still not quite clear.  Give me an example. 
A: The role of parent is defined in relation to that of children. 
B: O.K.  I'm with you.  Now go on to tell me about roles. 
 
which Widdowson claims may be the discourse underlying the following text in 




The basic psychological function of roles is to provide the individual with 
a fairly specific model for interaction.  It is a model in the sense that any 
role is defined in terms of its relation to other roles, as the role of 'parent', 
for example, is defined in relation to that of children.  Each role is 
associated with what, for the moment, is best called norms of 'behaviour'. 
 
 Notwithstanding the contrived nature of Widdowson's constructed underlying 
discourse of Kelvin's expository text, the point made is valid nevertheless in that in 
writing, given the observation that the interaction is not face-to-face, the writer has to 
imagine and anticipate her reader's possible questions/objections to her earlier points, 
such that the text appears to be a projection of not only her intended message but also 
to pre-empt any imagined and possible objections her reader may raise.   
 Similarly, such an extensive coverage of content in the context of a letter will 
mean that the number of letters going back and forth between the two parties will be 
minimised.   
 In conversation, the ease with which immediate feedback is made available in 
face-to-face interaction makes this constant to-ing and fro-ing between turns more 
tolerable than in written correspondence.  As such, the speaker may feel less 
compelled to pre-empt all the possible and major objections her hearer may raise 
against her contribution.  The speaker may well adopt a "take-it-as-it-comes" attitude.   
 In other words, in written correspondence, the goal of the writer may be to 
cover as much ground as possible in as few letters (or turns) as possible.  In 
conversation where there is a constraint on short-term memory and the relative ease 
with which feedback is given and received, economising on the number of turns taken 
to cover the same ground seems to be less of a priority. 
 Our final comment on the difference between written and spoken interaction is 
a more specific one related to the genre of our written data.  Our data comprises a set 
of official correspondence exchanged between a prospective student and a university 
supervisor.  We would therefore expect the style to be more formal than, say informal 
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messages on the fridge door meant for other members of the family.  It is commonly 
held that official correspondence requires a more formal structure, format and layout 
(see, for example, Bovee and Thill, 1992, or any basic textbook on business 
communication).  It would be interesting to see, for example, if the packaging of the 
referring expressions in our set of letters is affected by this need for greater formality 
(see Chapter 5, Section 1 for a discussion). 
 In examining our data, we should keep in mind these differences when we 
analyse our set of eight letters in terms of its interpretation, information structure and 
the building of common ground.  A lot of research has been done based on 
conversation data.  It would be interesting to compare some of these findings resulting 
from the spoken data with that of our written data.  We draw your attention to the 
results of the comparisons made in the following chapters.  See Chapter 5 for a 
comparison of Yule's (1981) account of spoken discourse with our account of written 
data in relation to the issue of information structure and the attenuation of referring 
expressions used.  See Chapter 6 for a comparison of our CG configurations with the 




 In this chapter, we offer an extended discussion of some of the key notions 
and issues related to the establishment of common ground.  In the next few chapters, 
we shall flesh out the details of our notion of common ground and of how common 
ground is established in the course of the exchange of the letters in our data.  We shall 
begin our analysis by examining how utterances are interpreted in the expanding 
context of the on-going exchange of letters.  The purpose of doing this is to examine 
the process in which the Base Propositions (BPs; described in Chapter 1, Section 4) 







Interpreting Utterances  





 The purpose of this chapter is to offer a systematic account of how utterances 
are interpreted in interactive extended written discourse.  In particular, we examine 
how the expanding context of a complete set of letters affects the reader's generation 
and organisation of inferences related to his perception of what the writer's intention 
may be.  Using the criterion of the writer's intention in constraining our generation of 
inferences, we demonstrate that the interpretation of utterances is not static but 
changing, especially in the light of feedback obtained from the writer.   
 We also consider how the reader's intention in reading affects this 
interpretative process, necessitating the further considerations of what the reader 
deems to be an adequate (as opposed to correct) interpretation and the level/depth of 
understanding he wishes to attain for his current purpose.   
 Finally, we examine how the interpretation of these utterances relates to the 
establishment of key propositions (Base Propositions; BPs) negotiated in the course 
of the correspondence.  We demonstrate how these BPs may have been ordered by a 
and b in accordance with their respective goals and pragmatic reasoning schemas.  
We argue that their different reasoning schemas influence the way they try to 
establish the last BP eventually. 
 We begin our discussion in Section 1 below by describing the theoretical basis 
of our analyses in Sections 2 and 3.  We shall also define some of the key terms to be 




1 Theoretical underpinnings 
 
1.1 Process of interpretation 
 
 We use as our basis for the generation of inferences and the constraining of 
this generation of inferences the criterion of the writer's intention in writing; or to be 
more specific, we mean the reader's perception of what the writer's intention is.   
 According to Vonk and Noordman (1990: 447), text understanding involves 
the "constructing [of] a coherent representation of the information in [the] text".  The 
problem is that a text often contains more information than what is explicitly 
expressed.  This implied information then has to be computed.  This computing of 
that which is implied would involve the process of generating inferences.  However, 
it has also been widely recognised that if we allow all the possible inferences of a text 
to be generated, we are likely to be faced with a infinite barrage of inferences.  
Obviously in every day discourse, people do not generate all possible inferences 
when they interpret an utterance.  This has to be so because reading/listening to a 
simple utterance made by another party will otherwise take an unbearably long and 
complicated process of decoding.  In fact, evidence from the rapid flow and intake of 
information particularly in face-to-face conversation, indicates that this potential 
proliferation of inferences must have somehow been constrained dramatically both in 
terms of its quantity and rate of generation.  So far, there has been a fair amount of 
consensus that there must be a constraint on the process of inference generation.  The 
answer, however, to the question of how the mind constrains the potential explosion 
of inferences is varied and far from unanimous. 
 A standard way of approaching this question is to examine particular 
utterances (whether invented or authentic) and attempt to list some of the inferences 
which are likely to be generated in interpreting them.  These inferences can then be 
labelled and a system of classification based on certain criteria may be imposed on 
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them to offer some light on the nature of inferencing and interpretation.  In the field 
of research of Philosophy of Language, interest (selected references to follow) has 
centred on the notions of entailment (Anderson and Belnap, 1975; Schnitzer, 1971), 
presupposition (Karttunen, 1973; Gazdar, 1979), implicature (Grice, 1975; 1978), 
indirect speech acts (Searle, 1975), etc.  In the field of Psycholinguistics, interest has 
tended to centre on the nature of the distinction between on-line (spontaneous) and 
off-line (on-demand) inferences (Vonk and Noordman, 1990; Bloom et al, 1990; 
Graesser et al, 1994), necessary (for coherence) vs. optional inferences (O’Brien et al, 
1988), clearly deducible vs. possible inferences (Harris and Monaco, 1978), forward 
vs. backward inferences (Duffy, 1986), etc.  So we see in the above the interplay of 
various criteria - logical deducibility, intentionality, automaticity of activation, 
coherence, necessity/optionality, directionality - for classifying inferences.  The 
plethora of labels and criteria for classification has shed valuable light on various 
aspects of the nature of inferencing and interpretation, but a purely descriptive 
account of the possible types of inferences that can or may be generated does not in 
itself answer a priori the question of why and how certain inferences are or should be 
constrained in the first place. 
 Herein lies the paradox.  If a writer expresses something indirectly, the reader 
has to first access the intermediate inferences which bridge the literal interpretation of 
the utterance to its intended and eventual meaning before he can work out the 
intended meaning of the utterance.  But how is the same reader to decide which 
bridging inferences to (not) generate without first identifying the writer's possible 
intended meaning?  We believe this Catch-22 scenario is a serious obstacle to the 
development of a theory of coherence and inferencing.  We would, however, like to 
argue that this paradox is more apparent than real because we know that in ordinary 
day-to-day conversation, people do in general communicate successfully (or 
adequately) most of the time.  Otherwise, normal day-to-day conversations would be 
frustrating, to say the least.   
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 We believe that the paradox is an issue if and only if we work within a view 
of communication which has to be fail-proof and risk-free.  But if we accept a view of 
communication, although largely successful, as an essentially risky enterprise, the 
paradox may be resolved.   
 In reality, people are unlikely to be always sure of other people's intended 
meaning.  On hearing an utterance, the hearer is likely to first make a literal 
interpretation of the utterance.  He is then likely to construct a hypothesis of what the 
speaker's intended meaning may be, and generate the appropriate bridging inferences 
relevant to this hypothesis.  If a logical link can be made, the hypothesis is reinforced 
and accepted.  But if there is a problem with the link, then the hypothesis is either 
suspended upon clarification, revised or dropped in favour of another, which will in 
turn generate another chain of facilitative inferences.  In this sense then, there is a sort 
of creative tension between the hearer's perception of the speaker's intended meaning 
and the bridging inferences he needs to make in order to arrive "logically' at this 
intended interpretation.  The two forces act as complementary forces in this 
negotiation towards meaning. 
 We shall outline our conception of what this “hypothetical-deductive” 
reasoning procedure may include: 
 
    Process of Interpretation 
 Initial -----> Hypothesis -----> Intermediate -----> Eventual 
   formation 
 
 Stated info a REQUEST?  Facilitative  Convers 
      inferences  implicature 
 
 (Note:  info = information;  Convers = Conversational) 
 
 For example, if John feels cold and wants his friend, Jane, to shut the window 
next to her, he may say, "It's freezing in here".  Jane's process of interpretation of 
John's utterance may go something like this:  John states literally that the room is 
cold.  Jane hypothesises that John may be requesting her to shut the window near her, 
52 
 
or he may be just stating his impression of the temperature of the room.  Jane may 
decide tentatively, based on her background knowledge of John and of the 
conventions for making requests, to adopt the first hypothesis.  Jane may then use the 
stated information arising from her literal "interpretation"/decoding of John's 
utterance to draw the following facilitative/bridging inferences - shutting the window 
will keep the cold air out; she is sitting by the window; it is more convenient for her 
to shut the window than John - and from which she therefore infers/supplies 
eventually the conversational implicature that John is making a REQUEST that she 
shuts the window.  John's response (nod/smile/”Thanks”) to her shutting the window 
will then confirm to her that her hypothesis is correct.  John, on seeing Jane's action, 
may however choose to cancel Jane's implicature by saying, "Oh, that's not what I 
meant; but thanks anyway".  And in which case, Jane adopts the second hypothesis to 
aid her interpretation process. 
 As an aside, we should add that we are aware of Morgan’s (1978: 274-275) 
notion of short-circuited implicature which is an implicature the hearer supplies 
without the need to calculate the inference.  For example, it is argued that the 
interrogative utterance Can you close the window? is so conventionalised in usage 
(Searle’s (1975: 76) terminology) or is so idiomatic is usage (Gordon and Lakoff’s 
(1971) speech act idiom) that the hearer need not infer the meaning of the utterance as 
a request by calculating the conversational implicature.  In other words, the hearer 
may well recognise the utterance as a request instantly, by-passing the need to make 
intermediate inferences to arrive at the intended meaning, hence the notion of a short-
circuited implicature (SCI).  However, for the more indirect declarative utterance It’s 
freezing in here used as a hint to close the window, Green (1975) observes that the 
utterance is too indirect to involve an SCI (cited in Horn, 1988: 139), unless of course 
John (in our example above) is in the habit of making the same utterance to Jane for 
the same purpose on many previous occasions.  We shall assume that this is not the 
case in our example.  As Horn (1988: 139) argues further, the view that the utterance 
is too indirect is “precisely to be expected” because “hints involve non-short-
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circuited, and hence non-detachable, implicata; only the literal meaning and 
extralinguistic context can be relevant for determining what is hinted, not the choice 
of expression used to express that meaning”.  For our current purpose, we shall adopt 
Horn’s (1988) and Green’s (1975) views on this issue. 
 We should also add that our proposed interpretation process is similar to the 
one suggested in Clark and Clark (1977) which involves four steps in the 
interpretation process.  The main difference is that they do not include a ‘hypothesis-
formation’ stage. 
 In view of the above discussion, we shall therefore adopt the hypothesis-
driven model of the interpretative process as our basis for generating inferences for 
the utterances we will be analysing and interpreting below. 
 Obviously, the more indirect the meaning, the more convoluted the series of 
bridging inferences which need to be generated by the reader in order to arrive at the 
intended meaning.  On the other hand, the less indirect the intended meaning, the 
easier it will be for the reader to infer the intended meaning.   
 
1.2 Levels of understanding 
 
 Our account of what might reasonably be supposed to be the 
interpretative/decoding process adopted by the two interactants in their role as readers 
of each other's letters is tempered by further considerations of how the readers' 
individual goals (to be explained in the next section) in interpretation may affect the 
decoding process.  In particular, we further our account by drawing from Brown's 
(1995) notion of an adequate interpretation and her notion of levels of understanding. 
 According to Brown (1995: 22), an adequate interpretation is one in which 
the reader is satisfied that he has understood "an utterance adequately for a particular 
purpose on a particular occasion".  As she puts it succinctly,  "understanding an 
utterance is rarely an end in itself, in the way that it might appear to be in a test of 
ability in a foreign language" (p. 51).  Brown adds further that in real life, 
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understanding an utterance is "typically the basis for some further activity" and that 
"the nature of the activity will often determine for the listener what can be accepted as 
an adequate interpretation".  Does the reader intend to use the information acquired 
through the interpreted utterance to help him decipher more complex utterances 
which follow or does he just need to acquire a "working" understanding rapidly so 
that he can move on to reading other things?  The former will require a "deeper" level 
of interpretation - one which is more certain than the latter. 
 The observation that the reader is able and does indeed entertain the notion of 
an adequate interpretation, instead of a correct one, for his current purpose of 
communication shows that the reader is prepared to take certain risks in 
communication.  And whatever is considered adequate for the writer's current 
purpose in the communication depends on what he wants to do with his interpretation 
in the context of the current discourse or some future discourse.   
 In advocating the notion of an adequate understanding of an utterance, Brown 
is not suggesting that there is no place for a correct understanding of other utterances.  
In fact, she points out that there are many familiar everyday speech situations where a 
correct interpretation may be desirable and achievable.  We shall point out some of 
these successful (and less successful) instances of communication under the following 
headings of levels of understanding as proposed by Brown.  She (1995: 30-31) draws 
our attention to four possible levels of understanding, depending on whether a 
correct, adequate or incorrect understanding has been achieved. 
 The first level of understanding is one which is, or at least appears to be, 
complete and correct.  She (p. 30-31) cites familiar everyday formulaic expressions 
(like Can you tell me the time? - Five past four), certain utterances (between close 
colleagues) occurring in repetitively similar everyday contexts, certain technical 
terminology and information which seems to have been transmitted satisfactorily. 
 The second level of understanding is one which is partial but adequate for the 
current purpose.  The example Brown (p. 29) cites involves an account of a three-
year-old boy handing a plastic watering can to his 18-month-old sister and asking her 
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to water some trees in the garden.  On hearing the order Now go and water the trees, 
the girl seems unsure as to what to do.  She looks at her brother, then at the garden, 
and then at him again.  He repeats the order, this time gesturing.  She appears to 
understand him this time, makes her way to the tree and waters its base.  Although we 
have no evidence that she has indeed understood all the words in the utterance, we 
can safely conclude that there appears to be at the very least a partial but clearly 
adequate understanding achieved by the girl for her current purpose. 
 The third level of understanding is one which is adequate for the current 
purpose, but this time, it is partially incorrect.  Brown (p. 8) recounts an episode in 
which a three-year-old boy was told on several occasions a story about an enormous 
turnip.  In a friend's garden some three weeks later, he sees a large acanthus plant and 
goes on to ask if it is an enormous turnip.  In querying whether the acanthus plant is 
an enormous turnip, he has obviously understood enough of the meaning of the 
expression an enormous turnip previously - that it was a very large plant - in order to 
understand the story.  Although his understanding is partially incorrect, his 
understanding of the expression is adequate for his purpose then.  (We note, however, 
that Brown's distinction between the second and third levels of understanding needs 
further clarification.  A partially correct interpretation (Level 2) must necessarily be 
partially incorrect (Level 3) too.  Clearly, more examples are needed to fine-tune this 
distinction.) 
 The fourth and final level is one in which understanding has clearly been 
incorrect and not achieved.  An obvious example of this is when there is a clear 
failure of reference. 
 By highlighting the dual goals of correctness and adequacy in understanding, 
Brown is in fact drawing our attention to the dual need for truth and purpose in 





Figure 3.1:  Levels of understanding in terms of correctness and adequacy 
 
 Adequate Inadequate 
 
   
Correct 1  
Partially correct 2  
Partially incorrect 3  
Incorrect  4 
   
 
As the above figure shows, Brown's levels (numbered 1 - 4) cover four of the eight 
possibilities in the matrix.  In our analysis below, in particular of BP 1, we explore 
the explanatory value of her classification system. 
 
1.3 Goals and pragmatic reasoning schemas 
 
 In our account of the written data below, we will also concern ourselves with 
how the propositional content acquired with each relevant utterance interpreted builds 
upon previous contents in a systematic way, resulting in an intricate chain of 
propositions organised along a reasoning schema.  This reasoning schema organises 
the propositional content hierarchically, showing how the eventual goals of the 
interactants can be achieved at the end of the discourse. 
 We are aware of the literature on “so-called decision theory” (see, for 
example, Jeffrey, 1983) which takes practical reasoning as a matter of “weighing 
desire-belief reasons for and against conflicting courses of action” (Bratman, 1990: 
17).  As Bratman (ibid.: 17) observes further, this approach to practical reasoning 
provides no distinctive role for an agent’s future-directed intentions as inputs to such 
reasoning”.  Future-directed intentions, on the other hand, shapes later conduct “by 
way of their influence on intervening practical reasoning and the formation of 
derivative intentions, by way of this stability and by way of their tendency to control 
conduct when the time come” (p. 30; italics/emphasis added).  And it is this notion of 
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future-directed intention which we will draw on in defining the goals of the 
interactants in our data.  
 In analysing the letters, we employ the notion of goal insofar as it relates to 
our interest in the pragmatic reasoning schema (to be explained below) which we 
shall argue is particularly suited to explaining our data.  As we have mentioned 
briefly in Chapter 1, a and b seem to be driven by similar goals relating to the status 
of BP3f ‘b is willing in fact to supervise a’.  These goals relate to a future state of 
affairs.  For a, his goal is to persuade b to be willing to supervise him.  For b, her 
complementary goal is to determine whether she is willing to supervise a.  The 
pursuit of their goals in turn influences the reasoning employed by a and b.  This is 
where we think the notion of pragmatic reasoning schema is particularly valuable in 
explaining our data. 
 In a recent article on human reasoning, Holyoak and Cheng (1995) argue that 
their subjects, given the same set of information to work with, use different 
pragmatic reasoning schemas to resolve the same "industrial dispute" depending on 
which role (employer or employee) they assume (see also, Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; 
Cheng et al, 1986; Girotto et al, 1988; Legrenzi and Murino, 1974).  One of the 
"disputes" concerns whether a particular employee ought to or may be compensated 
for weekend overtime work with time off on a weekday.  We use the expressions 
ought to and may to express the two deontic relations of obligation and permission.  
When subjects assume the employee's point of view, the conclusions they draw are 
usually specified in terms of what the employer ought to do (obligation) in resolving 
the dispute.  But when subjects assume the employer's point of view, the conclusions 
drawn are often specified in terms of what compensation the employee may be 
entitled to (permissibility) in order to resolve the dispute.   
 As we will see in Section 3 below, we notice a similar dichotomy of reasoning 
strategies between a and b  in our data.  a first raises the request that b supervises 
him.  As we have seen briefly in Chapter 1, this turns later into an issue of whether b 
is willing in principle and in fact to supervise him.  From a's point of view, b ought to 
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be willing to supervise him, given that he has fulfilled some of b's conditions (i.e., a 
adopts a deontic obligation mode of reasoning).  Note that the very fact that a tries 
to persuade b to supervise him even though he knows full well that he is unable to 
satisfy all the conditions stipulated by b shows that he is treating some of the 
conditions as though they are optional (a point we shall discuss in detail in Section 
3).  It also shows a's ability to dissociate (i.e., to distinguish) his own treatment of 
some conditions as optional from b's treatment of the same conditions as mandatory 
(see next paragraph). 
 From b's point of view, she can only agree to supervise a if all the conditions 
stipulated by her have been met (i.e., b adopts a deontic permission mode of 
reasoning).  In other words, for b, each condition of in her reasoning is mandatory 
in order to arrive at the eventual goal.  
 We shall also demonstrate later how each pragmatic reasoning schema is 
realised as a series of steps leading to the goal.  Each step in the reasoning schema 
can also be conceived of as a condition to be satisfied in order for the goal to be 
reached.  As we have just mentioned above, some of the conditions may be treated as 
mandatory or optional, depending on the type of reasoning schema adopted.  We shall 
expand on this discussion of a’s and b’s goal-driven reasoning schemas in Section 3.  
But before we do this, let us first discuss the interpretation of the key utterances 
related to Base Proposition 1. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2 Interpreting utterances in interactive extended written discourse 
 
 In this section, we examine the way in which the prospective student a and 
lecturer/supervisor b interpret the utterances of each other's letters.  As we have seen 
in Chapter 2, several pertinent issues have arisen in the course of the correspondence.  





 BP 1:  a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
 
 BP 2a:  Linguistics Department is permitted to let b  supervise a 
 BP 2b:  Linguistics Department is willing to let b  supervise a 
 
 BP 3a:  b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 
 BP 3b:  b is interested in supervising a 
 BP 3c:  b will continue to be interested in supervising a 
 BP 3d:  b has time and so on to supervise a 
 BP 3e:  b is willing in principle to supervise a 
 BP 3f:  b is willing in fact to supervise a 
 
In order to provide a focus and purpose to our analysis, we shall only discuss the 
interpretation of certain key utterances in the correspondence insofar as they relate to 
these Base Propositions.  In particular, we are interested in how the reader's purpose 
in understanding and the dynamics of the expanding context of subsequent letters 
shape his interpretation of these key utterances.  We are of course acutely aware that 
an account of the reader's interpretation of, say, a particular utterance will have to 
take into account not only the expanding context and the reader's purpose, but also the 
recursion of beliefs, i.e., the reader's beliefs about his writer's beliefs about his 
interpretation and so on.  This latter complication to the reader's confidence in the 
certainty of his interpretation of the utterances will be addressed in detail in Chapters 
6 and 7 on Shared Beliefs. 
 As we have already pointed out earlier, we assume that the reader's 
interpretative process is driven by his assumptions/hypotheses about what his writer's 
intentions are in writing.  Our criterion for deciding which of these inferences to 
include is not meant to be exhaustive.  We merely intend to list some of the 
inferences made which we think are crucial to an understanding of the utterances.  
We emphasise that these are postulated inferences; they are not experimentally 
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demonstrated.  They are in our view necessary inferences which help to explain the 
reader’s subsequent behaviour in his reply letter. 
 From a discourse processing point of view, we assume that both readers of the 
letters are not skimming their letters, but that they read and re-read the letters 
carefully, looking for local and global coherence all the time.  Where coherence fails, 
readers will want to clarify the dissonant state of affairs. 
 It should be pointed out that there is a lot of background knowledge we can 
deem the two interactants to share even prior to their correspondence.  This 
constitutes the sort of knowledge of the University an analyst may be reasonably 
justified to assume that the two interactants may share.  This background knowledge 
has been listed in Chapter 1 (see Table 1.1).  
 The problem of miscommunication arises precisely because some of the 
knowledge listed on Table 1.1 is not entirely shared by both parties. 
 
2.1 Analysis of Base Proposition 1 (BP 1) 
 
 BP 1: a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
 
 In this section, we analyse the utterances relevant to BP 1.  We are interested, 
in particular, in how b, in her role as reader, interprets a's utterances in letters A1 and 
A2, and arrives at a level of understanding which she deems to be adequate and 
sufficient for her purpose.  We focus on b because it is she who is confused about the 
status of BP 1, and we will examine how she finally arrives at an adequate 
interpretation of the key utterances related to BP 1 with the expanding discourse 
context.  We have teased out the utterances relevant to BP 1 from the letters and 
present them in chronological order for ease of reading.  The left-most column 
indicates who the writer is.  The second column indicates the location of the utterance 
(e.g., A1P2 means a's first letter, second paragraph).  The third column lists the 
relevant utterances.  Our mode of presentation does not imply that the "exchange" 
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below is a single continuous dialogue comprising four turns.  We should bear in mind 
that each "mega-turn" corresponds with one particular letter.  The letters are separated 
by long time lags of several days/weeks between them. (For a discussion of the 
difference between interactive continuous spoken discourse and interactive written 
discourse, see Chapter 2.) 
  
Writer                     Location/Utterance 
   
a: A1P2 To extend my knowledge on this field ... I applied ... to take the M.A. 
in Linguistics ... 
    [intervening sentences] 
 A1P3 Therefore I would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in 
addition, 'Meaning in English' and 'Methods and Materials in 
English Language Teaching' 
 
b: B1P2 I cannot quite work out from your letter exactly what you  are going 
to be doing here during 1993/4;   
  you say you have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics, and I 
presume that that means what it says 
    [intervening sentences] 
 B1P4 Or, do you mean that you have applied to take the M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics here in the Applied Linguistics Department? 
 
a: A2P2 As you presume I have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics at the 
Faculty of Languages.   
  Lacking the  teaching experience of four years I am not eligible for 
the M.A. in Applied Linguistics anyway. 
 
b: B2P1 Thank you for your letter of 3 December in which you clarify your 
future affiliation in the University. 
 
 Firstly, let us offer an account of how the reader b interprets a's utterances in 
letter A1.  The information stated in the utterance in A1P2 ... I applied ... to take the 
M.A. in Linguistics seems quite straightforward and it is probably safe for us to 
assume that the reader b has no difficulty in understanding it.  But when b reads the 
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utterance in A1P3 Therefore I would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in 
addition, 'Meaning in English' and 'Methods and Materials in ... ', we assume that b 
becomes confused about a's departmental affiliation.  We know this is so because of 
b's reply in B1P2 I cannot quite work out ... exactly what you are going to be doing 
....  But why should b be confused in the first place?  The expression the M.A. in 
A1P3 refers to the M.A. in Applied Linguistics because the two named additional 
courses, as b, the Director of the M.A. in Applied Linguistics programme would be 
very clear about, are part of her own Applied Linguistics programme.  But the 
expression is still a source of confusion to b because of two reasons.   
 Firstly, the first mention of the M.A. in Applied Linguistics programme is 
referred to with the underspecified the M.A., suggesting to b that the referent of the 
underspecified expression is "given" (or available, to be more precise) information, 
when in fact and at this juncture, only the M.A. in Linguistics has been explicitly 
mentioned previously (see Chapter 4 on Information Structure for an extended 
discussion of this).  This probably contributed to b's thinking that a may have 
confused his application of one M.A. for the other. 
 The second reason has to do with discourse coherence.  The stated 
information of A1P3 does not fit in with b's world view, or to be more specific, her 
knowledge of her University, the two Departments, their separate responsibilities for 
administering their own courses and the protocols governing across-department 
supervision.  a's statement that he would like to read two additional courses of the 
M.A. in Applied Linguistics in addition to the M.A. in Linguistics programme 
suggests to b that a may be treating the two MA's as though they are modular, and 
this clearly contradicts b's existing background knowledge about the separate 
responsibilities of the two programmes.   
 The second problem of coherence has to do with the protocols governing 
across-department supervision.  In b's view, although across-department supervision 
is permissible, it is not generally practised.  a's request that b supervises him, as we 
will see later, suggests to b that a believes that this practice of across-department 
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supervision is not only possible but also widely practised.  a’s belief obviously 
contradicts b's background knowledge, making the stated information of A1P3 
Therefore I would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in addition ... (although 
"understood literally") incoherent with her world view.  This second source of 
discourse incoherence is probably the key difficulty for b.  We assume this to be so 
because, and as we will see later when we discuss Base Propositions 2 and 3, in 
B1P2, b writes you say you have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics ....  If that is 
the case, I am afraid that it would not really be the done thing for me to supervise 
you, since the Applied Linguistics Department is a separate department in a different 
faculty.  In other words, b does "understand" in part: 
 
 (i) that b has applied for the M.A. in Linguistics, and  
 (ii) that a is requesting that she supervises him.   
 
but she is also trying to say here that (i) and (ii) are incompatible with her world view. 
 As such, we assume that b's understanding of a's utterance A1P3 is only 
partial because she says so herself in her reply B1P2 I cannot quite work out ... 
exactly what you are going to be doing ....  Such a partially correct interpretation is 
surely far from adequate for b's current purpose.  As the Director of the M.A. in 
Applied Linguistics programme, b's purpose surely is to make sure that she has 
sufficient grasp of the facts so that she can then offer authoritative and correct advice 
to a regarding his request for supervision.   
 This notion about the inadequacy of b's interpretation for her current purpose 
brings us back to Brown's view about the receiver's subjective assessment of what 
constitutes an adequate interpretation.  As Brown (1995: 23) puts it 
 
It is not the case that we require the same level of certainty in all cases of 
communication in our assessment of whether or not our understanding is 
adequate, let alone correct.  It is always necessary to consider this issue 
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in the context of the listener's intentions in listening, and to formulate the 
question as 'adequate for what?'. 
 
 Similarly, Popper (cited in Brown 1995: 23) speaks about a "commonsense 
notion of certainty" of beliefs which is relative.  According to Popper (1972: 78-79), 
"subjective certainty ... depends not merely upon degrees of belief and upon evidence 
but also upon the situation - upon the importance of what is at stake".  And certainly 
in our example above, a lot is at stake if b does indeed misread a's first letter and 
consequently dispenses the wrong advice.  Her current interpretation, although 
partially correct, is far from adequate for her position and purpose. 
 Recall that Brown (1995: 30-31) offers four levels of understanding which we 
have placed in the following matrix (here, modified and renumbered as Figure 3.2): 
 
Figure 3.2:  Levels of understanding in terms of correctness and adequacy (Modified) 
 
 Adequate Inadequate 
 
   
Correct 1  
Partially correct 2 √ 
Partially incorrect 3  
Incorrect  4 
   
 
Returning to our analysis of the utterance in A1P3 above in which b has to interpret 
the underspecified the M.A., we conclude that b's understanding is partial and that her 
interpretation is inadequate for her current purpose.  We therefore offer this as 
another level of understanding in the above matrix (see √ ). 
 Coming back to b's beliefs at this juncture, we may summarise b's position as 




(A) regarding what a has done or intends to do 
 
 1. a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics  (?) 
 2. a would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in addition  (?) 
 
(B) regarding her own background knowledge   
 
 All the items 1- 6 are listed in full in Table 1.1 (see Chapter 1). 
 
(C) regarding a's background knowledge 
 
 As in b's list (B) 1 - 6 above, but all of which are doubtful  (?) 
 
 Let us summarise what we have said so far regarding b's interpretative process 
as it relates to A1P2 I applied ... to take the M.A. in Linguistics  and A1P3 I would 









As per stated information in A1P2 and A1P3 
Hypothesis b hypothesises that a's intended meaning is as per stated 




With the expanding context, especially from: 
   A1P3  I would like to read two core courses of the M.A. 
   A1P4  I really hope that you can be my supervisor 
 
b infers that: 
   a thinks that both courses are modular 
   a is not aware of the University protocols governing across- 
   department supervision 
 
Both inferences contradict b's view of the world/University.  
Therefore b becomes unsure of her initial interpretation. She 
considers her understanding as only partial and not adequate 




As per stated information in A1P2 and A1P3, but with doubt 
this time; ? attached 
 




 We see in the above an example of what we think b's interpretative process 
may look like.  During the intermediate stage, certain bridging inferences (drawing 
here from b's background knowledge) are made, leading finally to the eventual 
interpretation.  This eventual interpretation is not fixed, as the discussion of the 
expanding context below shows. 
 Let us now move on to discuss b's interpretation of a's utterances in his letter 
of clarification of A2.  When b reads a's utterances in A2P2 As you presume I have 
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applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics at the Faculty of Languages  and Lacking the  
teaching experience of four years I am not eligible for the M.A. in Applied Linguistics 
anyway, she probably sees the two utterances as a sort of a point-for-point 
clarification to her letter B1 in which she declares her confusion I cannot quite work 
out ... exactly what you are going to be doing.  In B1, she points out her confusion 
about the two possible scenarios expressed in (i) you say you have applied to take the 
M.A. in Linguistics, and I presume that that means what it says and (ii) Or, do you 
mean you have applied to take the M.A. in Applied Linguistics here... .   
 a's first utterance in A2P2 As you presume I have applied to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics at the Faculty of Languages  is a direct response to b's (i) above.  Notice 
the way a echoes b's expression I presume with As you presume, perhaps as a means 
of expressing acquiescence or solidarity with b.  a's second utterance in A2P2 
Lacking the  teaching experience of four years I am not eligible for the M.A. in 
Applied Linguistics anyway is a response to b's (ii).  By declaring his knowledge of 
his ineligibility to apply for the Applied Linguistics programme anyway, a is in fact 
saying that he has not applied for the Applied Linguistics programme precisely 
because he is not eligible to apply in any case.  Notice that the use of the adverbial 
expression anyway by a triggers the assumption that a already knows about his 
ineligibility; so the question of whether he has applied (or ought to apply) to take the 
M.A. in Applied Linguistics programme was never an issue to him and shouldn't have 
arisen.  This is not to suggest that a, the prospective student, is being dismissive of b's 
suggestion that he may have confused his application of one M.A. for the other.  After 
all, a has no reason to want to appear to be impolite as this may diminish any hope of 
his securing b as his supervisor.  Rather, and as we will develop in full later, the use 
of the expression anyway seems to be in line with a's persuasive tone and 
argumentative style of writing/reasoning in his letter.  (Note that we are not using the 
word argumentative in the negative sense of being quarrelsome.) 
 Having read a's clarification in the two utterances in A2P2 above, b is 
therefore able to "re-interpret" a's previous utterances A1P2 To extend my knowledge 
68 
 
on this field ... I applied ... to take the M.A. in Linguistics  and A1P3 Therefore I 
would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in addition in his first letter A1.  We 
said earlier that b's interpretation of these utterances has been partial and inadequate 
when she first read A1.  Now, armed with a's clarification and her enriched context of 
interpretation, she is able to revise and accept her initial interpretation as being 
adequate for her current purpose.  Hence she is able to write in her next letter in 
B2P1 Thank you for your letter of 3 December in which you clarify your future 
affiliation in the University and goes on to dispense additional information to a 
regarding his request for supervision.  Therefore b's revised and updated state of 
beliefs as listed in (A), (B) and (C) above would now be cleared of all doubts. 








Within the A1 context, as per stated information  
Hypothesis b's hypothesises that a's intended meaning is as per stated 














With the additional A2 context, as per stated information 
again, minus doubt 
 
Therefore, b's hypothesis is confirmed.  Her understanding of the two utterances 





 In the light of the above discussion, we conclude that BP 1 "a applied to take 
the M.A. in Linguistics" has been established as part of b's belief system.  
 
2.2 Analysis of Base Propositions 2a, 2b and 3a - f 
 
 BP 2a:  Linguistics Department is permitted to let b  supervise a 
 BP 2b:  Linguistics Department is willing to let b  supervise a 
 
 BP 3a:  b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 
 BP 3b:  b is interested in supervising a 
 BP 3c:  b will continue to be interested in supervising a 
 BP 3d:  b has time and so on to supervise a 
 BP 3e:  b is willing in principle to supervise a 
 BP 3f:  b is willing in fact to supervise a 
 
 In this sub-section, we shall analyse the utterances relevant to Base 
Propositions 2 and 3.  This time, we shall consider both a's and b's point of view, in 
their respective roles of readers of each other's letters, in interpreting the utterances.  
The two sets of BPs are so inter-twined that we think it is best to consider them 
together.  After all, both sets of BPs seem to draw from the same list of relevant 
utterances.  Because of the complexities with which the two sets of BPs are inter-
related and ordered idiosyncratically by both interactants, we shall focus our 
discussion on how a and b interpret each other's underlying goals and accompanying 
reasoning schemas.  Once again, the list of utterances is presented chronologically. 
 
a: A1P4 b, I certainly share your interest for sociolinguistics and discourse 
analysis 
  [intervening sentence] 




b: B1P2 you say you have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics .... 
If that is the case, I am afraid that it would not really be the done 
thing for me to supervise you, since the Applied Linguistics 
Department is a separate department in a different faculty 
(Education). 
 
 B1P4 Or, do you mean you have applied to take the M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics here? 
  [intervening sentence] 
... if such an application were successful ..., then I see no reason 
why I shouldn't supervise you, provided that our interests continue 
to coincide. 
 
a: A2P3 As to the problem of supervision I hoped that my belonging to a 
different department of the University would not be an obstacle for 
you to supervise me with the prospectus of the M.A. in Linguistics 
stating on page 2:   
" ... Students taking the M.A. in Linguistics ... may in some cases be 
supervised for the research components ... by a specialist from 
outside the Department." 
 A2P4 Since your academic work covers my field of interest to the full, I 
should really be happy, if I could benefit from your supervision. 
 
b: B2P2 I would really have nothing against supervising you, provided I 
have the time and so on; I merely think that it might be felt by the 
linguistics department that they are well able to provide supervision 
in your areas of interest themselves. 
 B2P3 Anyway, I am sure that you will be able to discover their preference 
when you visit in April. 
 
a: A3P1 Thank you very much for your letter ... in which you tell me that you 
would be willing to supervise me ... 
 A3P2 I already told you that I intend to visit X University during my 
Easter holiday in April. 
 





a: A4P1 I decided to postpone my visit to X University to 19th-23rd of April. 
 
b: B4P2 I suggest you try to visit c before you come to see me. 
 
 Before we consider the readers' interpretations of the utterances above, a few 
general comments about the underlying reasoning processes are in order.  Although 
the resulting "exchange" above is the collaborative process of both a and b, the 
reasoning processes which seem to underlie each individual's contribution are not 
only quite different, but actually in opposition to each other. 
 As we have pointed out earlier in Section 1.3, Holyoak and Cheng (1995) 
argue that their subjects, given the same set of information to work with, can use 
different pragmatic reasoning schemas (obligation/permission modes) to resolve the 
same "industrial dispute" depending on the role (employer or employee) they assume.  
Driven by their own goals, a employs the deontic obligation mode of reasoning in a 
bid to persuade b to supervise him, while b employs the deontic permission mode of 
reasoning to determine whether she is willing to supervise a. 
 This difference in pragmatic reasoning schema gives rise to quite different 
tactical procedures (borrowing Widdowson's (1984) terminology).  One of the 
purposes of listing the utterances above in chronological order is to highlight the 
point-for-point style of rebuttal which seems to characterise a's reasoning.  What 
seems to characterise a's "mega-turn"/letter is this argumentative style where several 
utterances (listed above) made by him seem to express counter-points to the relevant 
bits of contents expressed in b's previous letter.  We shall expand on this observation 
in Section 3.   
 Let us now consider the interpretation of the utterances as they relate to BPs 
2a - b and 3a - f.  For ease of discussion and reference, we shall discuss the utterances 




a: A1P4 b, I certainly share your interest for sociolinguistics and discourse 
analysis 
  [intervening sentence] 
I really hope that you can be my supervisor, if it is at all possible. 
 
b: B1P2 you say you have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics .... 
If that is the case, I am afraid that it would not really be the done 
thing for me to supervise you, since the Applied Linguistics 
Department is a separate department in a different faculty 
(Education). 
 
 B1P4 Or, do you mean you have applied to take the M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics here? 
  [intervening sentence] 
... if such an application were successful ..., then I see no reason 




 When the reader b reads the utterances I certainly share your interest  ... and I 
really hope that you can be my supervisor ... in A1P4, we suspect that b probably has 
no difficulty in understanding the nature and content of a's request.  But as we have 
seen in our discussion above, what is problematic is that b probably feels uneasy 
about a's assumption about the ease with which across-department supervision can be 
arranged.  Evidence of this lies in her reply B1 in which she expresses her reservation 
in B1P2 it would not really be the done thing for me to supervise you, since the 
Applied Linguistics Department is a separate department ..., assuming that a has 
indeed applied to the Linguistics Department. 
 b then postulates the alternative scenario where if a has applied to the Applied 
Linguistics Department, she would then be willing to supervise him.  Note, however, 
that b is careful to add the condition provided that our interests continue to coincide 
in B1P4.  We consider this to be an additional condition because it relates to the 
future. This condition is different from b's implicit presupposition (triggered by the 
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verb continue) that she already shares his interest at the current time of writing.  (In 
other words, she is agreeing with a's statement I certainly share your interest  in 
A1P4.)  This additional condition seems to be b's cautious response to a's enthusiastic 
affirmation that he certainly shares b's interest (A1P4). 
 In stating what she thinks the two possible scenarios are, what b is in fact 
doing here in her utterances is to make plain her world view and state of affairs, and 
how it may differ from a's.  According to b's view of the University, although across 
department supervision is permissible, it is not generally practised unless the 
Linguistics Department approves of a's research proposal and is not able to assign an 
internal supervisor themselves.  We know that this is so because b, being the Director 
of the M.A. in Applied Linguistics programme, is bound to be very familiar with the 
regulations of her department and her sister-department.  (We confirmed this 
information via personal communication with b).  Also, any show of unreserved 
interest on b's part in supervising a, especially since he has already applied to another 
department, may be misconstrued as an attempt to "poach" students from another 
department.  Such an act will be considered most discourteous and certainly against 
department protocol.  
 To give us an indication of how a, who is now the reader, has interpreted b's 
utterances and reservation in B1, let us examine his responses in A2, reproduced 
below. 
 
b: B1P2 you say you have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics .... 
If that is the case, I am afraid that it would not really be the done 
thing for me to supervise you, since the Applied Linguistics 





 B1P4 Or, do you mean you have applied to take the M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics here? 
  [intervening sentence] 
... if such an application were successful ..., then I see no reason 
why I shouldn't supervise you, provided that our interests continue 
to coincide. 
 
a: A2P3 As to the problem of supervision I hoped that my belonging to a 
different department of the University would not be an obstacle for 
you to supervise me with the prospectus of the M.A. in Linguistics 
stating on page 2:   
" ... Students taking the M.A. in Linguistics ... may in some cases be 
supervised for the research components ... by a specialist from 
outside the Department." 
 A2P4 Since your academic work covers my field of interest to the full, I 
should really be happy, if I could benefit from your supervision. 
 
 
 In A2P3, a refutes point-for-point b's objection to supervising him, as his 
expression As to the problem of supervision ... suggests.  When a reads B1P2 ... it 
would not really be the done thing ... he must have assumed that b may not be 
familiar with the Linguistics Department's prospectus or that her memory of its 
contents may have lapsed.  In other words, a mistakenly thinks that b does not share 
his world view which includes the permissibility of across-department supervision.  
Hence he feels the need to quote from the prospectus.  This assumption of course 
turns out to be wrong as b points out in her next letter. b is fully aware of the 
regulations which states the permissibility of across-department supervision; but she 
is less certain about the Linguistics Department's willingness.  (See discussion below 
of b's utterance it might be felt by the linguistics department that they are well able to 
provide supervision in your areas of interest themselves.) 
 In A2P4, a addresses the condition laid down by b in B1P4 I see no reason 
why I shouldn't supervise you, provided that our interests continue to coincide by 
affirming in A2P4 that Since your academic work covers my field of interest to the 
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full, I should really be happy, if I could benefit from your supervision.  Again, we see 
evidence of this point-for-point rebuttal, whose purpose seems to be to lead b to the 
"inevitable" conclusion that she should consent to supervising him.  After all, she did 
say that she saw no reason why she shouldn't supervise him if their interests 
continued to coincide (but see discussion below on the lack of fit between a's alleged 
fulfilment of b's condition and b's actual condition). 
 Next let us consider b's interpretation of a's utterances in A2P3 and A2P4.  
We draw evidence of b's probable interpretation of a's utterances from her response in 
B2P2 and B2P4. 
 
a: A2P3 As to the problem of supervision I hoped that my belonging to a 
different department of the University would not be an obstacle for 
you to supervise me with the prospectus of the M.A. in Linguistics 
stating on page 2:   
" ... Students taking the M.A. in Linguistics ... may in some cases be 
supervised for the research components ... by a specialist from 
outside the Department." 
 A2P4 Since your academic work covers my field of interest to the full, I 
should really be happy, if I could benefit from your supervision. 
 
b: B2P2 I would really have nothing against supervising you ... ; I merely 
think that it might be felt by the linguistics department that they are 
well able to provide supervision in your areas of interest 
themselves. 
 B2P3 Anyway, I am sure that you will be able to discover their preference 
when you visit in April. 
 
 
 In writing I would really have nothing against supervising you ... ; I merely 
think that ... in B2P2, b is in fact counteracting a's previous utterance in A2P3 I hoped 
that my belonging to a different department of the University would not be an 
obstacle for you to supervise me which he goes on to support with evidence from the 
prospectus.  b must have understood the "force" of a's rebuttal in A2P3, otherwise she 
wouldn't have gone on to explain that the Linguistics Department may be well able to 
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provide supervision ... themselves, suggesting that the Linguistics Department's 
willingness here is the issue, not constitutional permissibility, as stated in the 
prospectus.   
 b also realises that in using the set expression I would really have nothing 
against supervising you, she may appear to be "contradicting" her earlier utterance 
B1P2 I am afraid that it would not really be the done thing for me to supervise you, 
since the Applied Linguistics Department is a separate department in a different 
faculty (Education) in the previous letter.  But if we consider b's use of the expression 
I would really have nothing against supervising you with the immediately following 
utterance I merely think that it might be felt by the linguistics department that they are 
well able to provide supervision in your areas of interest themselves (B2P2), we 
realise that the expression I would really have nothing against supervising you doesn't 
really mean 'yes' to a's request.  In fact, b is expressing her reservation.  
 b's expression of her reservation is realised through the use of the "double" 
negative as in nothing (expressing negation) and against (expressing opposition).  
The double negative is further accentuated by the use of really in would really have 
nothing against ... which b uses to convince the addressee a of the truthfulness and 
sincerity of her claim that she has nothing against supervising a.  But why should b 
emphasise the sincerity of her words unless she has reason to believe that a may have 
reason to doubt her?  In expressing her reservation, b wants a to know that her 
reservation about supervising him should not be taken personally, especially since a 
has so far managed to show that he has fulfilled some of b's conditions, albeit 
partially.   
 Hence, b tries to mitigate the effect of her expression of reservation by 
continuing with the next utterance I merely think that it might be felt by the Linguistics 
Department that they are well able to provide supervision in your areas of interest 
themselves where the use of merely suggests that the ability of the Linguistics 
Department to supervise a themselves is really her only (or main) reason for her 
reservation.  The juxtaposition of both utterances in B2P2 may therefore be b's way of 
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saying that she is not trying to be difficult and that she merely thinks that it is best that 
a speaks to the Linguistics Department first to find out their preference.   
 The use of well in it might be felt by the Linguistics Department that they are 
well able to provide supervision ... themselves also suggests that the Linguistics 
Department is very able to provide supervision and that an external supervisor will 
not only be unnecessary, but also undesirable since that would mean that the 
Linguistics Department will have to give up part of their evaluative control of their 
own student to someone outside their department.  Hence, the Linguistics Department 
may prefer to supervise a themselves, and therefore may not be willing to let b 
supervise a.   
 Furthermore, and perhaps as a response to a's previous utterance in A2P4 
Since your academic work covers my field of interest to the full, by saying that it 
might be felt by the Linguistics Department that they are well able to provide 
supervision in your areas of interest themselves,  b may be implying that a's 
suggestion that their common research interest is "full" may be irrelevant (and 
misguided) at this juncture, since the issue of whether there is a suitable internal 
supervisor must be considered first, and that can only be found out if a visits the 
Linguistics Department first to discover their preference.  (Incidentally, the statement 
by a that b's academic work covers his field of interest to the full is fallacious since 
a's proposal to submit a title on critical language study and critical linguistics for the 
thesis (see A1P3 in Chapter 2) is not within the stated research interest of either b or 
the Applied Linguistics Department as a whole.  Hence, the alleged overlapping of 
interests cannot be full.) 
 This (i.e., that their overlapping interest is not the crucial issue at the moment) 
is the conclusion b seems to be alluding to in her utterance Anyway, I am sure that 
you will be able to discover their preference when you visit in April in B2P3 where 
she suggests that a speaks to the Linguistics Department first to find out their 
preference.  Notice that b, in writing this, is in fact adding another condition to her 
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reply to a's request that he should find out the Linguistics Department's preference 
first before she can even consider whether to supervise him or not.   
 Therefore, based on all that b has written in B2, we assume that she must have 
interpreted a's utterance in A2 and understood the force of his counter arguments and 
his suggestion that she should be willing to supervise him. 
 Summarising what has been discussed so far, we think that it may be possible 
to postulate that b is really saying two things here.  Firstly, she is saying that she may 
be willing in principle to supervise a, provided the conditions she has stipulated are 
met.  Secondly, she may be willing in fact to supervise a, provided that a finds out 
the Linguistics Department's preference first and that their preference, although 
unlikely, is for an external supervisor to supervise a.  This distinction between 
willingnessin principle and willingnessin fact is crucial, but it is a distinction which a 
does not seem to grasp (see discussion on reasoning schemas below).  
 It therefore seems astonishing to us to read a's declaration Thank you very 
much for your letter ... in which you tell me that you would be willing to supervise me 
in his reply in A3P1, which seems to confirm our suspicion that a may not have made 
the distinction mentioned above.  This failure to make the distinction is probably due 
to the difference between b's intended meaning in uttering I would really have 
nothing against supervising you ... in B2P2 and Anyway, I am sure you will be able to 
discover their preference ... in B2P3, and the inferences actually made by a in reading 
the same utterances (which obviously don't include the crucial inference that a should 
find out the Linguistics Department's preference first before b is able to agreein fact to 
supervise a).  Obviously, a, in his role now as reader, has failed to interpret b's 
utterances in B2P2 and B2P3 as intended. 
 The question remaining then is whether a's failure to discern the "in principle 
- in fact" distinction made by b is the result of an error in interpretation or whether a's 
"failure" is intentional?  Our discussion so far suggests that a's failure to make this 
distinction is due solely to an error on his part - perhaps an error arising from 
problems with interlanguage pragmatics since a's country of origin is Western 
79 
 
European but his First Language is not English.  We would like to argue that although 
this may well be a contributory factor to the problem, it may not be the only, or even 
the main, factor.  (b, incidentally, is originally from another Western European 
country whose First Language is not English either.  But b has been working in 
Britain for so many years that her linguistic competence is, in our view, virtually 
indistinguishable from that of an educated native speaker of British English.) 
 Our reason for this view (i.e., a's "failure" may be intentional) is two-fold.  
Firstly, although a may not be a native speaker of English, the quality of his 
writing/performance suggests a near native-like competency (although not as native-
like as b’s).  My personal communication with a also reveals that he sought the help 
of a native speaker of American English (USA) during his composing process.  This 
native speaker would have pointed out to him if he has misread b's letter.  But one 
may argue that the American speaker may not be used to the "indirectness" of b’s 
“British” English.  Presumably, if the American was placed in b's shoes, he might 
have written something more directly, and perhaps to this effect: 
 
I cannot supervise you because you are not from my department.  If, 
however, you still wish to pursue this matter, you should consult with the 
Linguistics Department first.  If they agree to your suggestion, then get 
back to me and I would be happy to discuss the matter further with you. 
 
Although I do not have empirical evidence for such a “British”-American English 
distinction, I did in fact receive comments about the "indirectness" of b's writing 
when I first presented this data to a predominantly white American audience at the 
International Linguistics Association Conference 1996 held in New York University, 
USA.  The style of writing adopted by b, it was claimed, is characteristic of British 
indirectness and formality, which differs from America's directness and informality.   
 But even if we do accept this alleged difference between American and British 
English, we would still be reluctant to embrace the view that a's failure to understand 
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b is caused by problems with interlanguage (or trans-Atlantic) pragmatics, 
considering the fact that many non-native speakers of English of my country of origin 
(in South-East Asia) with comparable competence to a are unlikely to misinterpret b's 
utterances in B2P2 as consent, both in principle and in fact, to supervise a.  
Therefore, the reason for a's unexpected declaration lies elsewhere. 
 We believe, secondly, that the reason for a's unexpected declaration has more 
to do with his reasoning strategy and the perspective he chooses to adopt in his letters 
than with interlanguage difficulties.  We shall draw support for this view from what 
has been said so far and from evidence found in the rest of the listed utterances 
below. 
 
a: A3P1 Thank you very much for your letter ... in which you tell me that you 
would be willing to supervise me ... 
 A3P2 I already told you that I intend to visit X University during my 
Easter holiday in April. 
 
b: B3P3 I hope you have ... useful discussions with the Linguistics 
Department ... 
 
a: A4P1 I decided to postpone my visit to X University to 19th-23rd of April. 
 
b: B4P2 I suggest you try to visit c before you come to see me. 
 
 Notice that in b's reply B3, b does not acknowledge nor follow up on a's 
declaration that she has agreed to supervise a, as one might expect b to if indeed she 
has agreed to do so, perhaps with an extended follow-up discussion of a's proposed 
research topic.  (We have also observed earlier that a's proposed thesis topic on 
critical linguistics is not within the stated research interest of b nor of her 
Department.)  Instead, b zooms in on the most important consideration remaining, 
which has to do with the Linguistics Department's preference.  Hence in the 
remaining letters, she seems to write rather repetitively in B3P3 I hope you have ... 
useful discussions with the Linguistics Department  and in B4P2 I suggest you try to 
visit c before you come to see me, both of which allude to the outstanding issue of the 
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Linguistics Department's preference.  a's letters, on the other hand, practically ignores 
b's suggestion and instead focuses on more mundane administrative matters 
pertaining to the scheduling of appointments.  This "selective reading" probably 
accounts for a's unexpected declaration above even in the face of contradictory 
evidence.  In the next section, we shall expand on this final point on how a's and b's 
goals in the communication affect the way they interpret each other's utterances and 
the reasoning schemas which underlie their understanding of the Base Propositions. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3 a’s and b’s goals and pragmatic reasoning schemas 
 
 In the above section, we offer an account of how the reader is able to 
understand the stated information as well as the indirect and intended meaning of 
certain utterances by generating the appropriate inferences in the interpretation 
process.  We also examined how the same utterances can be re-interpreted in the light 
of the expanding context.  In addition to offering an account of how each reader may 
have interpreted the writer's utterances, we have also mentioned the need for the 
reader to understand the goal and trend of reasoning which motivates the writer's 
utterances.  So far, we have suggested briefly that this reasoning strategy can be 
conceptualised in terms of the reader's perception of what the writer's reasoning 
schema might be.  Let us now consider the reasoning strategies of the two interactants 
in detail. 
 We should emphasise that what follows is what we consider to be the reader 
a's assumptions about his writer b's reasoning schema based on his interpretation of 
B1.  Note, firstly, that a’s assumptions about b’s reasoning schema is to be 
distinguished from a’s own reasoning schema.  a assumes that b adopts a deontic 
permission mode of reasoning while a himself adopts a deontic obligation mode of 
reasoning (see explanation of these modes of reasoning in Section 1.3 above; see also 
detailed discussion to follow).  Secondly, a’s assumptions about b’s mode of 
reasoning should be distinguished from b’s actual mode of reasoning. We shall argue 
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below that a is fully aware of b’s permission mode of reasoning, i.e., a’s assumptions 
about b’s mode of reasoning match b’s actual mode of reasoning.  The importance of 
these distinctions will become apparent later in interpreting Tables 3.3 and 3.4 below.  
And then later in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we shall place all these distinctions side by side 
in a series of flow diagrams for easy comparison.  Having clarified this, let us 
examine a’s interpretation of b's reasoning schema in B1. 
 Recall that b is confused at this juncture as to which M.A. a has applied to 
take.  She therefore offers two sets of conditions for her decision on whether to 
supervise a or not.  These two sets of conditions correspond with the two scenarios 
she postulates in her letter B1.  
 
Table 3.1: a's assumptions about b's reasoning schema (Permission) under 
hypothetical Scenario 1 "a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics" after reading B1 
only 
 
   b is not willingin principle and in fact to supervise a because: 
 
 
 i. a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics  
 ii. Linguistics Department is not permitted to let b supervise a 
 iii. Linguistics Department is not willing to let b supervise a 
 
 
Note: For ease of writing, we use the shorter expression a applied to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics to mean "a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics Programme 
offered by the Linguistics Department of the Faculty of Languages". 
 
(For the sake of completeness of discussion in this section, we ask that you allow us 
to repeat some of the relevant points made in Section 2.) 
 
 Table 3.1 above is based on a's assumptions about b's first hypothesised 
scenario that a has applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics.  At this stage of the 
correspondence, a assumes that b is unwilling to supervise him because b writes you 
say you have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics ....  If that is the case, I am afraid 
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that it would really be the done thing for me to supervise you, since the Applied 
Linguistics Department is a separate Department (B1P2).  On reading this, the reader 
a mistakenly assumes that b is not aware of the Linguistics Department's prospectus 
which clearly states that across-department supervision is permissible, resulting in a's 
assumptions about b's reasoning schema which includes conditions ii and iii above.  b 
is of course aware of the contents of the prospectus of the Linguistics Department.  a, 
however, mistakes b's rejection as caused by b's ignorance (or lapse of memory) of 
the contents of the prospectus.  This explains why he goes on to quote from the 
prospectus in his reply. 
 In reading b's utterance B1P4 Or, do you mean you have applied to take the 
M.A. in Applied Linguistics here? in letter B1, a realises too that b entertains a second 
possibility regarding a's departmental affiliation, hence, the following reasoning 
schema based on a Scenario 2 situation (see Table 3.2 below). 
 
Table 3.2: a's assumptions about b's reasoning schema (Permission) under 
hypothetical Scenario 2 "a applied to take the M.A. in Applied Linguistics" after 
reading B1 only 
 
   b is willingin principle and in fact to supervise a if: 
 
 
 i. a applied to take the M.A. in Applied Linguistics 
 ii. b is interested in supervising a 
 iii. b will continue to be interested in supervising a 
 
 
 Based on a's reading of b's words if such an application [to the Applied 
Linguistics Department] were successful ... then I see no reason why I shouldn't 
supervise you, provided that our interests continue to coincide, a probably assumes 
that the above Conditions i, ii and iii are part of b's reasoning schema under 
hypothetical Scenario 2.  (Note that the verb continue triggers the presupposition that 
their interests already coincide at the time of writing, hence Condition ii.)  By casting 
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her reasoning in terms of conditions which need to be fulfilled in order for her to act, 
b is in fact operating from a deontic mode of reasoning related to the permissibility of 
the nature of a's request.  We have argued in the last section that a is aware of b's 
reasoning schema and that this awareness probably explains his point-for-point 
rebuttal style of writing. 
 However by the time a reads b's next letter B2, a's assumptions about b's 
hypothetical Scenario 2 reasoning schema are abandoned.  a also assumes further 
that b has now modified her Scenario 1 reasoning schema in the light of the 
expanding context resulting from a's reply A2 regarding his actual departmental 
affiliation and the contents of the prospectus.  Table 3.3 below is based on a's revised 
assumptions of b's reasoning schema in regard to a Scenario 1 situation "a applied to 
take the M.A. in Linguistics".  We reiterate that the following is a list of a’s 
assumptions about b’s reasoning schema, not a’s actual reasoning schema.  (We shall 
also argue later (in Figure 3.3) that a’s assumptions about b’s reasoning schema 




Table 3.3: a's assumptions about b's reasoning schema (Permission) after reading 
B1 and B2. 
 
   b is willingin principle to supervise a if: 
 
 
 1. a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
 2. Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a 
 3. b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 
 4. b is interested in supervising a [transferred from Scenario 2 above] 
 5. b will continue to be interested in supervising a [transferred from  
  Scenario 2] 
 6. b has time and so on to supervise a 
 
 Conclusion: Therefore 
 7. b is willingin principle to supervise a  
 
   b is willingin fact to supervise a if: 
 
 
 Conditions 1 - 7 as above 
 8. Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a 
 8'. a finds out that 8 above is indeed the case 
 
 Conclusion: Therefore 
 9. b is willingin fact to supervise a  
 
 
 After reading b's utterances I would really have nothing against supervising 
you ... ; I merely think that it might be felt by the linguistics department that they are 
well able to provide supervision in your areas of interest themselves in letter B2, a is 
likely to assume that b has been forced to re-align her reasoning strategies to take into 
account a's previous rebuttal in A2 about the permissibility of across-department 
supervision and his re-assertion that her field of interest covers his to the full.  a 
assumes now that b is aware that he has applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics and 
about regulations stated in the prospectus.  Therefore, a can assume that Conditions 1 
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and 2 are now part of b's reasoning schema.  Condition 3 follows naturally from 2.  
Conditions 4 and 5 are probably part of b's reasoning as well based on evidence from 
her utterance I see no reason why I shouldn't supervise you, provided that our 
interests continue to coincide in B1P4.  These conditions are originally part of b's 
reasoning schema based on a Scenario 2 situation.  But they continue to be relevant to 
b's reasoning in B2 as well. 
 Notice that Condition 5 does not tally entirely with a's re-assertion Since your 
academic work covers my field of interest to the full, I should really be happy, if I 
could benefit from your supervision in A2P4 since a's assumption about b's Condition 
5 refers to future alignment of interests while his re-assertion in A2P4 refers to the 
current extent of alignment of interests.  a is of course aware of the difference 
between the two, but his re-assertion seems to be deliberate nevertheless.  Why then 
does he assert his alleged current fulfilment to the full (in A2P4) of b's "condition", 
while assuming correctly that Condition 5 of b's reasoning schema is about future 
fulfilment (continue to coincide; B1P4 )? 
 We suspect that the reason for a's exaggerated statement about the current 
perfect fit of their overlapping interests is to draw attention away from b's condition 
regarding a future fit which he has no control of.  In addition, the use of the 
expression to the full in Since your academic work covers my field of interest to the 
full also appears to have the effect of mitigating the lack of a perfect fit.  And the 
persuasive force of a's words seems to work.  We believe this to be so because it 
helps to explain why in her second letter B2, b appears to “relent” by writing I would 
really have nothing against supervising you.  Compare this with her categorical 'No' 
in B1 it would not really be the done thing.  We are not suggesting that b is unable to 
see the lack of fit between a's exaggerated statement and her actual condition.  
Rather, b recognises a's enthusiasm and persistence, and allows for some flexibility in 
their negotiation. 
 However, in yielding to a's persuasive tone, b adds the further Condition 6 as 
expressed in provided I have the time and so on immediately upon writing I would 
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really have nothing against supervising you.  She goes on to explain that the 
Linguistics Department may prefer to supervise him themselves and that he should 
find out for himself their preference during his proposed visit in April.  And as such, 
a is likely to assume now that conditions 8 and 8' have been added to b's reasoning 
schema as well. 
 In her reasoning, b seems to emphasise to a the need to follow certain 
protocols in his search for an answer to his request.  b draws the line very clearly 
between what is "permissible" at this stage of their correspondence and what is not.  
In this sense then, we identify b's pragmatic reasoning schema as one of expressing 
the deontic relation of permission, and we argue that a, the reader of b's letters, is 
aware of it.  We believe that when a writes in A3 to thank b for agreeing to supervise 
him, he is well aware that b hasn't really agreedin principle and in fact to supervise him, 
but he thanks her nevertheless.  After all, b's reply in B2P2 I would really have 
nothing against supervising you, provided I have time and so on; I merely think that it 
might be felt by the linguistics department that they are well able to provide 
supervision ... themselves is so elaborately modalised and hedged that it can hardly be 
mistaken for anything more than a tentative agreement in principle only.   
 We believe that it is not the case that a is not able to discern b's reasoning 
schema and conditions.  Rather, driven by his own reasoning schema and his goal of 
getting b to agree to supervise him, what a has chosen to do is to mitigate the severity 
of b's objections and reservations by ignoring/downplaying the importance of certain 
conditions.  Note that what follows is a brief description of a’s reasoning schema 
which we shall contrast with b’s reasoning schema.  (We shall argue later, a’s 
reasoning schema matches b’s assumptions about a’s reasoning schema as shown in 
Table 3.4.)  Coming back to our discussion, the conditions which a has chosen to 
ignore/downplay are: 
 
 5. b will continue to be interested in supervising a 
 6. b has time and so on to supervise a 
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 8. Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a 
 8'. a finds out that 8 above is indeed the case 
 
for which he has no control or evidence. 
 He does this by practically ignoring b's hints in letter B3 and B4 that he has 
useful discussion with the Linguistics Department and that he should see them first, 
while maintaining that b is willing to supervise him.  He chooses not to make the 
distinction between willingnessin principle and willingnessin fact.  In addition, a tries to 
emphasise those conditions which he has satisfied.  They are: 
 
 1. a has applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics  
 2. Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a 
 4 b is interested in supervising a 
 
a also tries to emphasise that which he has fulfilled in part: 
 
 5. b will continue to be interested in supervising a 
 
by downplaying the lack of an exact match with the overstated Since your academic 
work covers my field to the full in A2P4.  We have already observed above that a 
chooses to focus on the issue of the current extent of their overlapping interests rather 
than on the status of their overlapping interests in the future. 
 In highlighting point-for-point how he has met some of b's conditions, a is in 
fact appealing to b's sense of integrity and reasonableness in evaluating his eligibility 
and promise as a potential supervisee of hers.  In repeating his request in A2 under 
these circumstances, he therefore places a certain obligation on b to act "reasonably" 
and "justly" towards him. 
 This ties in very well with Holyoak's et al (1995) conclusion about why and 
how some of their subjects, while adopting the role of employee in their reasoning 
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experiments about their rights to a day off, operate on the deontic obligation mode of 
reasoning.  a, who is in a position of need and subjugation in relation to his potential 
provider, adopts the deontic obligation mode of reasoning in an attempt to achieve 
his goal by persuading b with his repeated and enthusiastic request to agree to 
supervise him, thus imposing on b a certain obligation to consent to his request.  The 
repeated request also places b in a doubly face-threatening situation should she decide 
against supervising him.  The situation is face-threatening to b because a’s request 
impinges on b’s negative face (i.e., the need for freedom from imposition).  By 
repeating his request, a makes the situation doubly face-threatening (see Brown and 
Levinson (1978) for a discussion of negative face and negative politeness). 
 (We hasten to add that we do not mean to cast a in such "crafty" terms.  In 
fact, given similar circumstances, any prospective student, anxious for a place in the 
programme, is likely to choose only to highlight his strengths, while omitting mention 
of his weaknesses.  Discrepancies in the application raised are likely to be 
downplayed, while points of possible consensus are emphasised.) 
 On the other hand, b, while adopting the opposite role of responsibility and 
power, operates on the deontic permission mode of reasoning in helping her to 
achieve her goal which is to determine whether she is willing to supervise a.   We 
believe that b, in her capacity as the solicited/sought after supervisor and more 
importantly as the Director of the M.A. programme in Applied Linguistics, has to be 
very careful to dispense only the right amount of advice and only at the right time in 
accordance with that which is permissible under existing University regulations and 
protocols.  Towards the close of the exchange of letters, b continues to hint to a to 
check with the Linguistics Department first and to have useful discussions with them.  
b's final decision on whether she is willingin fact to supervise a hinges on the 
Linguistics Department's willingness.   
 The above seems to us to be a rather arduous account of what must necessarily 
be a very complex issue.  a and b, in their respective roles as prospective student and 
potential supervisor, have to assume quite different points of view and reasoning 
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procedures in order to achieve their goals.  We are not suggesting that both 
interactants must have consciously processed all of the intricacies above in order to 
successfully interpret each other's utterances and intentions.  But surely b must have 
picked up on at least the main thrust of a's underlying obligation-driven reasoning; 
otherwise we will not be able to account for b's cautious stance in her letters.  
Similarly, a must have picked up on b's continual reluctance to tread beyond that 
which is permissible in terms of protocols; otherwise we are hard pressed to explain 
a's need to be persistent and persuasive. 
 You will realise that the above account is based largely on what we assume to 
be a's  assumptions about how b reasons about the issue of supervision.  We have also 
briefly mentioned how this may differ from a's own reasoning schema.  Let us now 
turn our attention to b's assumptions about a's reasoning (which we shall show later 
match a’s actual reasoning).  We summarise b's assumptions about a's reasoning 




Table 3.4: b's assumptions about a's reasoning schema (Obligation) after reading 
all his letters A1 - A4. 
 
  a hopes that b is willing______ to supervise a because: 
 
 
 1. a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics  
 2. Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a 
 3. b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 
 4. b is interested in supervising a 
 5.* b will continue to be interested in supervising a  
 5'.† a's and b's interests coincide to the full 
 6.* b has time and so on to supervise a 
 8.* Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a 
 8'.* a finds out that 8 above is indeed the case 
 
 Conclusions: Therefore 
 7. b is willingin principle to supervise a  
 9. b is willingin fact to supervise a  
 
 
Note: *  Conditions 5, 6, 8 and 8' seem to be treated as optional conditions by a 
 †  Condition 5' is not part of b's list of conditions (see Table 3.3) 
 b probably assumes that a casts Conclusions 7 and 9 together as b is 
willing______ to supervise a 
 
Strictly speaking, the above conditions should be cast as reasons; but for the 
sake of consistency, we shall continue to use the term ‘condition’. 
 
 As the above table shows, a seems to operate with the same set of conditions 
(except 5', which he has added) as b, but he orders them differently in relation to the 
final goal of getting b to agree to supervise him.  b assumes that a has relegated 
Conditions 5, 6, 8 and 8' to being non-crucial/optional conditions in his reasoning 
schema because a persists by repeating his request in A2, even though he knows full 
well that he hasn't met these conditions yet.  For b, the goal can only be achieved if all 
the conditions have been met, i.e., all the conditions are mandatory to b.  But for a, 
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by repeating his request in A2, a acts as though the goal is attainable even though not 
all the conditions have been met.  Condition 5 can only be determined after a has 
actually enrolled in the programme and made a more detailed/tangible proposal.  
Condition 6 can only be determined during the course of b's direction of her own M.A. 
in Applied Linguistics Programme in which she would be able to ascertain if she has 
not over-committed her availability to other students of her own Department and 
hence has time and so on to supervise a.  b assumes that a is aware that conditions 8 
and 8' can only be determined during a's proposed visit in April.  Because b now 
believes that a has downplayed some of her conditions, b assumes that a believes (or 
at least hopes) that b is willing to supervise him in spite of the fact that certain 
conditions laid down by her have not been fulfilled.   
 By repeating his request (in spite of the above), a places a certain 
“obligation”/pressure on b to respond to his request favourably (see earlier discussion 
in this section on how a’s request threatens b’s negative face).  We should not be 
surprised that a has chosen to operate on an obligation mode of reasoning.  After all, 
his position as an anxious prospective student in need of a definite answer (preferably 
'yes') from b is perfectly understandable.  His anxiety is made worse if he, like many 
other students, depends on the success of this application (for a place/supervisor) to 
secure funding from a third source. 
 Finally, in terms of a's mode of reasoning, b probably assumes that a has 
collapsed the distinction between the two levels of willingness into one, as indicated 
by the use of "willing______ " in the table above.  In the absence of any 
acknowledgement on a's part in relation to b's hint that he sees the Linguistics 
Department first during his April visit, b is likely to assume that a has conveniently 
collapsed the two levels of willingness into one in his mode of reasoning. 
 Let us summarise all that we have said so far in this section regarding a's 
reasoning schema, b's reasoning schema, and their assumptions about each other's 
reasoning schema.  We present the summary in terms of a series of flow diagrams to 
track the sequence in which the Base Propositions are to be established.  We have 
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recast the conditions of the reasoning schemas as Base Propositions (see Table 3.5 
below). 
 
Table 3.5: Recasting the reasoning schema conditions as Base Propositions 
 







a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
2 2a Linguistics Department is permitted to let b  supervise a 
3 3a b is permitted to supervise a 
4 3b b is interested in supervising a 
5 3c b will continue to be interested in supervising a 
5' 3c' a's and b's interests coincide to the full 
6 3d b has time and so on to supervise a 
7 3e b is willing in principle to supervise a 
8 2b Linguistics Department is willing to let b  supervise a 
9 3f b is willing in fact to supervise a 
 
 
Note: To be consistent with the original set of BPs identified in Chapter 2, we have 
excluded Condition 8' from our final discussion below. 
 
 Note that establishing BP 3f, i.e., whether b is willingin fact to supervise a,  is 
the goal of this line of reasoning.  The order is linear and cumulative, capturing both 
the systematicity with which the BPs are arranged as well as the sense of the building 
of an edifice of shared beliefs with each step in the flow diagrams (see Figures 3.3 
and 3.4 below).  The flow diagrams are placed side by side for easy comparison of the 
effects of differing perspectives on the reasoning strategies.  Note that each flow 
diagram consists of a series of shaded boxes to be read from top to bottom.  For ease 
of reading, we will use the shorter expression a assumes that b's reasoning schema is 
... and so on, instead of the correct but longer expression we infer that a assumes that 




Figure 3.3: Flow diagrams comparing a's assumptions about b's reasoning, b's 
actual reasoning and a's actual reasoning regarding BP 3f 
 
Base Propositions a's: b's  b's  a's 
      
1 a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 1  1  1 
 |  |  | 
2a Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a 2a  2a  2a 
 |  |  | 
3a b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 3a  3a  3a 
 |  |  | 
3b b is interested in supervising a 3b  3b  3b 
 |  |  | 
3c b will continue to be interested in supervising a 3c  3c  3c 
 |  |  | 
3c' (modified 3c) a's and b's interests coincide to the full |  |  3c' 
 |  |  | 
3d b has time and so on to supervise a 3d  3d  3d 
 |  |  | 
3e b is willing in principle to supervise a 3e  3e  | 
 |  |  | 







3f b is willing in fact to supervise a 3f  3f  3e & 3f 
 
Note: a's: b's a's assumptions about b's reasoning regarding BP 3f 
 b's  b's actual reasoning regarding BP 3f 
 a's  a's actual reasoning regarding BP 3f 
 Light boxes Optional steps in the chain of reasoning 
 Heavy boxes Mandatory steps in the chain of reasoning 
 
Each column of shaded boxes constitutes a flow diagram to be read from top 
to bottom 
 
 The first column lists all the BPs, including a's modification of b's original BP 
3c as BP 3c'.  The second column tracks (reading from top to bottom) a's assumptions 





reasoning regarding the same BP 3f, and the final column tracks a's chain of 
reasoning.  We also assume that the establishing of the status of BP 3f is the 
collaborative and eventual goal of both interactants in the negotiation of their 
positions on the information in the exchange of letters.  (We should emphasise that 
the above shows the chain of reasoning, we are not suggesting that all the BPs in the 
reasoning chain have been established at the end of the exchange of letters.) 
 Comparing the three columns of flow diagrams, we get an immediate feel of 
the intricacies of the reasoning schemas employed by a and b, and their assumptions 
about each other's reasoning schemas. 
 Firstly, the flow diagrams of the first two columns are identical, showing that 
a's assumptions about b's reasoning schema is the same as b's actual reasoning 
schema.  This is a position we have argued for all along.  This of course doesn't mean 
that a is not able to dissociate his assumptions about b's reasoning schema from his 
own schema (see flow diagram of third column).  In fact, we have argued that it is 
this dissociation which enables a to operate quite independently in terms of his own 
reasoning schema.  The result is the adoption of an obligation mode of reasoning in 
order to counteract his assumptions about b's permission mode of reasoning.  (See 
Chapter 6, Section 7, for a similar discussion of a’s ability to dissociate his actual 
belief BP3f from what he writes in his letters.) 
 Secondly,  we see two distinct types of flow diagrams, each corresponding to 
a particular mode of reasoning.  b's permission mode of reasoning is characterised by 
a series of boxes, each of which represents a mandatory step in the reasoning.  In b’s 
view, each step is mandatory in the sense that every intermediate step has to be 
satisfied before the final goal BP3f can be reached.  In contrast, a operates on an 
obligation mode of reasoning which is characterised by a few optional steps (in 
addition to the mandatory ones), represented by the lightly shaded boxes.  As we have 
explained earlier in this section, some of these steps are treated as optional by a 
because he repeats his request to b even though he knows full well that these steps are 
part of b’s reasoning and that he hasn’t satisfied them.   
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 (This is not to suggest that there is necessarily an inherent relationship 
between a particular mode of reasoning, say, the obligation mode, and the occurrence 
of optional steps.  It is just that in our data, we happen to have an example where a 
finds it advantageous to his purpose to ignore certain conditions laid down by b 
(hence, the “optional” status) while imposing on b a certain obligation/pressure to 
consider his request again.) 
 Finally, in b's reasoning schema, BP 3e has to be established first before the 
terminal BP 3f can be established.  This chain of reasoning corresponds with b's 
position of authority which dictates a strict adherence to procedures and protocols.  
On the other hand, a operates on a mode of reasoning which enables him to project a 
certain sense of obligation on b's part to accede to his request.  In the light of the fact 
that a is unable to fulfil certain conditions stipulated by b, a introduces a certain 
flexibility into his reasoning schema which enables him to not only relegate certain 
steps to optional status, but also move BP 3e to the end of the chain of reasoning, 
blurring the distinction between b's willingnessin principle and b's willingnessin fact to 




Figure 3.4: Flow diagrams comparing b's assumptions about a's reasoning, a's 
actual reasoning and b's actual reasoning regarding BP 3f 
 
Base Propositions b's: a's  a's  b's 
      
1 a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 1  1  1 
 |  |  | 
2a Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a 2a  2a  2a 
 |  |  | 
3a b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 3a  3a  3a 
 |  |  | 
3b b is interested in supervising a 3b  3b  3b 
 |  |  | 
3c b will continue to be interested in supervising a 3c  3c  3c 
 |  |  | 
3c' (modified 3c) a's and b's interests coincide to the full 3c'  3c'  | 
 |  |  | 
3d b has time and so on to supervise a 3d  3d  3d 
 |  |  | 
3e b is willing in principle to supervise a |  |  3e 
 |  |  | 







3f b is willing in fact to supervise a 3e & 3f  3e & 3f  3f 
 
Note: b's: a's  b's assumptions about a's reasoning regarding BP 3f 
 a's  a's actual reasoning regarding BP 3f 
 b's  b's actual reasoning regarding BP 3f 
 Light boxes Optional steps in the chain of reasoning 
 Heavy boxes Mandatory steps in the chain of reasoning 
 
Each column of shaded boxes constitutes a flow diagram to be read from top 
to bottom 
 
 In Figure 3.4 above, we offer a comparison of b's assumptions about a's 










 We have attempted to cover a lot of ground in this chapter.  Based on our 
proposed process of interpretation and Brown’s concept of levels on understanding, 
we are able to demonstrate how the expanding context affects the reader’s 
interpretation of certain key utterances related to BP1.  The reader’s interpretation of 
an utterance, we have shown, is not static.   
 In our analyses of the reader’s interpretation of key utterances related to BPs 
2a, 2b and 3a-3f, we further demonstrate the need to consider the reader’s 
assumptions about his writer’s goal and pragmatic reasoning schema.  By examining 
the order in which certain conditions of the reasoning schema are arranged, we are 
able to give an account of the way in which the BPs are/can be established in a linear 
and cumulative order as the exchange of letters continues. 
 In summary then, we have shown that the interpretation of utterances is a 
dynamic process influenced in part by the level of understanding the reader wishes to 
attain in reading, and in part by the reader's assumptions about his writer's goal and 
reasoning schema. 
 










 The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the distribution and dynamics of 
new-given information in extended and continuous written correspondence.  The 
same set of eight letters will be analysed for this purpose.  We begin by examining 
previous treatments/studies of new/given information and acknowledge the 
terminological confusion.  We take Chafe's notion of consciousness as the defining 
factor for the information status of referents.  We use a ternary division of information 
states: activated, available, new. 
 We propose as our conceptual framework for analysis a three-layer 
classification of information structure, combining the triple concerns of the speaker 
regarding her assumptions about the hearer's information state, and the speaker's 
assumptions about the hearer's ability and willingness to accept the speaker's 
packaging of information.  The purpose of using a three-layer classification is to show 
that it is not sufficient to merely consider the speaker's assumptions about her hearer's 
actual information state, but that the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's ability 
and willingness states must be considered as well. 
 We demonstrate the explanatory value of our conceptual framework by 
resolving several issues arising from the lack of a one-to-one correspondence between 
the use of definite/indefinite expressions and the ternary conceptualisation of 
information status.  Using our conceptual framework, we are able to offer a systematic 
account of how new information can be treated as though it is available (sometimes 
referred to in the literature as pragmatic boot-strapping).  More interestingly, we are 
also able to offer an account of how activated/available information can be treated as 
though it is new (a phenomenon rarely discussed in the literature). 
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 We end our discussion by showing how it may not always be helpful to take 
for granted that there is a "default" relation between the use of definite/indefinite 
expressions and activated/new information respectively. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Information structure and status 
 
 On an intuitive level, the packaging of information in a sentence, for example, 
reflects the speaker's/writer's desire to convey certain information to her intended 
hearer/reader as either new or given.  (For the sake of brevity, we will refrain from 
using the term speaker/writer from now on.  Instead we will use either speaker or 
writer depending on whether the examples we discuss concern written or spoken data.  
We will also use the pronoun she to refer to the generic writer, and he to refer to the 
generic reader.  As in Chapter 3, we will continue to refer to the student a as he and 
the potential supervisor b as she.)  Whether this information is solicited or not, the 
speaker, assuming she wishes to convey new information, would have to first 
consider what her intended hearer already knows or considers given.  Otherwise she 
may run the risk of sounding excessively redundant and hence boring to her hearer.  
This is why Prince's remark below seems particularly helpful.  According to Prince, 
information packaging is 
  
the tailoring of an utterance by a sender to meet the particular assumed 
needs of the intended receiver.  That is, information packaging in 
natural language reflects the sender's hypotheses about the receiver's 
assumptions and beliefs and strategies. 
        (Prince, 1981: 224) 
 
 The use of the expression tailoring an utterance  suggests that the utterance 
made by the speaker is really a customised product of the speaker to meet specific 
perceived (whether real or apparent) informational needs of a specific hearer.  We use 
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the expression perceived informational needs because it ties in with Prince's view that 
the packaging of the information is really based on the speaker's hypotheses about the 
hearers.  In the examples to follow, we intend to expand on this observation.  We will 
argue that this hypothesis-construction is actually based on several layers of 
assumptions.  These assumptions involve not only the speaker's assumptions about the 
hearer's existing information state, but also the speaker's assumptions about the 
information the hearer ought to have, the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's 
ability to unpack the information which the speaker encodes in the utterance, and the 
speaker's assumptions about the hearer's willingness to co-operate with the entire 
enterprise.  Of course the speaker may be wrong about any one or more of the above 
layers of assumptions, in which case the hearer will be free to accept, query or reject 
the way the speaker has packaged her information.  This is why we think the term 
hypotheses is so apt for the tentative and speculative nature of the speaker's 
assumptions as reflected in the encoding process. 
 Lambrecht (1994: 3) makes a similar point by highlighting the fact that we are 
really talking about the perceived mental states of the hearer by asserting that these 
perceptions are in fact "hypotheses about the statuses of the mental representations of 
the referents of linguistic expressions in the mind of the receiver at the moment of 
utterance".  It is important to point out from the outset that we take a similar stance 
that information status is a mental construct, a phenomenon located entirely in the 
head of the speaker. 
 Similarly, Chafe (1976: 27) points out that: 
 
The statuses to be discussed here have more to do with how the content 
is transmitted than with the content itself.  Specifically, they all have to 
do with the speaker's assessment of how the addressee is able to 
process what he is saying against the background of a particular 
context.  Not only do people's minds contain a large store of 
knowledge, they are also at any moment in certain temporary states 
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with relation to that knowledge ... Language functions effectively only 
if the speaker takes account of such states in the mind of the person he 
is talking to. 
 
Notice that Chafe asserts that the hearer's mental state is a state of mind in the hearer 
which the speaker has to take into account.  Following from what we have discussed 
in Chapter 1 regarding the nature of the enclosed mind of the hearer, we must then 
assume that the speaker's access to the hearer's mental state is by means of certain 
assumptions which the speaker chooses to hold in regard to the hearer.  Such 
assumptions, as we've already pointed out, are solipsistic, often generated on-line and 
evaluated/calculated on a moment-by-moment basis in regard to the hearer's 
developing/evolving beliefs and state of mind.  This concurs with Chafe's observation 
that the speaker assumes that the hearers' minds are at any moment in certain 
temporary states in relation to the hearer's existing store of knowledge.  In other 
words, certain parts of the hearer's existing knowledge in long term memory can be 
temporarily called to mind or brought to the forefront of working memory or 
activated  depending on how the speaker chooses to package her information.  And it 
is this temporary activation of that which is in the hearer's long term memory store 
which is referred to when Chafe (1976: 30) writes about "what the speaker assumes 
he is introducing into the addressee's consciousness by what he says".  And it is on 
this basis that Chafe claims that the notion of consciousness holds the key to the 
distinction between given and new information. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2 Defining given and new information and other key terms 
 
 In this section, we define some of the keys terms we shall use in the chapter.  
Our definition and discussion of given and new information is necessarily detailed 
because of the need to not only clear the confusion arising from the different ways 
scholars use the two terms, but also to justify our use of Chafe's notion of 
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consciousness as the key to defining given and new information.  The definition of 
the other key terms are more straightforward. 
 
 According to Chafe (1976: 30; bold/emphasis added), 
 
The key to this distinction [between given and new information] is the 
notion of consciousness (Chafe 1974).  Given (or old) information is 
that knowledge which the speaker assumes to be in the consciousness of 
the addressee at the time of the utterance.  So-called new information 
is what the speaker assumes he is introducing into the addressee's 
consciousness by what he says. 
 
Chafe reiterates elsewhere that givenness should be restricted to that knowledge 
which is "in the forefront of the mind" and "spotlighted in the hearer's attention" 
(1970: 211).  Hence in  
 
 (1) Yesterday I saw a little girl get bitten by a dog. 
  I tried to catch the dog, but it ran away. 
         (Chafe, 1972: 52) 
 
the first mention of the entity 'dog' in a dog activates the referent in the hearer’s 
consciousness.  This new referent is standardly introduced by an indefinite expression 
as new information.  Once the referent has been activated in the hearer’s 
consciousness it is then possible to refer to it again as a given referent.  This 
givenness is standardly realised as a definite expression as given information. 
 It is generally accepted that in English there is a "default" correlation 
between the use of definite expression with given information, and the use of the 
indefinite expression with new information (Brown and Yule, 1983: 169).  In the 
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above example, the given referent is realised as a full definite lexical expression the 
dog or as the attenuated pronominal (definite) form it.   
 By a full definite lexical expression, we mean that the referring expression 
used to refer to a given referent contains the same number of lexemes as the original 
referring expression (two lexemes, in the above example, a dog --> the dog).  The 
only difference is a change of the article used from the indefinite a to the definite the.  
Therefore, the dog is a full definite lexical expression.  Similarly, if the expression the 
animal had been used, we shall call it a full lexical expression as well since it contains 
the same number of lexemes.   
 If, however, we use a longer expression (as in the horribly vicious animal), 
this longer expression is called an expanded/elaborate/extended lexical expression.  
(In the discussion of our data in Section 4.2, we shall explain why an expanded lexical 
expression may be used.)  If a shorter form is used (as in the pronominal it), we shall 
call it an attenuated form.  Note that the attenuated form need not be a single lexeme 
expression.  If the original referring expression had been a very elaborate lexical 
expression containing five lexemes (as in a big, black, furry dog), any subsequent 
mention of the dog with an expression containing four or fewer lexemes would be 
considered attenuated.  Thus, a later mention of the referent referred to in the five-
lexeme referring expression will be considered attenuated if the subsequent mention 
contains three lexemes, but considered highly attenuated if the subsequent mention is 
a single lexeme pronominal form. 
 In terms of prosody, the expression used to refer to a given referent is 
characteristically said with an attenuated phonological form (by which we mean, for 
example, lower pitch, weaker stress) while the expression referring to a new referent 
is said with intonational prominence (high pitch, strong stress) (see Chafe, 1976: 31; 
Brown and Yule, 1983: 189). 
 Brown and Yule (1983: 172-174) fine-tune the textually activated state of 
givenness by distinguishing between that which is currently activated and that which 
has been activated but is now displaced.  In making this distinction, they introduce a 
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system of tracking mentions in conversational discourse which tags each referring 
expression with a numerical subscript.  Consider the following example taken from 
the data arising from a diagram task: 
 
 (2) draw a line1 and above it1 write ON2 
 
As the discourse proceeds, each new referent is labelled consecutively (as in a line1, 
and ON2).  If the now given referent ('a line1') is referred to again (as in it1), the same 
numerical subscript is used.  They then make a finer distinction between given 
information which is current and that which is displaced as the following expanded 
examples illustrate: 
 
(3) draw a diameter2 across it1 
(4) draw a straight line5 across the circle1 
 
In (3), the textually evoked referent1 (not shown in example) is still currently 
activated since it has just preceded the second referent 'a diameter2', and is therefore 
referred to as it1 during its second mention.  In (4), the textually evoked referent 'the 
circle1' was introduced previously (not shown in example) and has been displaced 
after the introduction of referents2,3,4,5 (not shown in example except 5).  Therefore 
when referent1 is mentioned again, the full definite lexical expression the circle1 is 
used in order to avoid confusion of reference with the intervening referents.  They 
further observe that the two types of given information are not in free variation for the 
spoken data arising from their diagram task.  They (Brown and Yule, 1983: 174) 
summarise their results as follows: 
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      Current Displaced 
 the + property + NOUN  3  44 
 the + NOUN    21  56 
 pronoun    65  0 
 ellipsis     11  0 
      ____  ____ 
 Total     100  100 
 
(In each case the figures represent the percentage of expressions under each 
head which have this particular form.) 
 
The distribution pattern of the textually evoked referents clearly calls for a distinction 
between two types of givenness.  In a sense then there appears to be at least two levels 
of consciousness: one in which a highly attenuated pronominal or zero form is 
sufficient for the hearer to identify the referent as currently in focus; and one in which 
a more expanded definite lexical expression seems to be needed to identify the 
referent (displaced) from the intervening referents.  In both cases, the referents have 
already been activated in the minds of the listener. 
 The above should be distinguished from recoverable referents which have not 
been mentioned previously in the discourse but which the speaker assumes that the 
reader is able to recover from the context.  For example, in 
 
 (5) I took the bus home this evening.  The driver was drunk. 
 
the driver is recoverable from the referent 'bus' and its associated set.  This is to be 
compared with (6) below 
 
 (6) Robert went to the supermarket.  The bread was stale.   
 
where the bread would be considered as encoding recoverable information because it 
has been evoked via the supermarket scenario (Sanford and Garrod, 1981).  One may 
certainly speculate, in the absence of experimental proof, that the driver is more 
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strongly associated with the bus and hence more easily inferred or recovered than, 
say, bread from the supermarket.  Likewise one may also speculate on the extent to 
which presuppositions are recoverable from the source utterance (see example (8) 
below for a discussion).  But the issue of whether current research in 
psycholinguistics/psychology supports such a continuum of recoverability is missing 
the point of what ordinary people do in everyday speech.  Typically, when a speaker 
ponders on the state of the hearer's existing information state prior to making her 
utterance, the speaker has no access to experimental proof.  She therefore has to rely 
on her own belief (or folk notion) of whatever may already or potentially be in the 
hearer's head.  The speaker then packages her utterance on the basis of this folk 
notion.  And it is this speaker's notion (rather than, say, the more objective 
experimental proof) which influences the packaging of the utterance.  We will return 
to this issue in the next section when we discuss the different layers of assumptions 
made by the speaker regarding the hearer. 
 Chafe (1976: 30) also makes the distinction between knowing something and 
being conscious of something.  In fact, Chafe has repeatedly emphasised (1974, 1976, 
1987) that "the conveying of information in natural language not only involves 
KNOWLEDGE but also CONSCIOUSNESS".  And as Lambrecht (1994: 93), a 
former research assistant of Chafe, rightly points out, "knowing something and 
thinking of something are different mental states".  According to Lambrecht, the first 
has to do with identifiability, the second has to do with activation.  Identifiability "has 
to do with a speaker's assessment of whether a discourse representation of a particular 
referent is already stored in the hearer's mind or not", while activation "has to do with 
the speaker's assessment of the status of the representation of an identifiable referent 
as already 'activated', as merely 'accessible', or as 'inactive' in the mind of the hearer at 
the time of the speech act" (Lambrecht, 1994: 76).  It seems to us then that the former 
has to do with knowledge store while the latter has to do with current attention. 
 With this distinction in mind, Chafe examines Haviland and Clark's (1974) 
notion of "old information" as "what the listener is expected to know already" and 
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"new information" as "what the listener is not expected to know already" and is being 
introduced into the addressee's knowledge for the first time.  Hence if a speaker says: 
 
 (7) I saw your father yesterday. 
 
Chafe would classify your father as new information since there is no prior mention 
of the hearer's father in the discourse, and that "the addressee ... [is certainly] not 
thinking about his father at the moment" (p. 30).  But in Haviland and Clark's 
terminology, your father would have been classified as old information since the 
hearer will certainly have previous experience, prior to the speech event, of his own 
father.   
 (In contrast, Brown's (personal communication) current view is that your 
father refers to a referent which is made available via background knowledge that 
people have fathers or via some personal contacts with the addressee's father prior to 
the current speech event.  Brown concedes that the referent referred to is certainly not 
activated, but she points out that it is not entirely new (or brand-new in Prince's 
terminology) either.  In Prince's terminology, the referent referred to in your father is 
an unused new entity.)  
 In other words, when Chafe speaks about a referent being in the hearer's 
consciousness, he assumes that the hearer is already thinking about the referent at the 
moment of the utterance, or that the referent is "already activated" in the speaker's 
mind.   
 This view of givenness is contrasted with that of Haviland and Clark (which 
we have already alluded to briefly above).  We will now expand on the Clarkian 




He [the speaker] agrees to convey information he thinks the listener 
already knows as given information and to convey information he 
thinks the listener doesn't yet know as new information. 
 
They claim that one of the possible use of the it-cleft construction is to convey 
"given" information, as the following example shows: 
 
 (8) It was Percival who piqued the professor. 
 
They argue that "for a speaker to utter this sentence, he must be confident that the 
listener already knows that someone piqued the professor" (p. 4).  In philosophical 
terminology, they are in fact identifying the semantic presupposition as the given 
information or as the "antecedent" to (8).  Similarly for (7), Clark and Haviland 
probably assume that the presupposition that the addressee has a father constitutes 
given information.  Our observation here is that while Chafe draws on the 
psychological status of referents (e.g., 'father') as the basis of discussion, Clark and 
Haviland's example draws from propositional substance (in this instance, 
presupposition) as the basis of discussion.  This is not to suggest that Chafe's interest 
in information is confined to the referent-level only; in fact, he argues that the 
"concept" of the verb, adjective, adverb or preposition can be "lit up" as well (see 
Chafe, 1976, 1987). 
 Coming back to our discussion of (8) above, Brown and Yule (1983: 178) 
express a similar sentiment when they point out that the term 'given' is "no longer 
being used as an analytical term to describe the status of the referents of expressions 
within the clause (or tone group), but is being used of the presuppositions attributed to 
clauses within sentences".  A further complication is that the Clarkian view 
encompasses the notion of shared knowledge (by which they mean mutual in our 
terminology) as well, which opens the floodgates to problems associated with the 
exacting requirements of mutual knowledge discussed in Chapter 2.  Finally, the 
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Clarkian notion of givenness is much more expansive than the restricted scope of 
Chafean givenness.  This obviously poses difficulties in discussing the current 
literature on givenness because different scholars use the term to mean different 
things. 
 An even more expansive use of the term givenness is found in Sanford and 
Garrod's use of the notion of scenario (which has been mentioned in passing above).  
According to Sanford and Garrod (1981: 114), the scenario "enables referring to 
individuals to be made in the first instance by a definite noun-phrase, because they are 
already given in the representation".  As Brown & Yule (1983: 181) rightly point out, 
givenness in this sense refers not only to that information which is activated in the 
hearer's consciousness (Chafe's notion), nor is it just that which is made/already 
known to the hearer (Clark's notion), but that which is evoked within the confines of 
the scenario.  Hence in the previous example, here reproduced as (9): 
 
 (9) Robert went to the supermarket.  The bread was stale.   
 
the bread would be considered as referring to a given referent because it has been 
evoked via the supermarket scenario. 
 It becomes apparent by now that what is considered "given" depends on 
whether we define it in terms of consciousness, shared assumptions arising from 
inferences, or a more expansive notion involving common and relevant background 
knowledge.  Our view is that surely all three concerns of activation, availability and 
general knowledge are important to the speaker in helping her to decide on the way 
she should/wants to package the information.  But our interest here lies in the notion 
of consciousness.  We shall use the labels activated, available and new to refer to the 
three states of hearer's consciousness as assumed by the speaker (see Section 3.1 for a 
discussion).  As far as it is possible, we avoid the label given.  We avoid the label 
given because it is bound to lead to a certain degree of conceptual confusion, as our 
discussion of the various uses of the term given above suggests. 
 111 
 We should also point out that because our interest here lies in the notion of 
consciousness, we will exclude discussion of eclectic approaches to "givenness".  
See, for example, Ariel’s (1988, 1990, 1991) accessibility hierarchy and more 
recently, Gundel's et al (1993) givenness hierarchy.  As Chafe (1994: 179) points out, 
all the above hierarchies are essentially "a conflation of activation cost, identifiability 
and the functioning of demonstratives", the forcing of which into a single dimension 
is something which "would be more profitable to keep apart". 
 In an early paper, Chafe (1976) warns against confusing "givenness" (i.e., in 
terms of consciousness/activation/attention state) with contrastiveness (p. 33) and 
identifiability (p. 39).  And more recently, Chafe (1993: 179; cited above) points out 
again the problem with mixing the different concepts with givenness.   
 There is of course value in adopting an eclectic approach if the goal is to 
identify as many implicationally related cognitive statuses (six, in Gundel's et al case) 
as possible in order to give a "fuller" account of the various uses of referring 
expressions in natural language discourse.  Our goal is different.  Our aim is more 
narrow; we are only concerned with activation states (or consciousness) and the forms 
related to them.  If we adopt Gundel's classification, we will be examining NP forms 
related to things other than the attention/activation state, like identifiability, 
familiarity and the use of demonstratives and even contrastiveness. 
 Gundel et al (1993: 275) identify six cognitive statuses relevant to the form of 
referring expressions (indicated below in { } brackets) in natural language discourse, 
which they place on a single hierarchical scale in which the higher statuses (to the 
left) will necessarily entail the lower statuses (to the right) but not vice versa (see 
hierarchy below).  For example, if the pronominal it is used, this means that the 
cognitive status of the referent referred to is not only in focus, but also activated, 
familiar, uniquely identifiable and so on. 
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    The Givenness Hierarchy 
 
        in                 type 
     focus     >     activated     >     familiar     >     uniquely     >     referential     >     identifiable 
 
      {it}    {that}   {that N}  {the N}        {indefinite this N}         {a N} 
    {this} 
    {this N} 
       Source:  Gundel et al (1993: 275) 
 
 The value of Gundel's et al hierarchy is that it encompasses the notions of 
activation cost, identifiability and the use of demonstratives.  The drawback is that it, 
like Prince's (1981) taxonomy of given-new information, only takes into account the 
speaker's assumptions about the hearer's actual information state. It does not offer any 
account of the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's ability and willingness states.  
This is an important point because the speaker can and often does package that 
information she assumes to be new to her hearer as though it is "given" information, 
i.e., she assumes additionally that her hearer is able and willing to treat the new 
information as though it is already "given" information.  This is exemplified in the 
"non-default" use (see discussion above) of the definite expression to refer to new 
information. 
 Another important account of information packaging lies in the work of Givon 
(1979; 1983; 1992) who offers an explanation of the range of forms used (and word 
ordering options) in terms of their relative degree of topicality/topic continuity.  
Givon (1983) sees topic continuity as a property of discourse referents.  These 
referents are ranked on a scale of continuity from the most continuous (i.e., those 
referents mentioned most recently) to the least.  The most continuous (most 
accessible) referents are encoded by the zero anaphora and/or unstressed pronouns, 
while the least continuous (least accessible) referents are encoded by indefinite NPs, 




Zero anaphora  >  unstressed pronouns  >  stressed pronouns  >  right-
dislocated DEF NPs  >  neutral ordered DEF NPs  >  left-dislocated DEF 
NPs  >  Y-moved NPs (contrastive)  >  clefts  >  indefinite referential NPs 
 
 Note that the referents with intermediate statuses are encoded by the forms of 
the referring expression as well as by the word order options (as in the use of right-
dislocation, cleft construction, etc.).  Once again, the value of Givon's account, like 
the hierarchies postulated above, lies in its incorporation of different concerns.  
Givon's concerns include referential distance (by which he means recoverability/ 
predictability (see Givon, 1979: 60-61) as well as availability/identifiability (Givon, 
1992: 12) and other considerations like emphasis and contrastiveness (as indicated by 
the incorporation of word order options above).  Recall Chafe's warning above 
regarding the dangers of conceptual confusion arising from such a conflation of very 
different concerns.  Notwithstanding Chafe's skepticism, we believe that Givon's goal 
is to address a larger issue.  In Givon's (1979: xiv) own words, his purpose is to offer 
"a redefinition of syntax in terms of communicative function and discourse-
pragmatics, and thus of the relation between the function of grammatical devices and 
their formal properties".  This explains in part the broad range of concerns which 
Givon addresses in his notion of topic continuity.  Our interest in this chapter is less 
expansive.  We are primarily concerned with the forms of the referring expression, 
and not so much with word order options or other syntactic constructions.  We adopt 
Chafe's more restrictive definition of "givenness" in terms of consciousness/attention 
states and extend this notion to our interest in the three layers of assumptions made by 
the speaker regarding her hearer's actual information state, ability and willingness 
states in helping her to package her referring expressions.  Givon's framework, like 
the other frameworks mentioned above, does not take into consideration the speaker's 
layers of assumptions.   
 In Section 3 below, we offer an extended discussion of the importance of 
making this three-way distinction between the speaker's assumptions about her 
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hearer's actual information state in packaging her referring expressions and her 
assumptions about her hearer's ability and willingness to accept her packaging of 
information.  We further argue that our conceptual framework (to be proposed in 
Section 3.3) accommodates these three layers of assumptions made by the speaker.  
We demonstrate the explanatory value of our framework by applying it to our data.  
We shall also demonstrate how our framework is able to handle referring expressions 
with dual information status (see Section 4.2).  To the best of our knowledge, we 
are not aware of any other existing model/hierarchy/taxonomy which is able to 
account for all the above concerns regarding the speaker's layers of assumptions as 
well as account for expressions referring to referent units with dual information status. 
 We should just make one further comment before we move on to develop our 
conceptual framework.  As our interest lies entirely in the packaging of referring 
expressions, we shall exclude discussion of information structure at the sentential 
level.  According to Prince (1986; 1992), information packaging can take place at two 
levels: the sentential level and the noun phrase level.  As Prince (1992: 399) points 
out, "the two levels are mutually independent, though statistical relationships may 
exist between them".  We are aware of accounts of information packaging which 
relate to syntactic notions (selected references to follow) like theme-rheme (Halliday, 
1967; 1985), topic-comment (Gundel, 1974; 1988), left- and right-dislocation (Ashby, 
1988; Geluykens, 1987; Prince, 1984; Vallduvi, 1994), it-clefts (Atlas & Levinson, 
1981; Ball, 1994) and others.  But our current interest here is in the noun phrase level.  
In the next section, we explain our conceptual framework for analysing the data.   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3 The speaker's perspective of information status 
 
 We have seen so far that there is not only a terminological confusion related to 
the notion of givenness, but also a conceptual confusion of the notion at various 
levels.  We have also explained briefly the need to take into account the three layers 
of assumptions made by the speaker in information packaging.  In this section, we 
 115 
shall take pains to explain our position in detail on the issue.  It is hoped that our 
account will be sufficient to lay the foundation for our proposed conceptual 
framework. 
 We take as the starting point of our discussion that it is the speaker who 
determines what information is expressed as activated or new.  Although various 
syntactic structures have been described in the literature as conveying activated/new 
information, we maintain that it is the speaker/writer who entertains an idea and 
encodes that idea in words.  Often it is even possible for the writer to determine how 
she wants her reader to assess the information status of the encoded referents, quite 
independently of the default syntactic forms these referents normally take.  We should 
qualify this by saying that there are certainly correlations between particular syntactic 
forms and particular information status; the correlations aren't necessarily causal nor 
rule-based.  The correlations are at best described as "regularities", i.e., scholars have 
argued that definite noun phrases (NPs) are often used by the speaker to present 
"given" information while indefinite NPs are often used by the speaker to present new 
information, but not always. 
 Writing about oral communication, Halliday (1967: 211) states quite 
unequivocally that "what is new is in the last resort what the speaker chooses to 
present as new" [italics/emphasis mine].  Very similar sentiments have been 
expressed in Brown & Yule (1983: 189) that "information status is determined, not by 
the structure of discourse but by the speaker", and in Prince (1981: 224), "it is only 
the sender's assumptions at the time of producing the utterance that are relevant to the 
structure and distribution of given-new information". 
 A less obvious observation is that although it is true that what is activated is 
what the speaker chooses to present as activated, the hearer is at liberty to accept or 
reject the speaker's imposition on him.  Therefore, of equal interest is the hearer's 
perception of the in-coming information: whether he perceives the information to be 
activated/new; the hearer's perception of how the speaker intends the information to 
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be received; and whether he wants to co-operate with the speaker's intention.  (See 
Chapter 3 for a discussion of the reader's (or hearer's) perspective in interpretation.) 
 There is a third possible perspective on information status - that of the 
omniscient observer, a perspective which the discourse analyst should be careful not 
to assume.  Technically speaking, the third perspective is possible, although it is 
unlikely that individuals will have direct access to such a Being during normal 
everyday discourse.  Prince (1981) makes a similar point about the error of taking 
given information to mean something pertaining to "shared" knowledge (by which she 
means mutual).  Such a position, she claims, is "taking the position of an omniscient 
observer and is not considering what ordinary, nonclairvoyant humans do when they 
interact verbally" (p. 233). 
 Coming back to the speaker's perspective, we have already suggested in 
Section 1 that the speaker's hypothesis-construction about the hearer's information 
state is based on several layers of assumptions.  These assumptions involve: 
 
(a) the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's existing information state, 
(b) the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's ability to decode the information 
the speaker encodes in the utterance, whether this information is presented 
directly or indirectly,  
(c) the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's willingness to accept the 
speaker's presentation of the status of the information, whether or not this 
presentation concurs with the hearer's existing information state in (a) 
 
 We believe the point that there are layers of assumptions affecting information 
packaging has not been made sufficiently clear in the literature in analysing 
information structure and is probably one of the main sources of confusion remaining.  
The confusion over the different ways of conceptualising information status in terms 
of consciousness, sharedness, identifiability and predictability has received a fair 
amount of discussion and clarification.  Prince (1981), in particular, offers a very 
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helpful discussion of the various ways givenness has been used in the literature in 
terms of the three factors of: predictability/recoverability, saliency, and shared 
knowledge/assumed familiarity.   
 But concerning the various layers of speaker's assumptions, nothing much has 
been discussed in the literature.  To be fair though, the different layers of assumptions 
have been alluded to.  For example, Prince (1981:224) speaks about the "sender's 
hypotheses about the receiver's assumptions and beliefs and strategies", and by 
strategies we assume that Prince is referring in part to the speaker's assumptions about 
the hearer's ability (layer (b) above) to unpack the information intended by the 
speaker.  Similarly, Chafe (1976: 27) refers to this assumption of the hearer's ability 
when he writes about "the speaker's assessment of how the addressee is able to 
process what he is saying against the background of a particular context".  In regard to 
the phenomenon of "delayed construal" of the expression he in: 
 
 (10) a Peter went to see Bill, but he was not at home. 
  b Peter went to see Bill, but he had to return 
       (Dahl, 1976; originally  
       attributed to Lashley, 1951) 
 
Lambrecht (1994: 102) argues that "the hearer is able to keep the interpretation of the 
pronoun on hold until a referent can be assigned on the basis of the entire sentence in 
which it occurs".  As such, he concludes that the use of the pronoun "cannot always 
be understood as evidence that the speaker assumes that a representation of the 
specific referent is already ‘lit up’ in the hearer's mind at the time the pronoun is 
uttered.  Rather, the use of the pronoun indicates the speaker's assessment that the 
hearer is able to INFER the referent from contextual clues".  Again, we see the 
reference to the importance of considering the notion of hearer's ability in 
information packaging.  Implicit in Lambrecht's comments above is the suggestion 
that the speaker has to make certain assumptions  about the hearer's willingness to 
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co-operate in the entire enterprise as well.  The fact that the speaker assumes that the 
hearer is willing to keep the interpretation of he "on hold" is evidence of what we 
postulate to be the third layer of assumption which the speaker makes about her 
hearer's willingness (layer (c) above) to co-operate. 
 We need to clarify the distinction between the different layers because what 
might be assumed by the speaker to be new at one layer may not be so at another 
layer.  But before we delve into an account of how a three-layer conceptualisation can 
help to clarify the process in which the speaker packages information, we should 
point out that there is a further layer of assumption which may be of interest to the 
speaker: 
 
(d) the speaker's assumptions about what the hearer ought to be informed of (i.e., 
what the speaker wants/desires the hearer to know/believe) 
 
The assumptions in (d) affect the speaker's choice of information to be presented, 
whereas the assumptions in (a) - (c) affect the packaging of such information as 
decided upon in (d).  As our current concern here is with the how of information 
packaging, and not with the what of information packaging, we will only discuss 
issues pertaining to (a) - (c) below.  (d) will only be referred to insofar as it relates 
directly to matters raised under (a) - (c). 
 
3.1 The speaker's assumptions about the hearer's existing information state 
 
 First of all, regarding (a) above, what are the possible positions a speaker can 
take?  Following Chafe (1987: 22ff), we believe the speaker may assume the 






(ii) available (semi-active/accessible) 
 
(iii) new (inactive) 
 
Using the above classification, one immediate problem will be that of classifying 
referring expressions which refer to referent units with dual information status, as in 
the following example taken from Prince (1981: 237):  
 
(11) Susie went to visit her grandmother and the sweet lady was making 
Peking Duck. 
 
where the referent 'grandmother', referred to in the lady, constitutes activated 
information while the attribute sweet constitutes new information.  We could of 
course argue further that the lady may constitute new information as well since it tells 
the hearer something more about the speaker's perception of her grandmother as a 
lady (hence, a "lady-ish" grandmother), and not just an ordinary woman, whatever 
that means.  But in Prince's classification, the NP the sweet lady refers to a given 
entity (Evoked) + attribute.  (Prince's evoked entity is similar to that of Brown's 
textually given entity).  In other words, the attribute is not analysed for its 
contribution to the information status of the referent referred to in the NP even though 
it is clearly part of the encoded information of the NP and intended by the writer.  
This is clearly unsatisfactory.  Our solution is to assign the reference of the expression 
the sweet lady to two categories: the referent is activated, the attribute(s) new. 
 The conceptualisation of (ii) as involving the availability, rather than 
activation, of the referent is more difficult to grapple with.  The notion of availability 
relies heavily on the assumptions that the intended referents are not referred to 
directly in the text but inferable via some form of commonsensical/general reasoning, 
back tracking to a not so recent previous mention, or via background/shared 
knowledge/belief of membership of a particular set/frame/schema/scenario.  We shall 
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use the following terms to refer to the above types of availability: availablereasoning, 
availabledisplaced and availableschema respectively.   
 Obviously, what is available via schema depends on the extent the referent is a 
prototypical member of the schematic set.  Similarly, what is available via reasoning 
depends on the number of intervening steps the speaker assumes the hearer needs to 
infer in order to arrive at the referent referred to; and how available a displaced 
referent is depends in general on its distance from its first mention. 
 Consider the following example (Kempson, forthcoming: 9): 
 
 (12) John walked into the kitchen. 
  The windows were filthy. 
 
where "the marker of definiteness on the windows is not marking co-reference, but 
rather a different type of link with some preceding expression, a link we can establish 
via our knowledge that kitchens have windows".  She makes the further observation 
that "unlike pronouns, definite NPs sometimes don't seem to be anaphoric at all".  In 
other words, the expression refers to entities which are textually new (since there is no 
prior mention), but can be treated as available via inference from background 
knowledge/belief.  (Brown (personal communication), however, points out that the 
expression the windows [note the plural] may be construed as being informative since 
the stereotypical British kitchen has a single window.) 
 Now consider: 
 
 (13) Mary got some picnic supplies out of the car. 
  The beer was warm. 
 
where the beer has been classified by Haviland and Clark (1974: 515) as referring to 
"given" information on the basis that 'beer' is inferable from the semantic set and 
allegedly activated by the expression picnic supplies  even though there is no explicit 
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mention of beer in the text.  But if we use Chafe’s notion of consciousness as the 
defining characteristic of "givenness", the use of the beer will presume availability on 
the part of the hearer rather than currency of activation.  We wish to go one step 
further in the discussion by suggesting that there is really no hard evidence that the 
beer is any more available, psychologically speaking, from the speaker’s point of 
view than, say, 
 
 (14) Mary got some picnic supplies out of the car. 
  The sushi was warm. 
 
First of all, although sushi is not one of the prototypical foods associated with picnic 
supplies (at least from the point of view of a typical working class white British 
family), there is really no reason to suppose that the hearer will find the utterance any 
more difficult (discounting micro-second difference in processing time which the 
speaker is not conscious of anyway) to understand than the previous utterance (13).  
Secondly, although it can be argued, in the light of retrospective evidence from 
psychological experiments, that the reading times of beer versus sushi may prove to 
be different in relative availability, it must be remembered that the speaker at the time 
of the utterance has no such evidence.  We suspect that the issue for the speaker in 
uttering the expression then is not just one of considering/assuming the availability of 
the referent in the hearer’s mind per se, but also one of assuming that the hearer is 
willing to accept the information as available even though it is clearly textually new 
and probably only marginally available.  Hence if I were to utter the following to a 
fellow citizen in your presence: 
 
 (15) Mary got some picnic supplies out of the car. 
  The beehoon was warm. 
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you, as an overhearer (and if you're not familiar with my cultural background), are 
quite likely to accept my utterance as intending you to accept the referent 'beehoon' as 
available.  In fact, you are likely to infer that beehoon is probably a type of picnic 
food.  [Gloss:  Beehoon is the Hokkien word for rice noodles, a popular picnic food in 
my country.] 
 Lambrecht (1994: 105) expresses a similar view (but in relation to the active-
inactive dichotomy): 
 
I believe that the main criterion in manipulating the pragmatic states of 
referents in a discourse is not whether some referent is "objectively" active 
or inactive in a hearer's mind but whether a speaker assumes that a hearer 
is willing and able, on the basis of grammatical forms with particular 
presuppositional structures, to draw certain inferences which are necessary 
to arrive at the correct interpretation of a referent. 
 
 Coming back to our original concern with what constitutes activation, we can 
safely conclude that apart from more objective evidence to be derived from 
psycholinguistic experiments, the speaker in reality has no access to such evidence 
on-line.  The speaker can never really know for sure whether the referents are 
currently activated or merely available via inferencing.   
 Now consider (16) below which is an extract from a recent speech made by 
the current President of the United States of America, Bill Clinton, addressed to the 
American Congress (cited in Chipere, 1996b; see also 1996a for a discussion).  The 
President’s address was televised live nation-wide (USA).  Prior to this extract, 
Clinton spoke on the evils of environmental pollution and why 'big polluters' ought to 




(16) My fellow Americans, we have work to do.  Let us seize those days and 
the century. Thank you, and God bless you and God bless America.  
(Applause.) 
         (Clinton, 1997) 
 
In (16), the definite expressions refer to various groups of referents: My fellow 
Americans (refers to Congress); we, us (Congress + Clinton); you, you (Congress); 
and America (Congress + Clinton + general public, including presumably the big 
polluters).  The first use of the definite lexical expression My fellow Americans is for 
the purpose of referring to the intended audience which in this case is a situationally 
evoked entity (borrowing Prince’s (1981) terminology).  In Clarkian terminology 
(Clark et al, 1981), the use of the above expression involves the notion of physical co-
presence.   
 What is interesting is the way Clinton exploits the antecedent in its various 
pronominal "anaphoric" realisations (all of which are definite and presumably 
activated).  Chipere (1996b: 5) correctly observes that the "referring expressions 
create patterns of exclusion and inclusion" and that "the referent at any one time is 
whatever is included".  He adds  further that referring "does not simply involve 
connecting a referring expression with a pre-existing object" but that it is also "an act 
of attention which creates objects for particular purposes" (cf. discussion of (22) 
below).   
 From an information status point of view, each time the speaker (Clinton) 
partitions the referential scope of his pronouns, he expects his hearers to be able to 
work out his intended treatment of the information on-line, and that he expects his 
hearers to co-operate in this enterprise.  While we agree entirely with Chipere's 
analysis of how Clinton partitions the referential scope of his pronouns, we would not 
go as far as to say that this process of partitioning actually "creates objects" for 
reference.  It seems to us that the choice of either us or you depends on what the 
speaker picks out to be situationally salient at the time of speaking, rather than as 
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instances of creating/establishing new objects (see, however, the Little Mermaid 
example of (17) discussed below). 
 The next question is how Clinton's intended audience may be supposed to be 
able to partition the changing and supposedly "activated" referents of his definite 
expressions.  We believe the answer lies in part in the fact that the speaker assumes 
(and often rightly so) that the hearer is able to infer the intended referent based on his 
existing background knowledge.  This background knowledge is not simply a list of 
"shared" information but structured in the sense that the information is organised 
systematically.  Hence, in Kempson’s example (12) mentioned above, the windows is 
retrievable from the hearer’s background knowledge that kitchens have windows, 
sinks, cookers, etc., but not sofas, beds, etc., because the hearer knows that only 
certain entities are functionally and systematically associated with kitchens.  Greene 
et al (1994) (cited in Cornish, 1996: 26) make a similar point regarding the use of 
unheralded pronouns (i.e., pronouns without textual antecedents): 
 
The process by which unheralded pronouns pick out their referents 
cannot be mediated by textual antecedents in the immediate discourse; 
rather, these pronouns can only be comprehended if, in the course of 
constructing and understanding a discourse, speakers and addressees 
make knowledge that they hold in common relatively more accessible 
than other knowledge. 
 
 Regarding this common knowledge, Lambrecht (1994: 90) proposes the 
"existence of a cognitive SCHEMA" which he argues is similar to Chafe's (1987: 29) 
notion of "interrelated expectations" associated with a schema, and which is also 
similar to Fillmore’s (1976, 1982 and 1985) notion of the frame (cf. Schank's (1973) 




By the term "frame" I have in mind any system of concepts related in 
such a way that to understand any of them you have to understand the 
whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a 
structure is introduced into a text, or a conversation, all of the others 
are automatically made available. 
        (Fillmore, 1982: 111) 
 
 But regarding this frame, Lambrecht rightly observes: 
 
The frame within which a referent becomes identifiable can be so broad 
as to coincide with the speaker/hearer's natural or social universe ....  It 
can be narrower....  Or it can be the physical environment in which a 
speech act takes place....  the text-internal discourse world itself can be 
such a cognitive frame. 
 
The issue of how context is constrained in the process of finding antecedents for 
anaphors is made more confounding if we want to get at the on-line level of figuring 
out exactly what is activated and what is merely available at the moment of hearing a 
particular referring expression. 
 Fortunately for the speaker, the need to determine with experimental 
objectivity the actual information state of the hearer is not at issue in information 
packaging.  The speaker, obviously, has no access nor needs any direct access to such 
information.  Indeed if such information were available to the speaker, she would have 
discovered that the hearer's actual state of consciousness would have been a 
continuum of various levels of alertness [gloss: I use the theory-neutral term alertness 
to include the various states of activation, availability and newness].  What is in fact at 
issue in information packaging is the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's state of 
consciousness.  And evidence (from linguistic analysis) so far regarding the speaker's 
treatment of the hearer's information state suggests a ternary division.  Since our 
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current concern is with the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's state of 
consciousness of, say, referents, and not with the hearer's actual state of consciousness, 
we shall employ a ternary division of information status. 
 The second issue is perhaps more important for our purpose here, and it 
concerns not so much the objective classification but the subjectivity with which the 
speaker makes her decisions about the hearer’s state of consciousness.  The point 
made earlier that the speaker has no direct access to the mind of the hearer is worth 
repeating, because it is the very substance (or lack of it) of the speaker’s 
decision/hypothesis testing.  Sometimes the speaker may have little idea about the 
status of certain background knowledge which the hearer may or may not share.  
Sometimes, we suspect the speaker may not worry too much about the hearer’s state 
of consciousness regarding a particular referent; the speaker may simply present the 
information as available (or as if available) and expect the hearer to accept the 
information as it is.  As has been pointed out elsewhere (see, for example, Hawkins, 
1978, and Lyons, 1980), the hearer can choose to accept the definite reference as 
establishing the required knowledge.  Lyons (1980: 86-87) cites a few examples of 
how the definite article the is used in instances where new information is involved.  In 
one example, Lyons argues that the Little Mermaid in  
 
(17) I'm coming to Copenhagen tomorrow; I suggest we meet at the Little 
Mermaid at six o'clock. 
 
may still be a successful instance of referring even if the hearer hasn't heard of it 
before, provided he is prepared to co-operate and assume that it refers to a famous 
landmark which most people on the street will be able to direct him to.  Rather than 
appeal to some notion of inferable information, the Little Mermaid may well be used 
by the speaker to inform the hearer of the existence of the referent.  As such, Lyons 
concludes that "the success of the definite reference ... depends on the hearer's 
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willingness and ability to co-operate in the conversation by using his imagination or 
powers of reasoning" (bold/emphasis added). 
 This is an important point because it is often assumed in the literature that the 
speaker must take into account the hearer’s state of mind each time she produces a 
definite/indefinite expression.  The speaker may choose not to do so at times.  There 
are obviously situations where the speaker can resort to this practice (as in (17) 
above) without appearing incoherent and uncooperative to the hearer.  The crucial 
point is how the speaker is able to decide when it is appropriate/possible to present 
new information as if it is available (or to present available information as if it is new) 
without appearing presumptuous or incoherent to the hearer, and when it would be 
considered inappropriate.  We believe the answer to this question of appropriateness 
is very complex, but our data suggest that the answer does lie in part in the various 
notions of specificity (see discussion of (35)), generics (see (32)), and certain 
pragmatic principles pertaining to clarity (see (18)), economy (see (18)), expedience 
(see (31)), politeness (see (40)) and prudence (see (35) & (36)) (we shall return to 
these notions later in our discussion of the examples listed above). 
 If we consider the observation that: 
 
(i) there is a continuum of actual information states of referents which the 
hearer may hold, 
(ii) the speaker's assumptions of the hearer's information state are ternary, 
but  
(iii) there is a two-way distinction of definite and indefinite expressions, 
 
then it is not entirely unexpected that we find so many exceptions to the "default" one-
to-one correlation between the definite/indefinite expressions (or prosody features like 
low/high pitch) and activated/new information status respectively.  We are 
understandably confronted with many instances of the "non-default" use of definite 
expressions to refer to referents which are new but treated as though they are available 
 128 
(e.g., the case of pragmatic boot-strapping where a complex definite NP is used to 
refer to an unidentifiable referent (Lambrecht, 1994: 91-92)).  Similarly, it may not be 
entirely out of order to find instances of the "non-default" use of indefinite expressions 
to refer to activated/available information but treated as though the referents are new.  
And this is precisely the same point made by Lambrecht (1994: 84) in the following: 
 
While the definite/indefinite contrast is in principle a matter of yes or 
no, identifiability is in principle a matter of degree. .....  Even though 
grammatical markers of definiteness are normally indicators of two-
way distinctions and cannot mark degrees, there are interesting formal 
hedges between definiteness and indefiniteness marking, which seem 
to stem from a psychological need for the grammatical expression of 
intermediate degrees of identifiability. 
 
While Lambrecht may be referring to identifiability in the above extract, we believe 
his observation is applicable to the notion of consciousness (or activation, in his 
terminology) as well.  We depart from Lambrecht's stand that the psychological need 
is to express intermediate degrees of identifiability; we believe that the need is 




3.2 The speaker's assumptions about the hearer's ability to unpack the 
information 
 
 In discussing the psychological status of available and inferable information, 
we have inadvertently broached the issue of the nature of the speaker's assumptions 
about the hearer's ability to unpack the information the speaker packs into her 
utterance, whether this information is presented directly or indirectly.  This is 
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unavoidable considering the fact that it is quite impossible, from the speaker’s point 
of view, to tease apart the three layers of assumptions: i.e., the assumptions the 
speaker makes regarding the hearer’s state of consciousness are inextricably bound to 
her assumptions about the hearer’s ability and willingness to make sense of the 
utterances.  Regarding the hearer’s ability, the speaker may therefore assume that the 
hearer is: 
 
(i) able to receive the information as activated 
 
(ii) able to receive the information as available 
 via displacement/schema/general reasoning 
 
(iii) able to receive the information as new 
 
3.3 The speaker's assumptions about the hearer's willingness to accept the 
speaker's presentation of the status of the information 
 
 Regarding the above, the speaker may assume that the hearer is: 
 
(i) willing to accept the information as activated 
 
(ii) willing to accept the information as available 
 
(iii) willing to accept the information as new 
 
In addition, the speaker may simply want the hearer to treat the information as though 
it is available even though the information is clearly new.  In this situation, the 
speaker assumes that the hearer will be willing to co-operate in this endeavour.  And 
as we will see later in our analysis, there is a final possibility that the speaker may 
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want the hearer to treat the information as though it is new even though it is clearly 
available/activated.  We therefore add the following to the list: 
 
(iv) willing to accept the information as though it is available 
 
(v) willing to accept the information as though it is new 
 
 If we accept the observation that there are (at least) three layers of 
assumptions, then we might intuitively assume that there are three layers of 
information structure as well, each layer of information structure with its own 
distribution of information types.   
 To recapitulate, we summarise our conceptual framework in the following 
table.  For ease of presentation, the first layer of assumptions is shown in column (a), 
the second layer in column (b), and the third layer in column (c). 
 
Table 4.1:  Layers of information structure (a - b - c), and types of information status 
(activated, available, new) 
 
 
The speaker assumes that : 
 
(a)  the hearer's state of 
consciousness regarding a 
referent unit is: 
 
(b)  the hearer is able to 
unpack the referent unit as 
referring to ________ info 
(c)  the  hearer is willing to 
treat the referent unit as 














as though New 
 
New 






as though Available 
 
 
Note:  We use the term referent unit to include both the referent and its attribute(s).  
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 In addition, we shall employ the following breakdown of subtypes of 
information status in our labelling: 
 
1. Activated i Immediate/last preceding mention 
   ii Situation salience 
   iii Topical salience 
 
2. Available i Displaced 
   ii Schema 
   iii Reasoning 
 
3. New  (no distinction is made between brand new and unused) 
 
 You will notice later that in our analysis, the "default" pairing of 
activated/new information with definite/indefinite expressions respectively results 
from the writer's consistency of assumptions about her reader across the three layers.  
In other words, the "default" use of a definite expression to refer to an activated 
referent is the result of a consistent set of across-layer assumptions of the following 
combination: 
 
 Activated - Activated - Activated 
 
where that which is assumed by the writer about the reader's information state (the 
first layer) is the same as her assumptions about the reader's ability and willingness 
states (the other two layers).  Similarly, the "default" use of an indefinite 
expression to refer to a new referent is the result of a consistent set of across-layer 
assumptions of the following combination: 
 
 New - New - New 
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 On the other hand, where a "non-default" pairing is made, it is often the result 
of a lack of consistency of across-layer assumptions.  Hence, the "non-default" use 
of the definite expression to refer to a new referent is often the result of an 
inconsistent set of across-layer assumptions of the following combination: 
 
 New - New - as though Available 
 
where although the writer may assume that the referent referred to is newly 
introduced into the consciousness of the reader and that the reader is only able to 
accept the new referent as it stands, she assumes nevertheless that the reader is willing 
to accept the referent as though it is already available.  As we have discussed earlier, 
this practice of pragmatic boot-strapping is not an uncommon practice in narratives 
where new information is often introduced to the reader as though it is already known 
or available to him.  Similarly, the "non-default" use of the indefinite expression to 
refer to an activated/available referent is likewise the result of an inconsistent set of 
across-layer assumptions of the following combinations: 
 
 Activated - Activated - as though New or 
 Available - Available - as though New 
 
In the above, by using an indefinite expression to refer to an activated/available 
referent, the writer is signalling to the reader that he should treat the referent as 
though it is new.  This "unlikely" pairing of the indefinite expression with 
activated/available information does occur in our data for several reasons to be 
discussed below.  This observation may be of particular interest since it highlights a 
type of "non-default" pairing hardly discussed in the literature on information 
structure.   
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 In the next section, we shall demonstrate the explanatory value of the three-
layer classification system in accounting for the “default” pattern as well as the "non-
default" pattern. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4 Written correspondence and information structure 
 
4.1 Clarification of terminology 
 
 We have thus far used the terms referring expression, referent and entity 
without explaining them.  Let us clarify our position on the use of these and other 
related terms before we delve into the data.  Following Brown (1995, Chapter 3; and 
personal communication), we distinguish between entities and referents (and later, 
denotata, below).  Entities are "things" which exist in the world, while referents are 
discourse constructs.  Therefore it is the referent (which exists in the user's head) 
which has information status within the discourse representation and not the entity 
(which exists in the world). 
 We also make the following distinction between reference and denotation, 
following Lyons (1977).  According to Lyons, reference has to do with "the 
relationship which holds between an expression and what that expression stands for 
on particular occasions of its utterance" (p.174).  The choice of the words 'expression' 
and 'utterance' is deliberate because as Lyons points later, "reference ... is an 
utterance-dependent notion ... it is not generally applicable to single word-forms ... 
and it is never applicable to lexemes" (p.176).   
 In contrast, denotation has to do with the relation "between lexemes and the 
whole class of individuals named by these lexemes" (p.176).  This definition of 
denotation becomes clearer if we examine Mill's (1843; cited in Lyons, 1977: 175) 
distinction between denotation and connotation.  According to Mill, "the word 'white' 
denotes all white things, as snow, paper, the foam of the sea, and so forth, and 
implies, or, as it was termed by the schoolmen, connotes the attribute whiteness".  
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And as Lyons rightly observes, this distinction between denotation and connotation is 
very closely connected to the distinction made between the extension (the set of all 
white things) and intension (the "whiteness" of white) of a term respectively (p.176). 
 If we adopt the above distinction, we are then well placed, following Lyons 
again, to assert that only expressions used by the writer when she has a specific 
identifiable entity in the world have reference.  On the other hand, expressions used 
by the writer when she does not have a specific identifiable entity in the world don't 
have reference.  The same can therefore be said for generic expressions since they are 
not "referring" to any particular individual or group of such individuals but denoting 
the class of such individuals.  This three-way distinction between the singular 
referring expression, the general referring expression and the generic non-
referring (or denoting) expression is exemplified in the following examples (a) - (c) 
respectively: 
 
(a) My cat is chasing after the rat. 
(b) Those cats are for adoption. 
  [while looking at a group of cats in the RSPCA] 
(c) Cats make wonderful pets. 
 
In (a) the referent of the expression My cat  is the writer's cat and the expression refers 
to a specific and singular entity in the world.  In (b), the expression Those cats  refers 
to a specific group (hence, general) of entities in the world.  In (c), the expression 
Cats denotes a generic class of feline mammals (the denotatum).  (We use the word 
'expression' loosely here.  We are of course aware that denotation, in Lyons' use, has 
to do with relation between lexemes (and not expressions) and the denotata.) 
 But note that the above terminology may not work well in all circumstances.  
Consider the following invented example [ C: Career Counsellor, S: Student]. 
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(d) C: What kind of work would you like to do when you leave school? 
 S: I would like to be a doctor. 
 C: If you do well in your exams next year, I'm sure you'll be able to get 
  into a good medical college. 
 
How are we to label the expression your exams?  It is certainly not a referring 
expression in the above sense as used by Brown which requires a specific entity in the 
world, and not just a hypothetically existing entity of the future.  The expression is 
neither a "denoting expression" (in Lyons' terminology) since the "expression" does 
not denote that which is included in the extension of the lexemes 'your' and 'exams'. 
 We are then forced to postulate another type of "referring" expression - one in 
which it is possible to speak in terms of an expression as referring hypothetically to an 
"entity" which exists in the discourse-world as determined by the user.  We shall call 
such an entity the hypothetical referent. 
 One final caveat regarding our use of terms is in order.  We should bear in 
mind that although we speak loosely about expressions referring to entities in the 
world, it is really the speaker who refers, and not the expressions per se.  Lyons 
(1977: 177) rightly points out that: 
 
it is the speaker who refers (by using some appropriate expression); he 
invests the expression with reference by the act of referring.  It is 
terminologically convenient, however, to be able to say that an expression 
refers to its referent (when the expression is used on some particular 
occasion and satisfies the relevant conditions). 
 
 Having clarified our terminology, we are ready to examine the data.  In the 
next sub-section, we will analyse the way the two writers, a and b, package their noun 
phrases (whether in fact they are referring expressions or "denoting" expressions, etc.) 
in order to convey activated, available and new information.  For ease of reading, we 
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shall use the terms refer and referent instead of the expressions denote/refer and 
denotatum/referent respectively unless we intend a deliberate distinction between 
them when discussing specific examples arising from our data.   
 We shall use the three-layer classification of information structure, combining 
the triple concerns of the speaker regarding her assumptions about the hearer's 
information state, and the hearer's ability and willingness to accept the speaker's 
packaging of information.  We demonstrate the explanatory value of our conceptual 
framework by resolving several issues arising from the lack of a one-to-one 
correspondence between the two-way distinction of definite/indefinite expressions 
and the ternary conceptualisation of information status.  The three-layer framework is 
also able to accommodate other factors (like specificity, generics, and some neo-
Gricean pragmatic principles of language use) into an integrated account of the use of 
definite/indefinite expressions in referring.  The final advantage of the conceptual 
framework presented here is its ability to handle nominal expressions referring to 
referent units with dual information status. 
 
4.2 Referring expressions and information status 
 
 1. Activated referents 
 
 Under this heading, there are three sub-types of activated referents.  (i)  A 
referent which is activated by virtue of immediate/last preceding mention refers to 
one whose currency of activation has not been displaced by an (or more) intervening 
referents(s).  (ii)  An activated referent which is situationally salient refers to one 
whose currency of activation persists because the entity is visibly present and salient 
in the speech event or because the entity is one of the interactants involved in the 
discourse (physical co-presence, in Clarkian terminology).  Hence the pronominal 
forms are often used to refer to situationally salient referents.  (iii)  A topically salient 
activated referent is one which is still the current topic of discussion at the time of its 
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mention in the discourse.  Although it may be difficult at times for the writer to 
determine with objectivity whether a topic is currently in focus in the reader's mind, 
we should remember that what counts ultimately is what the writer chooses to 
package as topically salient, and not that the writer actually knows that the topic is 
currently in focus in the reader's head.  There are many examples of the three sub-
types found in the data.  We shall discuss some of them below.   
 The following are some examples of definite expressions referring to referents 
which are currently activated by virtue of immediate/last preceding mention.  In A1, a 
writes: 
 
(18) To extend my knowledge on this field, I applied through the German 
National Scholarship Foundation scheme to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics in the academic year 1993/94.  Within this one-year course 
I would like to follow my interest in sociolinguistics, especially in 
critical linguistics. 
 
where the definite lexical expression this one-year course  is used to refer to the last 
mentioned referent 'M.A. in Linguistics' in the academic year of 1993/94.  (For ease 
of discussion, we shall treat this expression as referring to a referent unit with single 
information status first.  See (38) below for a discussion of its dual information 
status.)  This seems to contradict the popular view that a highly attenuated form is 
preferred in referring to currently activated referents in spontaneous spoken discourse.  
This view is of course based on the assumption that economy of expression is 
preferred in cases where the referent is activated.  This view is also consistent with 
Geluyken's Principle of Economy of expression (henceforth E-principle) in referring 
to activated referents.  Drawing from Grice's conversational maxims, Leech's (1983), 
Horn's (1985) and Levinson's (1987, 1988) principles, Geluykens (1994: 15-17) also 
postulates an opposite Principle of Clarity (henceforth C-principle) which is in tension 
with the first principle.  The C-principle dictates that a full lexical expression is 
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preferred in referring when clarity of reference is needed (for example, in cases where 
they are intervening referents which may make the use of an attenuated form 
ambiguous), hence over-riding the E-principle.  But in (18) above, it seems to us that 
the use of the full lexical expression has little to do with the drive for clarity since the 
highly attenuated form could have well been used without resulting in ambiguity of 
reference.  (Note that the full definite lexical expression this one-year course used 
here does not contain the same lexemes as in the M.A. in Linguistics, but they have 
the same number of words, not considering the hyphen.)  
 What motivates the writer a to package the expression as this one-year course 
instead of the simpler and sufficiently clear this course?  Obviously, the writer a must 
have been influenced by considerations other that those subsumed under the two 
principles postulated by Geluykens. 
 One possible explanation for the use of the full lexical expression is that the 
writer a is trying to show his familiarity with the details of the M.A. programme, 
perhaps as an indication to b that he takes the matter very seriously and has obviously 
put a lot of thought into it.   
 Another possibility has to do with appropriateness of style of writing.  Perhaps 
in a's mind, he may have thought that in the genre of official written correspondence, 
greater formality may be more appropriate.  This need for greater formality is often 
realised by the use of more elaborate nominal expressions.  In technical writing (e.g., 
scientific papers), it is generally held that because information is dense and complex 
and that there are often several competing potential referents for a referring 
expression, the full lexical expression is preferred in order to avoid confusion.  But in 
official correspondence (at least for our data here), the choice of the full lexical 
expression for a currently activated referent seems to be less motivated by the concern 
with confusion of reference, than by the desire to adopt an appropriate level of 
formality (see Chapter 2, Section 5 and Chapter 5, Section 1 for related discussions on 
formality of style). 
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 A third possibility is that a may feel that the overspecified form may be a safer 
option, given the grave consequences which may arise in the event of an unexpected 
failure to refer.  For the time being, we shall refer to the above considerations of 
appropriateness which seem to be in operation here as the A-principle.  We therefore 
depart from Geluykens' stance that there are only two competing principles at work in 
the choice of definite/indefinite expressions.  There is at least one other crucial 
principle at work here.  (See also Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the correlation 
between the degree of attenuation of the expression and the information status of the 
referent referred to.) 
 However in (also written by a in A1): 
 
(19) Accordingly, I will submit a title on critical language study in 
educational contexts for the thesis.  This educational aspect is rooted 
in my interest in foreign language teaching and in my desire to enter 
the teaching profession. 
 
the less elaborate lexical expression This educational aspect  is used to refer in part to 
the last mentioned referent referred to in the earlier and more elaborate lexical 
expression a title on critical language study in educational contexts for the thesis, 
showing a certain degree of attenuation (i.e., shortening of the lexical expression).   
 Similarly, in the following example in letter B1, a highly attenuated form 
which  has been used to refer to a similarly currently activated referent 'your letter': 
 
(20) Thank you for your letter of 17 November 1992, in which you ask me 
to be your supervisor in 1993/4. 
 
Note that the attenuated expression which is actually a relative pronoun (cf. discussion 
of the use of the dummy it in (26)). 
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 The attenuated form can also be used to refer to a currently activated referent 
which happens to be a proposition rather than an entity.  In the following example 
(21), the expression it has been used to refer to the proposition that b be a's 
supervisor. 
 
 (21) I really hope that you can be my supervisor, if it is at all possible. 
 
 The second sub-type of activated referents are those which are situationally 
salient.  These would include most instances of the use of proper names, the 
pronominals you, I and me.  In B1, however, the writer b switches from I to we as in 
(22): 
 
(22) Of course that doesn't mean that I would not be happy to talk to you 
from time to time, ....  Or, do you mean that you have applied to take 
the M.A. in Applied Linguistics here in the Applied Linguistics 
Department?  If so, we have not received your application yet.  
However, if such an application were successful (and competition for 
places is severe), then I see no reason why I shouldn't supervise you, 
provided that our interests continue to coincide. 
 
The switch from I to we and then back to I seems to signal a change in perspective 
from b, in her personal capacity as a potential supervisor, to b, the co-ordinator of the 
M.A. in Applied Linguistics programme and spokesperson for the Applied Linguistics 
Department (hence the use of we), and then a switch back to b as the potential 
supervisor again.  This switch in the pronominal form used is interesting because it 
illustrates very well how the writer b partitions the referential scope of the expressions 
by determining what she wishes to treat as situationally salient at various points.  Both 
pronominal forms refer to the same referent b, but the pronominal form I refers to b in 
her role as potential supervisor, while the pronominal form we refers to b in her role 
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as spokesperson for the department.  In this sense then, the referent is "partitioned" 
into two parts, each part referred to with a different pronominal form (see discussion 
of (16) for additional comments on the partitioning of referential scope). 
 The third type of activated referents are those which are topically salient.  In 
the opening two lines of B1, b writes, 
 
(23) Thank you for your letter of 17 November 1992, in which you ask me 
to be your supervisor in 1993/4.  I cannot quite work out from your 
letter exactly what you are going to be doing here during 1993/4 .... 
 
Given the time lag between letters A1 and B1, with the use of the expression your 
letter of 17 November 1992, the writer b probably assumes that the displaced referent 
'letter A1' is available in the reader a's mind.  In the second utterance, the use of the 
expression your letter refers to an activated referent, given that the referent is now 
topically salient.  The overspecified expression your letter could well have been 
substituted with the pronominal expression it without loss of clarity.  Like the 
previous writer a, b probably feels that the elaborate nominal expression may be more 
in keeping with the formality required of official correspondence (cf. (18)). 
 In all the examples above, you would have noticed that what the writer 
assumes to be activated in the reader's consciousness is the same as that which she 
assumes the reader is able and willing to accept as activated, hence the following 
combination of layers: 
 
 Activated - Activated - Activated 
 
There is no discrepancy between the writer's assumptions about the reader's current 
information state and that which she thinks he is able and willing to receive as 
activated.  This consistency of assumptions across the layers is to be expected, given 
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that the use of the definite expressions in the above examples conform to the "default" 
expectation that activated referents are referred to with definite expressions. 
 
 2. Available referents 
 
 Available referents may be of one of three sub-types: (i) those which have 
been activated in the discourse by previous mention but have since been displaced by 
intervening referents; (ii) those which have been made available via some schema 
previously activated in the discourse; and (iii) those which are made available via 
some form of general reasoning or inferencing mechanism. 
 Two examples of displaced entities from our data can be found in the 
following extract from the opening paragraph of a's first letter A1. 
 
(24) For two years I studied English, French, American Studies, Education 
and Foreign Language Teaching at Y University (Germany) and at this 
moment I am doing the 'licence' in French and German Studies at Z 
University (France).  During this time I have taken part in twelve 
courses of linguistics and my studies of Foreign Language Teaching 
cover applied linguistics to a great extent. 
 
In the above extract, the expression my studies of Foreign Language Teaching  clearly 
refers to a displaced referent previously mentioned in the first sentence.  The next 
expression this time  also refers to an available referent mentioned in the first 
sentence.  To be precise, the expression this time  seems to refer to two different 
referents: referent previously referred to in two years as well as the referent referred 
to in this moment.   
 In the next letter B1, the writer b demonstrates an equal ease with referring to 
displaced referents with full definite lexical expressions as in: 
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(25) I cannot quite work out from your letter exactly what you are going to 
be doing here during 1993/4;  you say you have  applied to take the 
M.A. in Linguistics, and I presume that that means what it says, i.e., 
that you will be a student of the Linguistics Department. 
 
where the expressions 1993/4 and M.A. in Linguistics refer to referents previously 
mentioned by a in A1.  The important difference is that now, the same referents are 
appropriated by another party b who now echoes two relevant bits of a's original 
expression in A1 I applied through ... to take the M.A. in Linguistics in the academic 
year 1993/94 in order to refer to the original referents.  Given the density of 
intervening referents which have been referred to since a wrote the last utterance, and 
that given the time lag of eight days which has lapsed between the two letters, it is not 
entirely surprising to find that b in her reply has chosen to use full definite lexical 
expressions to refer to the same referents. 
 Therefore it seems astonishing that we should be able to find an instance of 
the use of an attenuated pronominal expression to refer to a displaced referent as well.  
In the next sentence following (25) of the same letter B1, b writes   
 
(26) If that is the case, I am afraid that it would not really be the done thing 
for me to supervise you, since the Applied Linguistics Department is a 
separate department in a different faculty (Education). 
 
The use of it above is of considerable interest because it exemplifies the use of a 
dummy it to refer both cataphorically and anaphorically to the same propositional 
content that b supervises a.  It refers cataphorically to the referent of the expression 
for me to supervise you (which occurs later but within the same sentence) and 
anaphorically to a's request that b supervises him previously mentioned in a's first 
letter A1 (hence displaced).  If the dummy it has been used to refer cataphorically 
only, the assignment of reference would have been delayed until the predicate has 
 144 
been made known.  In this sense, the dummy it might have been used to refer to new 
information, but whose referent will be assigned almost immediately.  Because the 
dummy it here has been used anaphorically as well, the implication is that the reader 
will be forced to search in both directions for its antecedent.  This imposition of a 
dual-directional search for an antecedent may be due to the writer's concern for a 
more coherent text.  The text is more coherent because the pronominal it draws the 
reader's attention to what has been written previously and to what the writer is about 
to repeat.  For this reason then, we are forced to rethink our assumption that the 
highly attenuated form can only be used to refer to activated information in 
accordance with the E-principle (see (20)).  In the above example, the highly 
attenuated form may have less to do with currency of activation than with coherence 
of expression/propositional content. 
 The second sub-type of available referents are those which are made available 
via related schema information.  Once again, we draw as our examples a's utterances 
from A1. 
 
(27) To extend my knowledge on this field, I applied through the German 
National Scholarship Foundation scheme to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics in the academic year 1993/94 ....  Accordingly, I will 
submit a title on critical language study in educational contexts for the 
thesis.  
 
 In the above text, a uses the expression the thesis to refer hypothetically to a 
referent which he assumes has been made available via schematic information 
associated with the M.A. in Linguistics programme which includes information 
regarding the need to submit a thesis in partial fulfilment of the programme's 
requirements.  In referring hypothetically to the thesis with a definite expression, a 
therefore assumes that the information is already available in the reader b's head. 
 In the next example, b writes in B1,  
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(28) Of course that doesn't mean that I would not be happy to talk to you 
from time to time, and you might also be able to follow some courses 
here, provided your Linguistics timetable allowed it. 
 
using the definite expression your Linguistics timetable to refer hypothetically to a 
referent which is presumably made available via schematic information associated 
with the M.A. in Linguistics programme.  The writer of course has no direct access to 
the reader's mind and therefore cannot tell with certainty whether the referent is 
indeed available in the reader's head.  What she does here is assume it is available 
nevertheless and that the reader is able and willing to accept her assumptions about 
him.  In our framework of analysis, such a situation is exemplified by the following 
combination of layers of assumptions: 
 
 Available - Available - Available 
 
 Finally, the third sub-type of available entities are those made available via 
general inferencing or reasoning, as the next example taken from A1 shows. 
 
(29) During this time I have taken part in twelve courses of linguistics and 
my studies of Foreign Language Teaching cover applied linguistics to 
a great extent.  ...  To extend my knowledge on this field, I applied ... 
to take the M.A. in Linguistics ....  Accordingly, I will submit a title on 
critical language study in educational contexts for the thesis.  This 
educational aspect is rooted in my interest in foreign language teaching 
and in my desire to enter the teaching profession.  Besides, I have a 




In the above extract, when a uses the definite expression my desire to enter the 
teaching profession, he probably assumes that the referent it refers to is available via 
some form of reasoning which may go something like this:  since a has all the above 
educational background in linguistics, applied linguistics and language teaching, he is 
very likely to be interested in entering the teaching profession as well.  a is likely to 
assume that this is available information to b because he has gone to great lengths to 
elaborate on his educational background in foreign language teaching, which is 
suggestive of a's likely interest in the teaching profession.  a also probably assumes 
that b may adopt this line of reasoning because of b's own interest in selecting 
candidates with teaching experience for her own M.A. in Applied Linguistics 
programme. 
 
 3. New referents 
 
 The next type of referent is considered new in the sense that it is introduced 
into the discourse for the first time and is not available via associated schema or 
general reasoning.  If the writer chooses to use an indefinite expression, she probably 
wants the reader to treat the new referent as new information, hence the following 
combination: 
 
 New - New - New 
 
(But if the definite expression is used, the writer probably wants the reader to treat the 
new information as though it is already available.  This will be discussed in 4 below.) 
 
 In the following example, taken from a's opening utterance in A1, 
 
(30) For two years I studied English, French, American Studies, Education 
and Foreign Language Teaching at Y University (Germany) .... 
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a uses the expression two years to refer to a new referent.  The referent is new 
because it is introduced into the hearer's attention for the first time and that it is not 
available via associated schema or general reasoning.  The fact that a chooses to 
package the information as an indefinite expression further suggests that not only 
does he assume that the referent is new to his reader but that he also intends his reader 
to treat the referent as new too, hence the consistency of assumptions across the layers 
as in 'New-New-New'.   
 
 4. New referents but treated as though available 
 
 As we have mentioned briefly above, new referents which the writer intends 
the reader to treat as available are often packaged as definite expressions ("non-
default" use).  The crucial aspect here has to do with the third layer of assumptions as 
in the following combination 
 
 New - New - as though Available 
 
where the writer assumes that the reader is willing to accept the new information as 
though it is already available to the reader. 
 There are numerous examples of such new referents which the writer intends 
the reader to treat as though they are available, particularly in letter A1.  It is in this 
opening letter that a introduces many new referents into the discourse, most of which 
are introduced for the first time with the use of definite expressions  For example, in 
the opening line of a's first letter alone, a writes and introduces eight new 
referents/denotata (italicised expressions) which he wants the reader to treat as though 
they are already available.  Note that we analyse the expressions English, French, 
American Studies, Education and Foreign Language Teaching as definite expressions 
since they are proper nouns and capitalised.  If however the writer has chosen not to 
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capitalise the expressions, we assume that the writer intends the reader to treat them 
as common nouns and hence indefinite. 
 
(31) For two years I studied English, French, American Studies, Education 
and Foreign Language Teaching at Y University (Germany) and at this 
moment I am doing the 'licence' in French and German Studies at Z 
University (France). 
 
This "non-default" practice allows the writer to introduce new information rapidly 
into the discourse.  In using the definite expressions, the very act of referring/denoting 
establishes the referent/denotatum (see Hawkins (1978) and Lyons (1980), as 
discussed in the previous section).  The reason for this use of definite expressions to 
refer to or denote new information is because of the writer's desire for expedience of 
reference/denoting and his desire to establish new information quickly. 
 
 5. Available referents but treated as though new 
 
 A less discussed combination type of information status of referents are those 
which are available but treated as though they are new.  This status has the following 
combination of layers: 
 
 Available - Available - as though New 
 
Referents/denotata with this information status are referred to with or denoted by 
indefinite expressions.  For example in letter B1, b writes: 
 
(32) ... you say you have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics, and I 
presume that that means what it says, i.e., that you will be a student of 
the Linguistics Department. 
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It is interesting to note that the indefinite expression a student of the Linguistics 
Department has been used to attribute an obviously available piece of information to 
the referent a.  The information is available via reasoning in that if a has applied for 
the M.A. in Linguistics programme, he will become a student of the Linguistics 
Department, as opposed to the Applied Linguistics Department, if successful.  
Following Lyons (1977: 176) (see discussion in Section 4.1), we conclude that the 
attributive use of the expression is not meant to "refer" to an entity in the world, but 
to characterise in part what a's application to the M.A. programme may entail.  We 
should be careful here to point out that whereas what is attributed of the reader a is 
the possibility of he being a student of the Linguistics Department, the expression a 
student of the Linguistics Department itself denotes something generic.  Similarly, 
Hawkins (1978) observes that the construction 'a MEMBER of a SET' is often used 
not to pick out a particular member, but "any member of the total class" and that this 
fact "is responsible for the class idea inherent in singular indefinite generics" (p.215).  
 A final observation is that the utterance in (32), here reproduced as (33), 
 
(33) ... you say you have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics, and I 
presume that that means what it says, i.e., that you will be a student of 
the Linguistics Department. 
 
seems to involve a rather complex lexical chain of related propositions and referents.  
Notice that: 
 
that refers deictically to the first expression you have applied to ... Linguistics; 
 




it refers anaphorically to the first expression; and 
 
you ... student of the Linguistics Department expresses the propositional 
content now made available via reasoning from the propositional content 
contained in the first expression 
 
This complex lexical chain seems somewhat repetitive and is probably deployed by b 
to clarify and tell a her actual reading and interpretation of a's first letter A1 so that a 
can discern if she has misread him or not.  It may further explain why the generic 
notion expressed in a student of the Linguistics Department, now made available via 
general reasoning involving several steps, is instantiated as an indefinite expression.  
The steps involved in b's reasoning may include: 
 
(i) a says he has applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics, 
(ii) a means what he says, 
(iii) If i and ii, then a has actually applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics, 
(iv) People who have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics will, if successful, 
become students of the Linguistics Department, 
(v) Therefore, if iii and iv, then it is possible that a will become a student of the 
Linguistics Department, 
 
 The repetitive nature of the utterance may encourage this line of reasoning and 
its purpose seems to be to draw the reader's attention to the details of its contents, 
culminating with the contents of the generic expression.  By drawing the reader's 
attention to the indefinite generic expression which is located at the utterance-final 
position, the writer b probably intends a to treat the attribute as though it is new 
information. 
 The next utterance in the letter which follows immediately after (33) is: 
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(34) If that is the case, I am afraid that it would not really be the done thing 
for me to supervise you, since the Applied Linguistics Department is a 
separate department in a different faculty (Education). 
 
In (34), we see a similar use of indefinite expressions to attribute available 
information to the Applied Linguistics Department, but which the reader is to treat as 
though it is new.  The expressions a separate department  and a different faculty 
(Education) attribute information which is made available via the associated schema 
which contains and organises information about the relation which holds between the 
different departments and faculties of the University.  The effect of using the two 
"non-default" indefinite expressions to attribute already available information is to 
draw the reader's attention to the contrast between and the autonomy of the two 
departments of Linguistics and Applied Linguistics, and their respective faculties. 
 Similarly in the next paragraph of the letter, where b uses the indefinite 
expression  to refer to courses which have already been named in the previous letter, 
 
(35) Of course that doesn't mean that I would not be happy to talk to you 
from time to time, and you might also be able to follow some courses 
here, provided that your Linguistics timetable allowed it. 
 
the issue seems to have more to do with specificity than availability.  Although the 
implied referents of some courses are already available (and specified in the previous 
letter), the writer uses the indefinite some, probably intending the reader to take the 
referents as though they are new.  It is not entirely clear what motivates this.  Perhaps 
b feels that it is more prudent to be non-committal to a course of action proposed by a 
than to give a the green light prematurely to go ahead with his plans.  As such, b takes 
the expedient route by being vague (in accordance with the Principle of 
Appropriateness/Prudence/Caution) in order to expedite the communication. 
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 Linguistically speaking, it is interesting to note that this failure to meet 
specific descriptive content does not necessarily block reference.  This ties in very 
well with Kripke's proposal (1977) that we can use general statements to convey 
information about specific individuals.  As Kripke (cited in Larson et al, 1995: 342-
343) observes, if you and I were in a queue and a stranger cuts in the queue 
somewhere ahead of us, I might utter the general "Some people have no manners" to 
mean someone very specific.  Note that this is not to suggest that b's use of the 
expression some courses is meant to be ironic as in Kripke's some people; we only 
intend to draw attention to the similarity of use of an indefinite expression to refer to 
something specific. 
 Coming back to our present example some courses, although b may, literally 
speaking, be saying that there exist courses in general in the Applied Linguistics 
programme which a may be able to follow (literal interpretation), b is in fact saying 
something more specific (non-literal interpretation; intended meaning).  Following 
Larson's et al (1995: 344) terminology, this is an instance of a referential use of the 
quantifier some (i.e., non-literal interpretation), rather than a referential 
interpretation of the quantifier (i.e., literal interpretation). 
 
 6. Activated referents but treated as though new 
 
 This type of referent has the following combination of information status 
across the layers: 
 
 Activated - Activated - as though New 
 
These referents are currently activated but the writer wishes the reader to treat them as 
though they are new.  The writer does this by using "non-default" indefinite 
expressions to refer to the activated referents.  The following expression such an 
application  as used by b in letter B1 is one such example. 
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(36) If so, we have not received your application yet.  However, if such an 
application were successful (and competition for places is severe), 
then I see no reason why I shouldn't supervise you, provided that our 
interests continue to coincide. 
 
 We should clarify a few things before we proceed with our discussion of the 
expression such an application.  Firstly, the expression your application in the 
preceding utterance "refers" to a hypothetical referent (see Section 4.1 for related 
discussion), if indeed the reader a has made an application to the Applied Linguistics 
Department.  The next expression such an application refers back to this hypothetical 
referent.  As Lyons (1977) points out in the following example, if X says to Y 
 
(37) A friend has just sent me a lovely Valentine card 
 
he argues that  
 
[X] can refer subsequently to the same individual by means of the 
expression 'my friend', regardless of whether he had a specific person 
in mind originally or not .... The point is that, once any information at 
all has been supplied ..., it can then be treated by the participants as an 
individual that is known to them both and identifiable within the 
universe-of-discourse by means of a definite referring expression ....  It 
is not a necessary condition of successful reference that the speaker or 
the hearer should be able to identify the individual being referred to in 
any sense of identification other than this. 
        (Lyons 1977: 189) 
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 Lyons' view above, if taken on board in its entirety, will have significant 
ramifications on the traditional understanding of the term reference and a theory of 
meaning.  This is, of course, a complex issue of considerable interest, but it is beyond 
the scope of our concerns with information status in this chapter. 
 Coming back to our example, if we adopt Lyons' position, it is possible then to 
claim that the expression such an application refers to the hypothetical referent of the 
preceding expression your application.  What is of further interest is that like the 
previous example some courses, the indefinite expression such an application is used 
to refer to something specific, i.e., a's alleged application.  As such, this failure to 
meet specific descriptive content is probably due to the same Principle of 
Appropriateness/Prudence, given that the outcome of the application has not been 
made known yet. 
 We move now to discuss referring expressions which refer to referent units 
which have dual information status.  Strictly speaking, this dual information status 
arises from the fact that the referent referred to and the attribute attributed to this 
referent are found in the same referring expression.  Both the referent and its attribute 
have different information status.  For ease of writing, we will continue to call this 
"referent + attribute" unit the referent unit.  The various types of referent units with 
dual information status are best described by their combination of layers. 
 
 7. referent: Activated - Activated - Activated 
  attribute: Available - Available - Available 
 
 An example of a referring expression which refers to such a referent unit is: 
 
(38) To extend my knowledge on this field, I applied through the German 
National Scholarship Foundation scheme to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics in the academic year 1993/94.  Within this one-year course 
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I would like to follow my interest in sociolinguistics, especially in 
critical linguistics. 
 
where the definite expression this one year course, as we have already discussed in 
(18) above, refers to an activated referent 'M.A. in Linguistics'.  But the fact that it is a 
one-year M.A. and not a two-year programme is surely only available information 
(attribute) via background knowledge at this juncture. 
 The next type of referent unit with dual information status has the following 
combination: 
 
 8. referent: Activated - Activated - as though New 
  attribute: Available - Available - as though New 
 
Note that only indefinite expressions are used since the referents referred to are 
intended to be treated as though they are new.  The attributes referred to, however, are 
merely available but are to be treated as though they are new as well.  The following 
example is taken from a's reply A2 to b's hesitation to supervise him,  
 
(39) As to the problem of supervision I hoped that my belonging to a 
different department of the University would not be an obstacle for 
you to supervise me with the prospectus of the M.A. in Linguistics 
stating .... 
 
The attributive expression an obstacle attributes available information to the activated 
propositional content expressed in the preceding expression my belonging to a 
different department of the University.  The characterisation of b as belonging to 
another department as an obstacle is based on available information because the 
information is inferable via general reasoning from the text it would not really be the 
done thing for me to supervise you, since the Applied Linguistics Department is a 
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separate department written by b in the previous letter B1.  The choice of the 
indefinite expression gives the impression that the activated/available information is 
as though new and its purpose seems to be to draw attention to the lack of specific 
descriptive content in the generic expression, perhaps as a means of downplaying the 
scale of the problem. 
 The final type of dual status referent units found in our data has the following 
combination: 
 
 9. referent: Available - Available - as though New 
  attribute: New       - New          - New 
 
In the example below, a writes the following in A2 to clarify his departmental 
affiliation: 
 
(40) For one point, I would like to clear up a possible misunderstanding 
 
The "referent" referred to in the indefinite expression a possible misunderstanding is 
available information arising from b's previous letter in which she expresses her 
confusion over a's departmental status.  The modal adjective possible, however, 
"refers" to a new attribute which describes the tentativeness of the 'misunderstanding' 
referred to.  Since a, the prospective student, is suggesting here that b is mistaken, he 
is careful not to cause offence.  By casting his suggestion in indefinite terms, he 
intends b to receive the referent as though it is new.  The underlying principle 
governing a's choice here seems to be one of appropriateness (or politeness) of use. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
5 The nature of the writer's assumptions about the reader's consciousness of referents 
 
 The analysis of the data above lends support to our earlier observation about 
the different positions the writer may assume regarding her assumptions about the 
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reader's consciousness of referents, i.e., the nature of consciousness can be best 






 At the risk of sounding repetitive, we should emphasise that the above is our 
representation of what we take to be the range of the writer's assumptions about her 
reader's state of consciousness of referents, and not a representation of the reader's 
actual state of consciousness of referents.  The reader's actual state of consciousness 
of different referents can be inferred from reading times measured under experimental 
conditions (see, for example, Gernsbacher (1990) for an influential view on how the 
level of activation of memory may be enhanced or suppressed by incoming 
information).  The writer, however, in her choice of referring expressions at the time 
of writing, has no access to such experimental information regarding the reader's 
actual state of consciousness.  What she does have is a set of assumptions of what 
might reasonably be considered to be in the reader's consciousness based on existing 
evidence like prior mention, shared beliefs, background knowledge, etc.  We should 
point out that, based on the analysis of our data, we are only able to make the claim 
that the writer assumes a ternary division of the reader's consciousness of referents; 
we are not in a position to claim that the nature of the reader's actual consciousness of 
Figure 4.1: The three different states of assumed consciousness of referents 
less reasoning lllOl'e displaced 
direc1 direct 
less schema more 
prototypical prototypical 
New less Available more Activated 
STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF REFERENTS 
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these referents is in fact ternary.  Our intuition on the latter is that the reader's actual 
state of consciousness is more likely to be a continuum of relative "alertness" with 
very fuzzy boundaries between and within the categories postulated by the writer.  As 
we are not in a position to test this latter claim here, we shall leave the issue open for 
future research. 
 As we can see in the above figure, the writer may assume that the referent is 
new, available or currently activated in the reader's mind.  Our first observation is that 
the three categories are not at points of equi-distance to each other on the scale of 
assumed reader's state of consciousness of referents.  We also note that a very large 
group of referents fall into the category of available information state (see Section 6 
below for the actual number of tokens).  On one end of the availability scale are the 
displaced referents which are considered "more" available since they have been 
previously referred to explicitly in the text.  On the "less" available side are two 
parallel states of availability determined by the level of availability resulting from 
schema information or resulting from general reasoning.  These two states of 
availability via schema or reasoning are in parallel rather than as two points on the 
scale of availability.  They differ from each other in kind (or source of availability) 
rather than degree.  Information made available from schema varies from the more 
prototypical to the less prototypical associations.  Information made available by 
general reasoning varies from that which is available via direct and straightforward 
reasoning to that which is available via more indirect reasoning involving several 
steps. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6 Distribution of combination information types 
 
 Using our three-layer classification of information status of the referent units, 
we isolate nine combinations of layers (also called combination types) in our data, 
here reordered and renumbered as 1 - 9 (see table below).  There are of course other 
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possible combinations, but we have no evidence of them in our data.  Let us 
recapitulate what has been said so far. 
 
Table 4.2:  A three-layer classification of information status:  Observed combinations 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Combinations observed in the data 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Referent units with single information status 
 
  Definite expressions 
 
        1 Activ - Activ - Activ 
        2 Avail - Avail - Avail 
        3 New - New - asAvail 
 
  Indefinite expressions 
 
        4 Activ - Activ - asNew 
        5 Avail - Avail - asNew 
        6 New - New - New 
 
 Referent units with dual information status 
 
  Definite expressions 
 
       7 [ referent:  Activ - Activ - Activ 
  [ attribute: Avail - Avail - Avail 
 
  Indefinite expressions 
 
       8 [ referent:  Activ - Activ - asNew 
  [ attribute: Avail - Avail - asNew 
 
       9 [ referent:  Avail - Avail - asNew 
  [ attribute: New - New - New 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Activ  = Activated 
 Avail  = Available 
 asAvail = as though Available 
 asNew  = as though New 
 
We shall call each possible combination of layers a combination type because 
each type involves three layers of assumptions. 
 
 If we focus on the referent units with single information status first, we notice 
that there are essentially six observed combinations in the data.  The first three 
combination types of information states are associated with the use of the definite 
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expression.  The next three combination types of information states are associated 
with the use of the indefinite expression.   
 For referent units with dual information status, we observe that there are three 
possible combinations found in the data.  The seventh combination type of 
information state is associated with the use of the definite expression.  The last two 
combination types of information state are associated with the use of the indefinite 
expression.   
 The table below summarises the distribution of referent units of various 
combination types of information status (single information status only) for the entire 




Table 4.3:  Distribution of Combination Information Types 1-6 (Single information 




A1 B1 A2 B2 A3 B3 A4 B4 Tot 
Single information status only  
 
         
    Definite expressions          
        1 Activ-Activ-Activ 23 33 24 13 17 9 8 9 136 
  Last mention 2 9 1 1 1 0 0 0  
  Salience 21 24 23 12 16 9 8 9  
          
        2 Avail-Avail-Avail 13 10 19 5 10 4 5 4 70 
  Displaced 4 8 13 5 6 3 5 4  
  Schema 8 2 6 0 3 1 0 0  
  Reasoning 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0  
          
        3 New-New-asAvail 17 1 3 2 0 1 2 0 26 
          
    Indefinite expressions          
        4 Activ-Activ-asNew 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  Last mention 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
  Salience 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
          
        5 Avail-Avail-asNew 3 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 12 
  Displaced 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 0  
  Schema 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0  
  Reasoning 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
          
        6 New-New-New 8 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 15 
          
Sub-total (single info status) 64 52 50 22 28 15 15 14 260 
  
 
Note: The non-shaded rows of numbers show the breakdown of the tokens of the 
shaded row immediately above them.  For example, Type 1 can be subdivided 
into those activated referents which are current because of immediate/last 
preceding mention or because of situational/topical salience. 
 
 'Tot' refers to the total number of tokens counted across the series of letters. 
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 If we just look at the distribution of referents with single information status in 
a's opening letter A1 (see Table 4.3 above), we note that 17 (Type 3) out a total of 53 
tokens of definite expressions are used to refer to new referents, i.e., about 32%.  This 
percentage is even higher if we exclude the high proportion of pronominal 
expressions arising from situational/topical salience and proper nouns used (t = 21).  
In fact, the percentage of definite expressions used to refer to new information 
increases to 53% (17 out of 32 tokens).  There are in fact only 2 tokens of definite 
expression used to refer to currently activated referents arising from immediately/last 
preceding mention, compared to 17 tokens of definite expressions used to refer to new 
referents.  In other words, apart from the use of pronominal forms to refer to 
situationally/topically salient referents, definite expressions are hardly used to refer to 
activated referents arising from last preceding mention.  
 If we seriously consider the fact that in A1, there are a total of 17 definite 
expressions (Type 3) used to refer to new information compared to only 8 indefinite 
expressions (Type 6) used to refer to new information, in what sense then is it 
justified to assert that there is a "default" relation between the use of 
definite/indefinite expressions and activated/new information respectively?  We 
believe it may not be helpful always to characterise the relationship in such default 
terms; in fact, it may well be misleading.  New information is often recognised as new 
information by the reader quite independently of any conception of a "default" pairing 
of new information with the indefinite expression.  The primary reason behind the 
writer's choice of say, the indefinite or definite expression to refer to new information, 
may have more to do with how the writer intends the new information to be treated 
(either as new or as though available) than with the writer's concern with maintaining 
"default" relations.  This observation is particularly true of the first letter A1. 
 The next table below summarises the distribution pattern of combination 
information Types 7-9 (dual information status only) for the series of letters.  The 
number of tokens involved is very small compared to the previous table for single 
information status referent units.  The grand total of tokens for both single and dual 
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status referent units is indicated at the bottom of the table.  The details are self-
explanatory. 
 





A1 B1 A2 B2 A3 B3 A4 B4 Tot 
Dual information status only 
 
         
    Definite expressions          
    7 referent: Activ-Activ-Activ 
      attribute: Avail-Avail-Avail 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
          
    Indefinite expressions          
    8 referent: Activ-Activ-asNew 
      attribute: Avail-Avail-asNew 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
    9 referent: Avail-Avail-asNew 
      attribute: New-New-New 
0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 
          
Sub-total (dual info status) 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 5 
          
Sub-total (single info status) 64 52 50 22 28 15 15 14 260 
          






 In this chapter, we take Chafe's notion of consciousness as the defining factor 
for the information status of referents, thus yielding a ternary division of information 
states: activated, available, new.  We propose as our conceptual framework for 
analysis a three-layer classification of information structure, combining the triple 
concerns of the speaker regarding her assumptions about the hearer's information 
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state, and the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's ability and willingness to 
accept the speaker's packaging of information.  The value of our three-layer 
classification lies in its ability to offer an integrated account of both the "default" and 
"non-default" patterns of use of definite/indefinite expressions to refer to 
activated/available/new information. 
 In the next chapter, we examine the interaction of the information status of the 
referent units with the information status of their related propositions.  We shall 
conclude our investigation by suggesting how our discussion on the information 
structure of the letters relates to the larger issue of how common ground is established 












 One of the findings of the previous chapter is that the claim that there is a 
"default" correlation between the definite/indefinite expression and activated/new 
information respectively may be misleading.  We demonstrated this by using our 
three-tier analysis of information status of the referent units.   
 In this chapter, we look in detail at the case history of the two M.A. referents 
and the expressions used in the set of letters to refer to them.  In a series of graphs, we 
examine the effect the changing information status of the two referents has on the 
degree of attenuation of the expressions used to refer to them.  By comparing our 
findings with Yule's (1981), we are able to make further observations of the nature of 
the distinction between spoken and written data in regard to the relation between 
information status and attenuation of referring expressions. 
 Next, we analyse the information status of the two propositions related to 
these two referents.  We then explore the nature of the interaction of the two levels of 
information status of the referents and their related propositions in a series of graphs 
and bar charts.  We show, for the first time, how the two levels of information status 
are inter-related. 
 Note that an analysis of the information status at the propositional level (in 
our case, of the related propositions) is not to be confused with an analysis of the 
information status at the sentential level (realised in various syntactic constructions).  
Hence, Prince's (1992:339) comment (cited earlier in Chapter 4, Section 2) about the 
mutual independence of the two levels of information packaging at the NP level and 
sentential level does not affect our claims about the interaction of the two levels of 
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information packaging at the referent level and the propositional level.  Our analysis 
of the information status of the related propositions is not to be confused with an 
analysis of the syntactic constructions.   
 We reiterate here that because our interest lies primarily in the forms of the 
referring expressions used in relation to the activation/attention states of the referents, 
we shall exclude considerations of syntactic issues.  (For a discussion of this point, 
see Chapter 4, Section 2). 
 Once we have analysed the information status of the two M.A. referents, their 
two related propositions and the nature of the interaction of the two levels of 
information, we shall end our discussion of information structure in Chapters 4 and 5 
by drawing your attention to the larger issue of common ground and of its categories 
as defined and discussed in Chapter 2, Section 4. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Attenuation of referring expressions and information status 
 
 One early attempt at accounting for the distribution of attenuated forms which 
are used to refer to referents already mentioned in the discourse is that by Yule 
(1981).  (Recall that previously mentioned referents can either be currently activated 
or displaced (but available) (see Chapter 4).)  We highlight some of his results below 
(modified table from Yule, 1981: 48). 
 
Table 5.1: Types of 'non-new' information and choice of realisation forms. 
 
Realisations                   Types of 'non-new' 












Yule's "lexicalisations" (or full/expanded lexical expressions, in our terminology) 
include:  the + NOUN, this + NOUN, that + NOUN, and the + property + NOUN.  
His "non-lexicalisations" (or highly attenuated expressions, in our terminology) 
include:  it, that and ø (see Chapter 4, Section 2 for the definitions of our terms used).  
What the above table shows is that currently activated referents are more likely (64%) 
to be referred to by attenuated forms than displaced referents (8%).  (This result is 
similar to Brown and Yule's (1983: 174) finding.  See Chapter 4, Section 2 for a 
discussion.)  He captures this correlation between degrees of attenuation and the 
current/displaced distinction in the graphical representation below.  In the graph, he 
tracks the various forms used to refer to the same referent.  This referent is originally 
referred to as a red horizontal line of about two inches.  His data is drawn from the 
diagram task.  (This task involves two parties, one of whom gives instructions to the 
other to draw certain geometric figures.) 
 
Figure 5.1:  Graph showing the relationship between degrees of attenuation and 
information status of a particular referent. 
 
 
       (Source:  Yule, 1981: 49) 
 
 Of particular interest to our present discussion is the way the graph above 
shows how an increasingly attenuated form is used with a shift in information status 
l\1E\V 
n 1·r.d hori:omal line 






,i,, red line 
1/,e line 
position in discourse sequence 
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from new to current, and a reverse trend towards the full lexical expression with a 
further shift in information status from current to displaced.  Note that Yule also 
considered intonation cues such as high and low pitch in his spoken data.  This 
information, however, has been excluded from the graph. 
 Although the above representation is illuminating and insightful in terms of 
exposing the nature of the correlation between attenuation and information status, it 
glosses over other issues and runs the risk of over-simplification.  For example, 
although the observation that currently activated referents are more likely (64%) to be 
referred to by attenuated forms (pronominal and ø ) than the displaced referents (8%) 
is helpful, Yule does not offer an account of why the currently activated referents are 
referred to by expanded (in the sense that they consist of more lexemes than the 
pronominal form) lexical expressions the other 36% of the time, and why displaced 
referents can be referred to by attenuated forms as well (8%).  Yule is of course aware 
that the degree of attenuation is only attributable in part to this current-displaced 
distinction, and as we have discussed in Chapter 4, there are other factors to consider 
in offering an account of the linguistic forms employed in referring. 
 Returning to our data, we see a different distribution of attenuated forms with 
different information status.  To illustrate what we mean, we need to carefully examine 
the various forms used to refer to the two referents: the 'M.A. in Linguistics' and 'M.A. 
in Applied Linguistics' programmes.  The following table lists all the forms used to 
refer to these two referents.  All the referring expressions which are analysed are in 
normal font size, italicised and underlined.  The corresponding information status of 
the referents referred to is indicated in non-italicised and non-underlined font (New, 
Activ, Availdispl).  The italicised expressions/phrases in parentheses and in smaller font 
size are also taken from the letters.  Their information status is not analysed, but they 
have been included here to show the reader what has been "predicated" of the two 
referents each time they are referred to subsequently.  All quoted expressions/phrases 
are listed in sequence as they appear in the letters.  We have used shading in the table 
to contrast a's (shaded) and b's (unshaded) choice of referring expressions. 
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Table 5.2:  Forms used to refer to the referents of 'the M.A. in Linguistics' and 'the 
M.A. in Applied Linguistics'. 
 
Letters Forms used (in consecutive order) to refer to the referents of: 
 'the M.A. in Linguistics' 
 
'the M.A. in Applied Linguistics' 
A1 the M.A. in Linguistics New 
this one-year course  Activ 
 
 
(two core courses of) 
the M.A.   New 
 
B1 the M.A. in Linguistics       Availdispl 











(the Applied Linguistics Department) 
(a separate Department) 
(a different faculty) 
(some courses here) 
 
the M.A. in Applied Linguistics  
            Availdispl 




the M.A. in Linguistics        Availdispl 
(at the Faculty of Language) 
 
(my belonging to a different department 
(the prospectus of) 
the M.A. in Linguistics        Availdispl 
(c (Head of Linguistics Department)) 
 
(some courses) 
(at the Applied Linguistics Department) 
 
 
the M.A. in Applied Linguistics 
            Availdispl 
B2 (your future affiliation in the University) 





 As the above table shows, the following forms have been used to refer to the 
referent 'the M.A. in Linguistics':  
 
  A1 the M.A. in Linguistics  New 
   this one-year course   Activ 
  B1 the M.A. in Linguistics  Availdispl 
  A2 the M.A. in Linguistics  Availdispl 
   the M.A. in Linguistics  Availdispl 
 
The above seems to suggest that the full lexical expression can be used with equal 
ease to refer to the referent when it is presented for the first time (and hence new) and 
when it has been displaced.  Even when it is currently activated, the highly attenuated 
pronominal form is avoided.  Note that there is a fifth instance of the use of the 
expression the M.A. in Linguistics in A2 which we have not listed above.  The reason 
is because this instance of use occurs in cited form and is not actually part of a's use 
of the form (see A2P3 for the details). 
 We should point out that our use of the term displaced referent is somewhat 
extended compared to that of Yule's use.  In Yule's spoken data, referent displacement 
normally occurs within the same continuing discourse; whereas in our written data, 
referent displacement can and does occur across letters, i.e., the referent can be 
displaced in both the writer's and reader's minds for several days/weeks by other 
unrelated discourses.  We would therefore expect this extended notion of 
displacement to have certain repercussions on the degree of attenuation of forms used 
to refer to available referents, as the above examples of the forms used to refer to the 
referent 'M.A. in Linguistics' reveal. 
 Using Yule's method of presentation, we yield the following graphical 
representation of degrees of attenuation associated with the referent as it is referred to 
in the letters. 
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Figure 5.2:  Graph showing the relationship between degrees of attenuation and 




 As the graph shows, a similar pattern with that suggested by Yule is visible, 
although the trough of the curve is a lot less deep.  Note that since the expression this 
one-year course refers to a dual information status referent unit, we will accept the 
shorter and more attenuated expression this course as referring to the activated 
referent for the purpose of placing it on the graph above (see ACTIVATED), while 
acknowledging that the attribute referred to in one-year is available information (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4 for a discussion of this).  Since the expression this course is less 
attenuated than, say, the pronominal or ø form, the trough of the curve is less deep 
than that suggested by Yule for his referent. 
 In order to gain further insights into the behaviour of the referring expressions 
used, we calibrate the horizontal scale to produce the following modified graph. 
 
NE\V 






ihc Al.A. in Linguisitcs 
the ,11 . .-J. in Liuguisitcs 
the M.A. in li11g11is1ics 
position in discourse seqneuce 
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Figure 5.3:  Graph showing the relationship between degrees of attenuation and 




 In the above graph, the points mark the five instances of the use of expressions 
to refer to the referent 'M.A. in Linguistics'.  The points are not placed on the 
boundaries of the letters in order to mark roughly the place/sequence of use within and 
across the letters.  This graph differs from Yule's graph in several important ways for 
various reasons. 
 Firstly, the trough of our graph is not as deep as Yule's.  This means that in our 
data, the degree of attenuation of the form used is less than that in Yule's spoken data.  
We suspect that the reason for this difference may be due to the difference in genre of 
use.  In official written correspondence of our nature, it is commonly held that a more 
formal style of writing is preferred.  The choice of elaborate nominal expressions in our 
data may be a reflection of this formality of style (see Chapter 2, (Section 5) and 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.2) for related discussions).   
 Secondly, in our data, there are only two forms used to refer to the referent: the 
M.A. in Linguistics and this course, whereas for Yule's referent, there are five different 
forms used, ranging from a red horizontal line of about two inches [NEW] to Ø 
[CURRENT] to the red line [DISPLACED, last referring expression used].  Note that 
NEW DISPLACED 
1he M.,i, in lludl..~. in /he M.A. in 




Al BJ A2 
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Yule's graph does not return to its original height, while ours does.  What this 
difference amounts to is that in Yule's data, there seems to be a greater flexibility of 
attenuated forms used to refer to the same referent.  The fact that the final reference to 
the displaced referent can be made by the use of the shorter expression the red line 
compared to the original referring expression a red line of about two inches attests to 
this flexibility of choice of referring expressions.   
 In contrast, our data show that only two possible forms have been used - 
perhaps an indication of the cautious stance adopted by both writers.  This is shown 
not only in the avoidance of the pronominal form for the activated referent, but also 
by the return to the original full definite lexical expression upon displacement of the 
referent.  This cautious stance is understandable, given that the nature of the contents 
of the letters are important to the writers, especially a.  Also, in our letters, there are 
two similar MA's referred to; so the potential for confusion is great.  And indeed, this 
is the case with a's use of the underspecified the M.A. to refer to the referent 'M.A. in 
Applied Linguistics' discussed in Chapter 4, which led to b's confusion over a's 
departmental affiliation.  In order to clear up this confusion, both a and b have to 
resort to the use of full definite lexical expressions in order to "guarantee" referential 
success.  This hyper-corrective stance adopted by both interactants seems to be the 
sensible thing to do in the light of the current confusion. 
 Although we won't go as far as to suggest that this binary treatment of 
attenuation is characteristic of written discourse, we would however argue that this 
inflexibility is probably attributable to the same hyper-corrective stance mentioned 
above.  Because of this binary treatment of attenuation, the shift back to the full 
lexical expression upon displacement of the referent is total, i.e., the graph rises back 
to its original height; whereas in Yule's graph, the greater flexibility of forms used 
means that the return to the full lexical expression is partial, hence the graph does not 
return to its original height. 
 The third difference between Yule's graph and ours is that in Yule's graph, 
once displaced (available) status has been established, it requires an increasingly 
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expanded lexical expression with each repeated reference to the available referent.  
This is indicated by the upward slope of Yule's graph.  This contrasts with our flat 
line with the establishment of available status, showing the stability of use of the 
same full lexical expression. 
 The reason for Yule's upward slope and our flat line may be attributable to the 
difference between spoken discourse (in Yule's case) and written discourse (in our 
case).  In spoken discourse, further displacement places increasing demand on short 
term conscious memory of the referent referred to.  Subsequently, there may be a 
need for an increasingly expanded lexical expression (upward slope) for each 
displaced reference.  In our written discourse, visual permanence (i.e., having the 
letter in front of the reader) places less demand on memory, while allowing for 
recursive cycles of long distance backward (or even forward) search in the text (or 
even across texts) for previous mentions of the referent.  Hence there may not be a 
need for an increasingly expanded lexical expression. 
 Another feature of our written data is that they involve lengthy replies written 
in response to equally lengthy letters.  As we have discussed in Chapter 2, Section 5, 
written discourse of this nature differs from spoken discourse in several crucial ways 
(see, in particular, Widdowson, 1984).  Each lengthy letter in the exchange may be 
construed as a mega-turn, the contents of which (and the referents referred to in them) 
would normally take several turns in spoken discourse to be established.  The density 
of complex and often abstract referents packed into this mega-turn would therefore 
impose severe constraints on the ease with which attenuated and underspecified 
referring expressions would normally be interpreted in spoken discourse; hence, the 
need for the return to the expanded lexical expression upon displacement.   
 Besides, the on-line interaction and constant checking of understanding (by 
giving instant feedback) which is highly characteristic of spoken discourse is slowed 
down somewhat drastically in the exchange of letters which is spread out over a period 
of several weeks.  Needless to say, other sources of feedback normally available in 
spoken discourse like eye gaze, nodding/shaking of heads, facial expressions and 
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gestures are not available in written discourse (for a recent discussion of such 
paralinguistic cues to successful communication, see Boyle et al, 1994).  As such, the 
dynamics of tracking and of maintaining reference is quite different for written 
discourse. 
 Having discussed the forms used to refer to the first M.A. referent, let us turn 
our attention to the second referent 'the M.A. in Applied Linguistics'.  Going back to 
Table 5.2, we isolate the following expressions which have been used to refer to the 
referent 'the M.A. in Applied Linguistics': 
 
  A1 the M.A.    New 
  B1 the M.A. in Applied Linguistics Availdispl 
  A2 the M.A. in Applied Linguistics Availdispl 
 
In this case history, the form used to refer to the referent when it is new is actually 
more attenuated than when the entity has already been made available.  Note that 
although the first mention of the referent is not entirely successful, it is not totally 
unsuccessful either.  The fact that in b's reply B1, she is able to isolate the two likely 
MA's from the 40 or more MA's offered by the University shows that reference has 
been partially successful.  We therefore label the second mention M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics as Availdispl rather than as new information.   
 Using Yule's method of representation again, we yield the following graph.  
Notice that there is no instance of the use of a referring expression to refer to the 
referent when it is considered currently activated; hence there is no example of such a 
referring expression in the graph below. 
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Figure 5.4:  Graph showing the relationship between degrees of attenuation and 




 The gradient of the graph shows a totally different trend from that exhibited in 
the previous graph.  In A1, the writer a introduces the referent 'M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics' by using the shorter lexical expression the M.A.  a has obviously 
misjudged the referential adequacy of his choice of expression, resulting in b's 
confusion over his departmental affiliation.  In order to register her confusion, b uses 
the expanded lexical expression the M.A. in Applied Linguistics in her reply/query B1; 
and a maintains the use of this full lexical expression in his clarification in A2.   
 Another reason why the full lexical expression the M.A. in Applied Linguistics 
is used is to contrast it with the other expression the M.A. in Linguistics.  Finally, the 
expression the M.A. in Applied Linguistics is also used in spite of the fact that the 
number of predicates the referent (referred to) now carries with it has made it more 
than clear which M.A. is being referred to (see Table 5.2).  As mentioned above, this 
''hyper-corrective" overspecification is not entirely unexpected, considering the current 
confusion. 
 In line with our previous practice, we calibrate the horizontal scale of the graph 
to yield the modified graph below.  We observe a similar rise in the gradient of the 
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(displaced) of the referent.  Notice, however, that the graph flattens once availability 
has been established. 
 
Figure 5.5:  Graph showing the relationship between degrees of attenuation and 





 Based on the behaviour of the two revised graphs in Figures 5.3 and 5.5, we can 
therefore make additional generalisations about the shifts in information status of 
referents referred to in written discourse.  Generally speaking, a downward sloping 
graph indicates a shift towards activated status, whereas an upward slope indicates a 
shift in information status towards displacement.  When the graph levels off, it is a sign 
of displaced information status.  Taken together, we would expect the graphical 
representation of a successful history of discourse reference to exhibit the three stages in 
sequence: a downward slope, an upward slope and a flat line.  If any one stage is 
missing, we would expect a situation where referential success may have initially been 
inhibited or compromised.  In our observations of the second referent, we note that the 
missing downward slope indicates that the establishment of activated status has been 
compromised initially.  Note that this does not mean that there is a complete failure in 
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establishing reference, as shown by the fact that b can respond to a's letter by suggesting 
Or, do you mean that you have applied to take the M.A. in Applied Linguistics ... 
(B1P4). 
 In the next section, we attempt an analysis of the information status of two 
key propositions as they relate to the two 'M.A.' referents discussed above.   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2 Attenuation of referring expressions, related propositions and information 
 status 
 
 The purpose of this section is to offer an account of the interaction of the two 
levels of information status (referent and propositional) in this set of written 
correspondence.  We have seen how the information status of the two referents can be 
represented in a series of graphs.  In this section, we analyse the information status of 
the two propositions related to these referents.  We present our results in a series of 
tables.  By combining the results of the levels of analysis, we are able to investigate 
the interaction of the two levels of information status.  We close our discussion in this 
section by presenting an idealised representation of the interaction of the two levels of 
information status. 
 We begin our discussion by identifying the two related propositions.   
 While the expression the M.A. in Linguistics used by a in the following 
utterance taken from his second letter A2 
 
 ... I have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics at the Faculty of Languages 
 
refers to the available and displaced referent 'M.A. in Linguistics', the idea/thought that 
'a has applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics' as expressed in the above utterance is in 
fact new information to the reader b since the idea wasn't understood the first time it 
was made in A1.  In other words, at the referent level, the referent referred to is 
available (displaced); whereas at the idea/propositional level, the relation which holds 
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between the referents a and 'M.A. in Linguistics' as expressed in the utterance is 
actually new information to the reader b.  For our purpose here, we shall call this 
idea/thought, composed of the two referents and the relation which holds between them, 
the proposition. 
 When a writes his opening letter A1, he presents a lot of information about 
himself.  In A1P2, he writes I applied ... to take the M.A. in Linguistics and then later 
in the next paragraph in A1P3, he writes I would like to read two core courses of the 
M.A. [in Applied Linguistics] in addition.  Let us take the above contents to be 
expressing the following propositions: 
 
(1) a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
(4) a would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics in addition 
 
Note that these two propositions contain the two M.A. referents.  You may also recall 
that proposition (1) above is actually BP1 (see Chapters 1 and 3). 
 We shall now track the information status of these two propositions over the 
series of letters.  Just as it is possible to conceive of the notion of a discourse referent 
in extended texts, so we shall use the label discourse proposition to refer to the 
parallel notion/phenomenon for the proposition.  What follows below is a table 




Table 5.3:  Information status of propositions (1) and (4). 
 
Letter Information status of propositions: 
    
 a's view 
 
 a's assumptions about b's view 
A1 (1)  (4) —> (1)  (4) 
   [unsuccessful transfer] 
 
 b's assumptions about a's view 
 
 b's view 





a's assumptions about b's view 
A2 (?1)  (?4)   
 (1)  (4) —> (1)  (4) 
    
 
Note: Lightly shaded area = New information 
 Heavily shaded area = Known information 
 
We analyse the information status of the propositions as either new or known.  
Unlike the referents, we are not using the notion of "consciousness" as the 
criterion for defining information status of the propositions.  The reason for 
this is because our interest here lies in the knowing rather than the thinking of 
certain propositions. 
 
 Looking at the first row regarding A1, the heavily shaded area indicates that 
the two propositions are known information to a.  Since a is the writer of the letter, it 
is not surprising that the propositions are known to him.  The third column shows that, 
in writing A1, the writer a assumes that the reader b will accept the propositions as 
new information (light shade).  Just as a has misjudged the referential adequacy of the 
expression the M.A. used to refer to the referent 'M.A. in Applied Linguistics', he has 
also misjudged the successful transmission of (1) and (4) as new information.  This 
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unsuccessful transfer/transmission of information is caused by the confusion of the 
two M.A. referents discussed in the previous section (see also Chapters 3 and 4). 
 In B1, the writer b expresses her uncertainty about the two propositions by 
saying that she can't quite work out what a has applied to take.  We use the notation 
(?1) and (?4) to indicate this uncertainty.  In writing B1, the writer b assumes that the 
reader a will accept her uncertainties (?1) and (?4) as "new" (but uncertain) 
information.  When a writes his reply in A2, he would have stored the uncertainties 
(?1) and (?4) as "known" information (hence, the heavy shade).  He still has (1) and 
(4) as known information which he conveys to the reader b again, assuming that the 
reader will accept them as new information now. 
 Having looked at the information status of the referents and now of the related 
propositions which include these referents, we are in a position to examine the 
interaction of the two levels of analysis.  In  other words, is there a correlation 
between the information status of the referents on the one hand and their related 
propositions on the other? 
 In the following tables (5.4 - 5.6), we offer an analysis of this interaction.  Note 
that the relevant texts have been provided in the second column.  The expressions 
which have been used to refer to the two referents are underlined and their information 
status is indicated in bold and parentheses.  The related proposition of the referent 
'M.A. in Linguistics' is (1) 'a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics'.  The related 
proposition of the referent 'M.A. in Applied Linguistics' is (4) 'a would like to read 
two core courses of the M.A. in Applied Linguistics in addition'.  The last two 
columns show the information status of the propositions.  Once again, the lightly 
shaded areas indicate new information, while the heavily shaded areas indicate known 
information.  One major difference between the representation of the information 
status of the propositions here with that of Table 5.3 is that in the following tables, the 
in-coming information within each letter is indicated in sequence as it appears in the 
letters.  Note also that in Table 5.3, the text has not been indicated; whereas in the 
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following tables, we have included the relevant texts.  This difference will become 
clearer as we work our way through the tables below. 
 
Table 5.4:  For letter A1 only:  Correlating the information status of the two 'M.A.' 
referents with the information status of their related propositions (1) & (4). 
 
Letters Texts: Expressions referring to two referents 
(underlined) and supporting "predicates" 
(smaller font ) 
Information status of propositions: 
    a's view     a's assumptions 
      about b's view 
     
A1 ... I applied ... to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
(New) in the academic year 1993/94. 
(1) —> (1) 
    | 
 Within this one-year course (Activ)I like to 
.... 
(1) —> (1) 
  
[3 intervening sentences] 
 
  | 
| 
| 
 Therefore I would like to read two core courses of 
the M.A. (New) in addition ... 
(4) —> (1) (4) 
   [undetected 
unsuccessful transfer] 
     
 
Note: referents (underlined);  information status (Bold) 
 related propositions (numbered);  information status (heavy shade:  Known; 
        light shade:     New) 
(1) a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics  
(4) a would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics in addition 
 
 When a writes the utterance ... I applied ... to take the M.A. in Linguistics..., 
he assumes that the referent 'M.A. in Linguistics' will be established as new 
information in the reader b's mind.  The related proposition (1) 'a applied to take the 
M.A. in Linguistics' is also assumed to be established as new information (light 
shade).  When a writes the next utterance Within this one-year course I like to ..., he 
[I] 
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assumes that the 'M.A. in Linguistics' referent is currently activated while the related 
proposition is now known information (heavy shade).  In writing the utterance 
Therefore I would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in addition ..., the writer a 
assumes that the reader b will accept the attenuated and underspecified the M.A. as 
referring to a new referent 'M.A. in Applied Linguistics' and its related proposition (4) 
'a would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in Applied Linguistics in addition' 
as new information. 
 Presumably at the end of the letter, a's assumptions about b's view is that b 
will hold (1) as known information and (4) as new information.  a's assumptions 
about the reader b's eventual information state of the propositions are indicated in the 
last shaded box with borders.  The vertical line running down the last column traces 
a's assumptions about the reader's information status with regard to the propositions.  
At the time of writing, a obviously has no idea that he has erred in using the 
attenuated form, resulting in confusion and the unsuccessful transfer of information 
(indicated on the table by square brackets).  In reality, it is only in reading b's 
reply/query later on that he realises that neither proposition (1) nor (4) has been 
established as known information. 
 We should add the caveat that even though a has misjudged the referential 
adequacy of his underspecified expression the M.A. to refer to the referent 'M.A. in 
Applied Linguistics', b's failure to understand the expression is not total either.  It is 
not as though b has no idea whatsoever which two MA's (of the 40 or more MA's 
offered by the University) a may be referring to.  The fact that she can shortlist the 
exact two MA's which a has to be referring to is indicative of this partial 
failure/success to refer.  As such, we suggest in the next table that instead of a total 
referential failure, b carries with her the two doubts/uncertainties (?1) and (?4). 
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Table 5.5:  For letter B1 only: Correlating the information status of the two 'M.A.' 
referents with the uncertain information status of their related propositions (1) & (4). 
 
Letters Texts: Expressions referring to two referents 
(underlined) and supporting "predicates" 
(smaller font ) 
Information status of propositions: 
 b's assumptions   b's view 
 about a's view   
 
     
B1 I cannot quite work out ... exactly what you are 
going to be doing here ... ; 
(?1)   (?4) <— (?1)   (?4) 
  |   
 you say you have applied to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics, (Availdispl)  and I presume ... you 
will be a student of the Linguistics Department. 
    (?1) <—     (?1) 
  
If that is the case, I am afraid that it would not 
really be the done thing for me to supervise you, 
since the Applied Linguistics Department is a 














 Or, do you mean that you have applied to take the 
M.A. in Applied Linguistics (Availdispl) 
here in the Applied Linguistics Department? 
(?1)   (?4) <—           (?4) 
     
 
 In the second letter B1, b is now the writer who decides how she wants to 
package the referents and propositions.  In writing I cannot quite work out ... exactly 
what you are going to be doing here ..., the writer b assumes that the reader a will be 
able to pick up her uncertainties (?1) and (?4).  The writer b assumes that these 
uncertainties will be established as "new" information at this stage in a's mind.  By the 
time b writes you say you have applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics and so on, b 
assumes that a will now take uncertainty (?1) as "known" information.  When b writes 
Or, do you mean you have applied to take the M.A. in Applied Linguistics, she 
assumes that the reader a will now accept uncertainty (?4) as "known" information as 
-• 
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well.  By the time the writer b comes to the end of the letter, her assumptions about the 
reader a's eventual information state (shaded box with border) will be that 
uncertainties (?1) and (?4) will be treated as "known" information by a. 
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Table 5.6:  For letters A2 & B2 only: Correlating the information status of the two 
'M.A.' referents with the information status of their related propositions (1) & (4). 
  
Letters Texts: Expressions referring to two referents 
(underlined) and supporting "predicates" 
(smaller font) 
Information status of propositions: 
    a's view     a's assumptions 
      about b's view 
     
A2 ... you tell me that I may follow some courses at the 
Applied Linguistics Department. 
(4) —> (4) 
  
[1 intervening sentence] 
 
  | 
| 
| 
 ... I would like to clear up  a possible 
misunderstanding:  As you presume, I have applied 
to take the M.A. in Linguistics (Availdispl) 
at the Faculty of Languages. 
(1) —> (1) 
    | 
 Lacking the teaching experience of 4 years, I am 
not eligible for the M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics (Availdispl) anyway. 
(4) —> (4) 
    | 
 ... I hoped that my belonging to a different 
department of the University would not be an 
obstacle ... with the prospectus of the M.A. in 
Linguistics (Availdispl) stating on page 2: .... 
(1) —> (1)     (4) 
  
[3 intervening sentences] 
 
   
 Would you consider it useful to talk things over 
with c? 
   
  
 
   b's view 
B2 Thank you ... you clarify your future affiliation in 
the University. 
  (1)     (4) 
     
  
 In the above table, by the time a finishes writing A2, he probably assumes that 
the reader b's eventual information state will include both propositions (1) and (4) as 
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known information.  We notice that for both letters B1 (previous table) and A2 
(above table), a's and b's negotiation of their positions on the propositions is 
accompanied by the use of the full lexical expressions to refer to both M.A. referents 
even though both referents are available (displaced). 
 The complexities of the interaction of the information status of the referents 
(and the degrees of attenuation of their referring expressions) and the information 
status of their related propositions are best captured in graphical form.  The data for 
the following figures are drawn from a's letters A1 and A2 as shown in Tables 5.4 
and 5.6 above.  (Since we are taking the writer a's point of view here, we have 
excluded discussion of letter B1.)  For ease of explanation, we will refrain from 
repeating the expression "the writer a assumes that b's view of the information status 
of the referent/proposition is ....".  Instead, our assumption is that everything 




Figures 5.6 (a) & (b):  The interaction of the information status of referents (a) 'M.A. 
in Linguistics' and (b) 'M.A. in Applied Linguistics', and the information status of 
their related propositions (1) and (4) respectively. 
 
                 
 
 
Note: (1) a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics  
(4) a would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in Applied Linguistics 
in addition 
 
 Graph (a) above shows the interaction of the information status of the referent 











~ISJ LA ::ED 
the If.A. ·11 
ApJ. ' ied 
Lin, uisti .s 
" 
V p 
~ IVJ TED 
A2 
Sequence of letters 
(a) 
a's assumptions about 
b's view of proposition 
(1 )'s status 
§ Inhibited New Known 
(b) 
a's assu1uptions abou 
b's view of propositi 011 





to take the M.A. in Linguistics' as assumed by the writer a regarding his reader b.  On 
the first mention of the referent early in the text of A1, the related proposition is 
established as new information (lightly shaded area) as well.  The graph then moves 
downwards, showing a movement towards the use of an attenuated form.   
 Once activated status for the referent has been established, the related 
proposition is presumably established as known information (heavy shade).  As we have 
discussed previously, the confusion arises when the other referent 'M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics' is mentioned with the underspecified expression the M.A., resulting in b's 
confusion over a's departmental affiliation (see dotted line linking graphs (a) and (b)).  
This results in the unsuccessful communication of propositions (1) as well as (4), 
triggering the unshaded area of inhibited information transfer.  Recall that the writer a 
only realises this communication failure when he reads b's response. 
 Coming back to graph (a), when the writer a writes his next letter A2, he 
assumes that proposition (1)'s information status has been inhibited (the unshaded 
area).  As the graph enters the unshaded area (showing miscommunication), it rises 
rapidly to its original height, showing a shift back to the same full lexical expression. 
 Once the referent is established as available (displaced) during the first part of 
letter A2, the slope of the graph levels off.  Notice that the graph flattens, rather than 
slopes down, the second time round in the lightly shaded area.  This is so because the 
writer a is understandably cautious, and therefore chooses to use the full lexical 
expression for the already available (displaced) referent in order to avoid future 
confusion.   
 Summing up, in graphical terms, we expect the graph to slope down during its 
first entry into the lightly shaded area.  The graph should then slope up in the resulting 
heavily shaded area.  An unshaded area has the tendency to push the graph up to its 
original height.  During its second entry (especially after an unshaded area) into the 
second lightly shaded area, the graph begins to level off rather than slope down. 
 Graph (b) shows the relationship between the information status of the referent 
'M.A. in Applied Linguistics' and the information status of its related proposition (4) 'a 
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would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in Applied Linguistics in addition'.  
As we have observed earlier, the shape of the graph contradicts that suggested by Yule 
(1981).  The reason lies in a's misjudgement in using the underspecified the M.A. to 
refer to the referent 'M.A. in Applied Linguistics'.  While still writing A1, a has no 
way of knowing that his underspecified expression has failed to refer for his reader b.  
In other words, while writing A1, a assumes that the reader b will treat the expression 
and its related proposition as establishing new information (lightly shaded area).  By 
the time he writes his clarification to b's query in A2, he already knows that 
proposition (4)'s information status has been inhibited (unshaded area).  (Similar to 
graph (a), this unshaded area sees a similar rise in the graph towards the full lexical 
expression.)  With the second mention of the referent by a full lexical expression, 
displaced referent information status is established, while the related proposition is 
established as new information. 
 In both situations (a) and (b) above, we are looking at instances where 
referential success has not been immediate.  We have no examples of referential 
chains (i.e., at least three mentions of the same referent at different information 
status) in our data where success of reference is achieved without recourse to further 
clarification.  But it is not impossible to imagine the kind of graphical representation 
such an ideal situation might produce. 
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Figure 5.7:  An idealised representation of the interaction of the information status of a 
referent and its related proposition. 
 
 
              
 
 In a situation where an entity x and its related proposition px are established as 
new information without any setbacks, the above graph may well represent such an 
idealised discourse referent-proposition history.  When the referent x is first referred to 
in a proposition px , the full definite lexical expression is used.  Once activated, the 
referent is referred to again with a highly attenuated form.  This is shown by the dip in 
the graph.  Upon displacement, we would expect the initial reference to the available 
referent to be made with the use of a definite lexical expression although we do not 
expect the expression to be as extended as during its first mention (new).  This is 
shown by a rise in the graph but which does not rise to its original height.  With 
subsequent mention of the displaced referent x, we expect the stable use of the same 
definite lexical expression, hence the flat graph. 
 In such an idealised situation, the interaction of the two levels of information 
status is probably fairly straightforward too.  Once the referent has been established as 
new information, we would expect the onset of the lightly shaded area, showing that 
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referent is referred to again while activated, this will trigger the onset of the heavily 
shaded area, showing that the related proposition has been established as known 
information.  The heavily shaded area will persist with subsequent mentions of the 
available referent, showing that the information status of the related proposition as 
known is maintained throughout.  We do not expect to see an unshaded area of 
inhibited information status of the related proposition, and therefore do not expect the 
graph to be pushed up to its original height. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3 Information structure and common ground 
 
 We shall close our discussion of information structure by highlighting its 
relation to common ground.  Recall in Chapter 2, Section 4 that we classify shared 
beliefs as part of established common ground, and common/background knowledge 
as part of assumed common ground.   
 When the writer deliberates on her packaging of information in her utterances, 
she makes certain assumptions about what might reasonably be considered to be part 
of her reader's information state.  If she assumes the information to be already 
activated, she is probably drawing from her assumptions about her reader's shared 
beliefs (i.e., established common ground), since that which is activated must have 
arisen from a previous and recent mention.   
 If she assumes the information to be merely available, she is probably drawing 
from her assumptions about her reader's shared beliefs (i.e., availabledisplaced 
information) and/or her reader's background knowledge (availableschema, 
availablereasoning).  In other words, she is accessing her reader's established common 
ground (shared beliefs) and assumed common ground (common/background 
knowledge).  The above is summarised in Table 5.7 below. 
 193 
Table 5.7:  The basis of the writer's assumptions (1st layer) about her reader's actual 
information state. 
 
Writer's assumption about the 
reader's actual information state 
 
Basis of writer's 
assumption 
Type of CG 
Activated 
 













Note: CG = common ground. 
 The above is based on the writer's 1st layer of assumptions only.  See Chapter 
4, Section 3 for a discussion of our three-layer conceptualisation of the writer's 
assumptions about her reader's actual information state, ability and willingness 
states.  Table  4.1 in Chapter 4 summarises our conceptual framework. 
  
 Our discussion in Chapter 4 also reveals that the writer can package her 
utterances quite independently of her assumptions about her reader's actual 
information state.  In order words, she can make the additional assumption about her 
reader's willingness to accept the way she chooses to package her information (i.e., the 
writer's 3rd layer of assumptions about her reader).  See Table 5.8 below. 
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Table 5.8:  The basis of the writer's assumptions (1st and 3rd layers) about her reader's 
actual information state and willingness state. 
 
Writer's assumption about the reader's 
actual information state (and 
willingness state in parenthesis) 
 
Basis of writer's 
assumption 





(but the reader is willing to treat as 








As though CG 
   
 
 For example, the writer can package new information (i.e., not part of her 
reader's common ground or assumed common ground) as though it is available, and 
expects him to treat the information as such.  This takes place when the writer uses 
the "non-default" definite expression to refer to a piece of information which is new 
to the reader.  This "non-default" use, as we have pointed out in our discussion of (19) 
and (31) in Chapter 4, is possible because the writer makes the further assumption 
about her reader's willingness to accept the way she packages her information.  In 
doing this, we suspect that the writer is reaching a third "source" of information, apart 
from her reader's established common ground (shared beliefs) and assumed common 
ground (background knowledge).  This third "source" of information (as we have 
pointed out in Chapter 2, Section 4) has to do with that which the writer assumes the 
reader is willing to treat as though it is part of his common ground.  We have termed 
this third "category" of common ground as "as though common ground" (see Chapter 





 In Chapters 4 and 5, we offer a detailed account of information structure from 
the writer's point of view.  We analyse this at the referent and propositional levels and 
also the interaction of the two levels.  In conjunction with these analyses, we offer 
some observations on the nature of the difference between written and spoken 
discourse in relation to the issue of how information status affects the degree of 
attenuation of the expressions used.  We conclude our discussion by commenting 
briefly on the relation between information structure and common ground from the 
writer's point of view.  In the next two chapters, we shall return to the reader's point 
of view by looking closely at the configurations of the reader's beliefs in the process 













 In Chapter 3, we examined the role of the reader in interpreting utterances.  
One of our observations is that the reader has access to certain background knowledge 
which he assumes to be common ground to help him interpret the utterances.  We also 
show that as the exchange of letters progresses, previous propositions expressed in the 
earlier letters become part of the reader's conception of his common ground (shared 
beliefs), and that this "accumulated" context helps him to confirm/modify/reject his 
interpretation of other previous utterances as well as interpret new utterances.   
 In Chapters 4 and 5, we take the writer's point of view by focusing on how the 
writer uses her common ground to help her package the expressions in her letters.  We 
argue that she takes into account her reader's existing shared beliefs (established 
common ground) and her reader's existing background knowledge (assumed common 
ground) in packaging her utterances.  We also argue that she can make the additional 
assumption of her reader's ability and willingness to, for example, accept her 
packaging of certain new information as though it is already part of her reader's 
established/assumed common ground ("as though common ground").   
 In this chapter and the next, we return to the reader's point of view.  This 
chapter is concerned with the regression of beliefs.  We should emphasise that we 
continue to use the term regression in the Schifferian sense, as expounded in Chapter 
1 (Section 3) and Chapter 2 (Section 1).  The term regression is used in the context of 
a two-party discourse, where, in the process of negotiation of their respective 
positions on particular propositions, the first party begins to form beliefs about the 
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second party's beliefs about these propositions, and beliefs about the second party's 
beliefs about the first party's beliefs about the same propositions, and so on. 
 So far, we have seen that the process of establishing common ground runs 
right through the entire series of letters.  As the letters go back and forth between a 
and b, it becomes inevitable that there will be a certain degree of regression of beliefs 
involved.  For example, a is bound to not only have beliefs about certain propositions, 
but also beliefs about what b may believe about his beliefs of the same propositions, 
and so on.  In examining this regression of beliefs in detail in the current chapter, we 
offer a plausible solution to the Mutual Knowledge Paradox discussed in Chapter 2 by 
demonstrating that the regression is limited to a few steps.  We do this by expanding 
on the method of configuring beliefs first developed in Brown (1995) (see Chapter 2 
for a discussion of Brown's method).  In doing this, we will be able to demonstrate the 
kinds of configurations which are associated with establishing shared beliefs. 
 Next we shall explore the relationship between the individual's 
goals/pragmatic reasoning schemas (as discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3) and the 
order in which the key beliefs are/are not established as shared.  In order to 
investigate this interaction, we use the same set of Base Propositions (BPs) examined 
in Chapter 3 as the basis of our analysis in this chapter. 
 Finally, we shall consider the written-spoken language distinction in the light 
of our findings in this chapter which is based entirely on written data.  We conclude 
by restating our position on the Mutual Knowledge Paradox, and by comparing our 
findings with those of Clark's (1996) and Brown's (1995) (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
 Note that in this chapter, as in the rest of the study, we refer to the generic 
writer as she and the generic reader as he.  We shall continue to refer to b as she, and 
a as he. 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Defining some key terms 
 
 We begin by introducing the use of several new terms to label the 
concepts/phenomena we will isolate in our analysis of the data.  We define some of 
the crucial terms here but will leave the detailed discussion for later. 
 As we have seen in Chapter 2 (Section 3) of our discussion of the regression 
of B's beliefs in Brown's (1995) example, this regression can be represented by a 
series of values to indicate B's beliefs about the palm tree, and B's beliefs about A's 
beliefs about the palm tree and so on.  We have used the term 'configuration' to refer 
to this series of values which characterises B's regression of beliefs. 
 Likewise in our current study, in configuring the beliefs of the interactants, a 
and b, as the exchange of letters progresses, we are able to highlight the regression of 
their beliefs.  This regression, we shall demonstrate later, is solipsistic.  By a 
solipsistic regression, we mean that each interactant has his own set of beliefs and his 
own beliefs about the other interactant's beliefs.  For example, a has his own set of 
regressed beliefs regarding the sharedness of, say, proposition (1) 'a applied to take 
the M.A. in Linguistics'.  b, on the other hand, has her own conception of (1) and of 
her conception of a's position on (1).  We shall exemplify the complexities of this 
distinction in Section 3 below.   
 Because each interactant develops his own notion of sharedness when reading 
a particular letter, obviously only one interactant can establish sharedness for (1) at a 
time. Whoever establishes sharedness first for (1) depends on who has access to the 
information regarding (1) first.  (We shall explain what we mean by "having access to 
information first" later in Section 4.)  For the time being, we should just point out that 
the first person to establish sharedness for (1) has, what shall call, 1st Party 
Sharedness.  The second person to establish sharedness for the same belief has 2nd 
Party Sharedness.  We shall demonstrate, in the discussion of our data below, the 
difference between the configurations of 1st Party and 2nd Party Sharedness. 
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 We shall also demonstrate that once sharedness has been established, this 
regression of, say, belief (1) is terminated or arrested.  Once we have ascertained that 
sharedness has been established, we can count, quite literally, the number of steps in 
the regression.  By counting the number of steps and the actual values of each step, 
we are able to identify the kind of configuration that is associated with the 
sharedness.  (This is best exemplified later when we look at the data.)   
 By looking at the configuration of various beliefs we are then able to identify 
generic patterns of configurations, each pattern depicting a different type of 
sharedness.  These patterns will reveal that there are three types of sharedness: shared 
belief, shared doubt and shared disbelief.  Shared belief (also called common 
ground (CG))is a state where one interactant, say a, believes (1), and a also believes 
that the other interactant b believes (1).  Shared doubt is a state where a is uncertain 
about (1) and where he believes that b is uncertain about (1) as well.  Shared 
disbelief is a state where a does not believe (1) and where he believes that b does not 
believe (1) either.   
 Although each interactant's goal is to establish CG, it is not always achieved.  
This is attributed to three problems (to be discussed in Section 2).  These problems 
are: (i) conflicting initial beliefs; (ii) inaccurate representation of the other party's 
beliefs; and (iii) conflicting resultant beliefs.  The state of (i) pertains to a lack of 
sharedness prior to the interaction; whereas the state of (iii) pertains to a lack of 
sharedness even after an attempt at bridging this gap through some interaction has 
been made.  (ii) is a situation where one interactant forms an inaccurate representation 
of the other interactant's beliefs during the interaction, possibly due to a lack of 
understanding or misinterpretation of the other interactant's utterances.  Having 
defined these terms briefly, we are now in a position to examine the data. 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
2 List of assumptions made by the writer a  in writing A1 
 
 We begin our discussion by listing the assumptions made by a in writing letter 
A1.  We use the propositional content expressed in these assumptions as our basis for 
tracking whether these assumptions are established as shared beliefs subsequently as 
the exchange progresses. 
 The list of assumptions made by a in writing A1 may be subdivided into three 
categories: those pertaining to a himself; those pertaining to the world (i.e., University 
regulations and protocols, prospectus, etc.); and those pertaining to b.  (See Chapter 1 
or Appendix 1 for the text of letter A1.)  We shall use the term assumption 
interchangeably with belief; hence by a's assumptions we mean too a's beliefs.  
Strictly speaking, we think there is a fundamental difference between a's beliefs about 
himself and a's beliefs about the world and b.  The second set of beliefs concerns 
propositions whose contents are external to a, the writer, while the first set concerns 
propositions whose contents are internal to a .  In this sense then, one may say that a 
knows the propositions concerning himself; while a can only believe propositions 
about the world and b, or anything else external to him.  The first set of assumptions 
is more secure, while the second is less secure.  After all, a is more likely to be 
mistaken about others than he would be about himself, his actions and intentions, 
barring any cognitive/mental abnormalities. 
 The following table lists the assumptions made by a in writing letter A1.  You 
will notice that these assumptions are in fact the list of Base Propositions (BPs) listed 
in Chapters 1 and 3.  For our purpose here, we shall refer to them as 
assumptions/beliefs instead of BPs.  We have however retained their original 
numbering for easy cross-referencing with Chapters 1 and 3.  So, BP 1 is now 
assumption/belief 1, BP 2a is assumption/belief 2a, and so on. 
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Table 6.1: Assumptions/beliefs made/held by a, the writer, in writing letter A1 
(including those which a is unsure of; marked by [?] ) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
a believes that: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 (regarding a) 
 
1 a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
 
 (regarding the world: University regulations, prospectus, etc.) 
 
2a The Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a  
2b The Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a  
 
 (regarding b) 
 
3a b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 
3b b is interested in supervising a  [?] 
3e b is willing in principle to supervise a  [?] 
3f b is willing in fact to supervise a  [?] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 (Note that we have excluded BP 3c 'b will continue to be interested in 
supervising a' and BP 3d 'b has time and so on to supervise a' from the table because 
these BPs have not arisen yet in letter A1.) 
 The first of a's beliefs (1) concerns a himself.  In a sense then, it is really a's 
knowledge of himself.  Surely a knows his own action.  Assumption (1) is based on 
stated information found in the text in A1P2. 
 Assumptions (2a) - (2b) pertain to the state of the world, especially that 
concerning the University regulations, organisation, procedures and practices.  They 
are largely taken/adapted from the list of background knowledge (assumed common 
ground) listed on Table 1.1 of Chapter 1. 
 a's assumptions (3a) - (3f) pertain to a's assumptions/beliefs about b.  
Assumption (3b) is drawn from A1P4.  Assumption (3a) is very similar to (2a), but 
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written from b's point of view.  Notice that we have included on the list, a's beliefs 
(3b), (3e) and (3f) pertaining to b which he is unsure of. 
 Being the writer and source of the information in letter A1, a may be assumed 
to believe all of the above information, except (3b), (3e) and (3f) which he isn't sure 
of.  See Table 6.2 below for a summary of a's beliefs in writing A1.  (A '+' indicates 
that a believes the proposition expressed; while a '?' indicates uncertainty/doubt.  
'Assms' = Assumptions.) 
 









 1 + 
 2a + 
A1 3a + 
 3b ? 
 3e ? 
 2b + 
 3f ? 
 
Note that we have rearranged the order of the beliefs/assumptions to reflect the order 
in which they are arranged sequentially as conditions in terms of b's pragmatic 
reasoning schema (see Chapter 3, Section 3 for a discussion).  The purpose is to see if 
the order in which these beliefs are established as shared corresponds with the order 
in which the conditions of the reasoning schema of b are arranged.  As we have 
shown in Chapter 3, the order in which the beliefs (BPs in Chapter 3) are arranged 
sequentially is driven by b's goal which is to determine the status of the terminal BP3f 
'b is willing in fact to supervise a'.  As we have seen in Chapter 3, a's goal also 
pertains to the status of the terminal BP 3f.  If the order in which the beliefs are 
established as shared reflects the same order in which the conditions of the schema 
are arranged, we are then well placed to assume that the order in which shared beliefs 
are established is similarly goal-driven. 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
3 The reader b's beliefs after reading A1 
 
 We have seen in Chapter 3 how b, in reading A1, has doubts about which 
M.A. (i.e., Linguistics or Applied Linguistics) a has applied to take.  Based on the 
evidence found in b's reply B1, we therefore assume that b believes that a may have 
confused his application for one M.A. for the other.  b is also quite convinced that 
although across department supervision is permissible, she has no reason to suppose 
that the Linguistics Department would be willing to let an external expert like her 
supervise a, given that the Linguistics Department already has a sociolinguistics 
expert.  Hence, she believes at this juncture that neither is the Linguistics Department 
willing to let her nor is she willing to supervise a.  As such b does not believe that: 
 
2b. The Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a  
3e. b is willing in principle to supervise a  
3f. b is willing in fact to supervise a   
 
 b's beliefs may be represented in the following way in the table below. 
 
Table 6.3: A comparison of a's and b's beliefs after writing/reading letter A1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief a  (Step 1) a/b  (Step 2) b  (Step 1) b/a  (Step 2) b/a/b  (St 3) 
A1 1 +  ? ?  
 2a +  + +  
 3a +  + +  
 3b ?  - ?  
 3e ?  - ?  
 2b +  - +  
 3f ?  - ?  
 
Note: a + = a believes that ... 
 a/b + = a believes that b believes that ... 
 a ? = a is not sure that ... 
 a/b ? = a believes that b is not sure that ... 
I I 
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 a - = a does not believe that ... 
 a/b - = a believes that b does not believe that ... 
 
 b + = b believes that ... 
 b/a + = b believes that a believes that ... 
 b ? = b is not sure that ... 
 and so on ... 
 
 (For our purpose here, note also that 'a -' means that a does not believe that p 
(the proposition); it does not mean that a believes that not p.  Furthermore, 'a/b -' 
means that a believes that b does not believe that p; it does not mean that a believes 
that b believes that not p.  Note too that the negation of belief extends to the last 
individual named in the regression only (in this case, b, for 'a/b -'); it does not extend 
to prior individual(s) mentioned in the regression (in this case, a).  Hence, 'a/b/a -', for 
example, means that a believes that b believes that a does not believe that p.) 
 In order to facilitate our discussion of the above table, we shall examine it in 
this order: 
 
(i) A comparison of columns a and b. 
 Firstly, we shall compare a's and b's own (i.e., only Step 1) beliefs.  In Table 
6.3 above, this is done by comparing column a with column b.  This amounts 
to a comparison of a's and b's own beliefs prior to the exchange of letters.  
What our analysis will show below is that there are conflicting initial beliefs. 
 
(ii) A comparison of columns a and b/a (both shaded). 
 Secondly, we shall track b's conceptualisation/representation of a's beliefs.  
(This is done by comparing columns a and b/a (both shaded).)  On the table, 
this representation is presented visually by the "transfer" of beliefs from the 
shaded column on the left to the shaded column on the right.  In Table 6.3, a's 
beliefs (column a; Step 1; shaded) get "transferred" to b and become b's 
beliefs about a's beliefs (column b/a; Step 2; shaded).  In reality, there is no 
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actual transfer of beliefs from a to b since beliefs are held solipsistically and 
reside entirely in the head of an individual.  We merely use the term 'transfer' 
as a convenient way of describing the visual presentation of the beliefs on the 
table.  Rather, and in psychological terms, the "transfer" of beliefs from a's 
Step 1 beliefs to b's Step 2 beliefs is in fact b's representation of a's beliefs 
(b/a).  In our analysis below, we will show that b's inaccurate representation 
of a's beliefs shows a lack of understanding on b's part of a's intended 
meaning.  Evidence of this lies in b's remark that she cannot quite work out ... 
exactly what you [a] are going to be doing ... in B1P2.  Please refer to Chapter 
3 for an earlier discussion of this communication problem. 
 
(iii) A comparison of columns b and b/a. 
 Once we have examined (i) and (ii) above, we are then in a position to see if 
there is a match between b's own beliefs (b, Step 1) and b's beliefs about a's 
beliefs (b/a, Steps 1-2).  (As you can see, this is done by comparing b's 
columns b (Step 1) and b/a (Step 2).)  If there is a Step 1-2 match, we can 
safely say that shared beliefs (or shared doubts; to be discussed later) have 
been established.  If there is a lack of match of beliefs after b has formed a 
representation of a's beliefs, we shall refer to this outcome as a state of 
conflicting resultant beliefs. 
 
 We shall exemplify the above order of investigation by looking more closely 
at Table 6.3. 
 Firstly, let us compare a's (a; Step 1) and b's (b; Step 1) own beliefs about (1), 
(2a), (3a), (3b), (3e), (2b) and (3f) in letter A1.  The following is an extract of the 
relevant parts from Table 6.3. 
 
 206 
    a's beliefs  b's beliefs 
            a           b 
  1          +           ? 
  2a          +           + 
  3a          +           + 
  3b          ?           - 
  3e          ?           - 
  2b          +           - 
  3f          ?           - 
 
 We have already discussed a's beliefs (column a above) when we discussed 
Table 6.2 previously.  Now, looking at b's beliefs only, the column b (Step 1) shows 
that, like a, b believes (2a) 'The Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise 
a' and (3a) 'b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a'.  We know that this is so 
because b is familiar with the Linguistics Department's regulations (see Chapter 3, 
Section 2.2 for a discussion). 
 b, however, is not sure of (1) 'a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics'.  The 
evidence for this lies in b's reply B1 where she declares that she is not sure what a has 
applied to do.  In contrast to a, b doesn't believe (3b) 'b is interested in supervising a', 
(3e) 'b is willing in principle to supervise a', (2b) 'The Linguistics Department is 
willing to let b supervise a' and (3f) 'b is willing in fact to supervise a'.  Recall that b 
does not hold (3b) 'b is interested in supervising a' because she still doesn't know at 
this juncture what a's departmental affiliation is.  See Chapter 3 for a detailed 
discussion of why b is uncertain about a's status as a student of the Linguistics 
Department, and why she is unwilling, at this juncture, both in principle and in fact to 
supervise a.  Hence for (1), (3b), (3e), (2b) and (3f), a's and b's initial beliefs are in 
conflict (conflicting initial beliefs). 
 Having compared a's and b's own beliefs (Step 1 only), let us consider b's 
representation of a's beliefs.  This is indicated on the second column b/a (Step 2) of 
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b's beliefs in Table 6.3.  The column b/a concerns b's beliefs of a's beliefs.  We 
reproduce below relevant extracts (originally shaded columns) from Table 6.3. 
 
    a's beliefs  b's beliefs 
            a          b/a 
  1          +           ? 
  2a          +           + 
  3a          +           + 
  3b          ?           ? 
  3e          ?           ? 
  2b          +           + 
  3f          ?           ? 
 
 Notice that all the Step 2 beliefs in the column b/a are new to b because this is 
b's first encounter with a's beliefs.  In fact, another way of looking at it is that a's 
beliefs are "transferred" en bloc to column b/a (note that in Table 6.3, the "transfer" 
from columns a to b/a is indicated by the shaded columns).  Notice that the beliefs of 
b/a are Step 2 beliefs of b concerning a's beliefs.  This  may also be described as the 
second step (Step 2) in the regression of b's beliefs.  The above shows that a's beliefs 
and b's beliefs about a's beliefs are the same for all the beliefs except (1) after reading 
A1, i.e., the "transfer" is accurate except for (1). 
 If we examine the second column b/a closely, it shows that b now 
realises/believes that a believes (2a) 'The Linguistics Department is permitted to let b 
supervise a', (3a) 'b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a' and (2b) 'The 
Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a' (indicated by [+] above).  b also 
realises/believes that a is not sure of (3b) 'b is interested in supervising a', (3e) 'b is 
willing in principle to supervise a' and (3f) 'b is willing in fact to supervise a' 
(indicated by [?]). 
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 A crucial difference between a's belief (column a; [+]) about (1) 'a applied to 
take the M.A. in Linguistics' and b's Step 2 belief (column b/a; [?]) about the same is 
that while a knows full well which M.A. he has applied for, b believes that a may 
have got the two MA's mixed up and is therefore not sure which M.A. he has applied 
for.   
 
    a's beliefs  b's beliefs 
            a          b/a 
  1          +           ? 
 
As such, when a's belief (1) in column a (Step 1) gets "transferred" to b as b's beliefs 
about a's belief (b/a; Step 2), the "transfer" is less than perfect.  What this imperfect 
representation on b's part of a's belief amounts to is that b has not understood in full 
a's intended meaning regarding his department affiliation (inaccurate 
representation). 
 Once b has figured out and formed a representation of (or "transferred") a's 
beliefs, the next thing for b to do is to see if their beliefs are the same.  This is done by 
comparing both of b's columns b (b's beliefs) and b/a (b's beliefs about a's beliefs).  
The values for columns b and b/a have been explained above.  In the following extract 
from Table 6.3, we see that b's beliefs and b's beliefs about a's beliefs differ in regard 
to (3b), (3e), (2b) and (3f).  This mismatch between columns b and b/a shows that 
shared beliefs have not been achieved because their beliefs contradict each other's 
(conflicting resultant beliefs). 
 
     b's beliefs 
            b  b/a 
  1          ?  ? 
  2a          +  + 
  3a          +  + 
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  3b          -  ? 
  3e          -  ? 
  2b          -  + 
  3f          -  ? 
 
 However, for beliefs (2a) ‘The Linguistics Department is permitted to let b 
supervise a’ and (3a) ‘b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a’, there is a match 
of Step 1-2 values, showing that what b believes (b; Step 1) and what she believes a 
believes (b/a; Step 2) are the same.  In other words, b has established shared beliefs 
for (2a) and (3a).  These shared beliefs become part of her notion of common 
ground (CG).  It is important to emphasise here that it is b who has achieved CG at 
this juncture, not a.  (In fact, evidence from a’s next letter A2 shows that he 
mistakenly thinks that b does not believe (2a) and (3a).  This explains why a feels the 
need to quote from the Linguistics Prospectus in A2 regarding the permissibility of 
across department supervision.  (Please refer to the discussion of Table 6.11 below for 
the details.) 
 The observation that only one person, in the above case b, has achieved CG so 
far shows that CG is a solipsistic notion; it is a condition of sharedness which b holds 
to be true in her head regarding (2a) and (3a).  In fact, our discussion below will show 
that the belief is established as shared by one interactant at a time (see Sections 4-7 
below).   
 Once sharedness of (2a) and (3a) has been established by b (i.e., CG), the 
regression of the beliefs is arrested, since it is no longer necessary for b to pursue the 
matter further.  We indicate this cessation of regression by the dotted line at the end of 
shaded region to the right (see Table 6.3a below; reproduced from Table 6.3).  Note 
that for (2a) and (3a), b's CG has a  Step 1-2 [+ +] configuration, showing that b 
believes (2a) and (3a) to be true (b; Step 1), and that she believes that a believes that 
(2a) and (3a) are true (b/a; Step 2).  In other words, shared truth has been established. 
 210 
Table 6.3a: (Reproduced 6.3) A comparison of a's and b's beliefs after 
writing/reading letter A1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief a  (Step 1) a/b  (Step 2) b  (Step 1) b/a  (Step 2) b/a/b  (St 3) 
A1 1 +  ? ?  
 2a +  + +  
 3a +  + +  
 3b ?  - ?  
 3e ?  - ?  
 2b +  - +  
 3f ?  - ?  
 
 Similarly for (1), there is a Step 1-2 match, but this time it is a state of shared 
doubt, where b is not sure about (1), and b believes that a is confused (and hence not 
sure) about (1) too.  Since sharedness has been established, the regression is arrested 
too (see dotted line at the end of b's configuration on the table above).  Note that this 
shared doubt has a Step 1-2 [? ?] configuration.  This is obviously not the desired state 
of affairs.  Surely the purpose of the communication between a and b is not only to 
establish sharedness, but also truth.  We shall term the desired state of [+ +] 
sharedness as a resolved state of shared belief or CG (plus truth).  The less desired 
state of [? ?] sharedness is as yet unresolved in terms of its truth although its 
regression has been arrested.  We shall continue to refer to this state as shared doubt 
(minus truth).  We reserve the use of the term CG or shared belief for [+ +] 
sharedness only. 
 Having looked at the reader b’s configuration of beliefs of (1), (2a), (3a), (3b), 
(3e), (2b) and (3f) after she has read letter A1, let us move on to consider the other 
letters.  The analyses of the configuration of all seven beliefs (1) - (3f) in the next few 
letters will get increasingly complex and difficult to grasp.  For ease of reading, we 
shall consider the beliefs separately.  For example, we shall track the regression of 
belief (1) first over the entire series of letters until its regression has been arrested.  
Next, we shall track the regression of beliefs (2a) and (3a) together, since both beliefs 
are very closely related in that they both pertain to the permissibility of b supervising 
I I 
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a.  We shall then track the regression of (3b).  This is followed finally by tracking the 
regression of the last three beliefs of (3e), (2b) and (3f).  Note that the order in which 
we track the beliefs correspond with b’s goal-driven reasoning schema as discussed in 
Section 3 of Chapter 3.  The purpose is to see if there is a correlation between the 
order in which the conditions of the reasoning schema are arranged and the order in 
which shared beliefs are established. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4 a's and b's regressions of belief (1) 
 
 (1) 'a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics' 
 
 In this section, we shall consider a’s and b’s regression of belief (1) ‘a applied 
to take the M.A. in Linguistics’ over the next few letters until CG has been 
established.  We shall only consider a and b in their respective roles of readers of each 
other letters.  For example, when analysing letter B1, we shall only look at the reader 
a’s regression of beliefs.  When we analyse A2, we shall only look at the reader b’s 
point of view, and so on.  The only exception is for A1 where we shall look at both 
the reader b’s regression as well as the writer a’s point of view.  Since a is the 
initiator of the exchange of letters, we shall take his initial beliefs as the basis for 
discussion in the correspondence. 
 We have already shown in Section 3 above that when b reads a's first letter, b 
would have necessarily made two steps in her regression of beliefs:  her beliefs about 
certain propositions (p) and her beliefs about a's beliefs about p.  As for belief (1) ‘a 
applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics’, we know that when b reads a’s first letter, 
she is confused about a’s department affiliation and she believes that a may have 
confused his application of one M.A. for the other.  The following table summarises 
what has been said so far regarding (1). 
 
 212 
Table 6.4: b’s regression of belief (1) after reading A1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A1 1 +      ? ?     
 
As we have discussed in the previous section (see discussion of Table 6.3a above), b 
achieves a state of shared doubt for (1).  This is shown in the Step 1-2 [? ?] 
configuration above.  We have argued that this state of affairs is a non-desired state.  
We know that this is so because we observe that in spite of the sense of sharedness 
achieved, b seeks further clarification of a’s department affiliation in her reply B1 to 
a. 
 Next, let us look at a’s regression of belief (1) 'a applied to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics' after he has read b’s letter B1.  When a reads b's utterance I cannot quite 
work out from your letter exactly what you are going to be doing in B1P2, a's belief 
would have regressed one step further to Step 3.  We configure a’s regression of 
belief (1) in Table 6.5 below.  Recall that: 
 
          a's beliefs      b's beliefs 
  Step 1 (St 1)  = a or b 
  Step 2 (St 2)  = a/b  b/a 
  Step 3 (St 3)  = a/b/a  b/a/b 
  and so on ... 
 
All shaded columns show the ongoing regression of beliefs to the right with each step 
in the regression.  The heavily shaded columns show the corresponding columns of 
beliefs which have been "transferred" from the top half of the table to the bottom half. 
 In Table 6.5 below, b's regression of beliefs (Steps 1 and 2; b & b/a; heavily 
shaded region) gets "transferred" to a and is realised as a's beliefs as Steps 2 and 3 
(a/b & a/b/a; heavily shaded region).  In psychological terms, these "transferred" 
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beliefs are in fact a's representation of b's beliefs (Step 2; a/b), and a's representation 
of b's beliefs about a's beliefs (Step 3; a/b/a).  When a reads b's words I cannot quite 
work out from your letter exactly what you are going to be doing in B1P2, a realises 
that b has established a state of shared doubt. 
 
Table 6.5: a's regression of belief (1) after reading B1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A1 1 +      ? ?     
B1 1 + ? ?          
 
 These "transferred" beliefs (a's Steps 2-3; [? ?]) do not match a's own belief 
(a's Step 1; [+]), showing that a has not established CG.  We know that a is aware of 
this lack of match because he goes on to clarify to b regarding his department 
affiliation in the next letter in A2P2 As you presume I have applied to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics at the Faculty of Languages.   
 When b reads a’s clarification in A2P2, she realises that a has indeed applied 
to take the M.A. in Linguistics (b's Step 2; b/a; [+]) (see Table 6.6 below for the 
"transfer" from a to b; heavy shade).  b therefore believes (1) too (b's Step 1; b; [+]). 
 
Table 6.6: b’s regression of belief (1) after reading A2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
B1 1 + ? ?          
A2 1       + + ? ?   
 
 As such, b’s belief (b; Step 1) of (1) now matches that of her belief about a's 
belief (b/a; Step 2), and it is on this basis that she is prepared to declare later in her 
reply B2 that she is satisfied with and thankful for a's clarification of his departmental 
affiliation.  In other words, for b to concede that CG for (1) has been established in 
I I I I I I I I I 
I 
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her mind, it is sufficient for her that the first two steps in her regression of beliefs 
match.  It appears to us that for b, the fact that her belief about a's belief about her 
belief (Step 3; b/a/b; [?]) of (1) does not match the first two steps [+ +] does not seem 
to be crucial to her for her to be satisfied that CG has been established.  The same can 
be said about Step 4 (b/a/b/a; [?]) of her belief.  Steps 3 and 4 seem to be secondary 
to her notion of CG and merely an incidental occurrence resulting from the 
regression of beliefs with each turn taken in the exchange of letters in order to clarify 
a’s department affiliation. 
 In view of the above, we suspect that people in general have a strong sense of 
awareness of Steps 1 and 2 (and Step 3 as well for 2nd Party CG; see discussion 
below) being shared (or different), and only a vague notion of the other steps being 
'similar' (or different).  This seems to us to be a sensible position to take because 
otherwise the processing load would be too mind boggling for rapid on-line 
processing.)  This is a view we shall maintain throughout this chapter in interpreting 
all our configurations. 
 You may realise that this is the second time b is achieving a sense of 
sharedness for (1).  Recall that after reading a’s first letter A1, although b establishes 
sharedness [? ?], b is confused about a’s department affiliation (see discussion of 
Table 6.4 above).  We shall pull together b's configuration of belief (1) 'a applied to 
take the M.A. in Linguistics' at the two points of reading A1 and A2 for easy 
comparison.  Compare b’s configuration of belief (1) at A1 and A2 on Table 6.7 
below. 
 
Table 6.7: b’s regression of belief (1) at the point of reading A1 and A2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A1 1       ? ?     
A2 1       + + ? ?   
 
I I I I I I I I I 
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 When b first reads a’s opening letter A1, she establishes a sense of shared 
doubt.  We have argued that once sharedness has been established, the regression is 
arrested.  There is no sense in which this regression should persist even if clarification 
is not forthcoming subsequently.  What does persist is the doubt itself and not so 
much its regression.  But this state of shared doubt is not the desired outcome, as 
evidenced in b’s request for clarification.  Without establishing truth as well, the issue 
of a’s department affiliation is unresolved.  Such an unresolved state is potentially 
unstable in that change/clarification is desired and eagerly sought after. 
 However, when b reads a’s clarification in A2, b establishes CG or shared 
belief for (1).  Because the truth of (1) has been established this time, this state of 
sharedness is a resolved state in that it is the desired outcome and that further 
clarification is not needed.  Such a state is potentially stable.  It is potentially stable 
in the sense that b does not desire or foresee any change to her belief.  This, however, 
does not mean that her belief will never change in the future, since b may well find 
out later that a is lying about the whole matter.  (We hasten to add that this isn’t the 
case.)  But this is beside the point.  The point is that b finds it sufficient for her to hold 
(1) as true based on the evidence of a's letters A1 and A2, and not so much that b 
knows for sure that (1) is true (which, we suppose, she can find out for sure if she 
checks directly with the Linguistics Department). 
 Having looked at how b has established CG for (1) after reading A2, let us see 
if a establishes CG for (1) next in reading B2 (see Table 6.8 below).  When a reads 
b’s acknowledgement in B2P2 Thank you for your letter ... in which you clarify your 
future affiliation in the University, a realises that b is satisfied with his clarification.  
It is on the basis of this realisation that a is prepared to accept (1) as CG as well.  We 
assume that this is so because he doesn't go on to offer further clarification of his 




Table 6.8: a's regression of belief (1) after reading B2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A2 1       + + ? ?   
B2 1 + + + + +        
 
 As the above table shows, when a reads b's second letter B2, a inherits b's 
beliefs (Steps 1-4; heavy shade).  These beliefs are “transferred” to a as a's beliefs 
(Steps 2-5; heavy shade).  From a's point of view, CG is established only after 
 
(i) a detects that b has established CG, i.e., b's  Step 1-2 match, which in turn 
becomes a's Step 2-3 match; and  
(ii) a detects that his Step 1 matches his Step 2-3 match.   
 
 In other words, for a to establish CG, Steps 1-3 must match.  As we have just 
mentioned above, we know that this is so because a does not continue to clarify this 
matter (i.e., his department affiliation) further in his next letter A3.  Notice that a's 
Steps 4 and 5 are [+] instead of the anticipated transfer of b's Steps 3 and 4 which are 
[?].  This is so because once a realises that b has achieved CG prior to him, there is no 
need for him to retain the uncertainty anymore by "transferring" them.  Hence, they 
are modified/normalised in the "transfer".  By 'normalised', we mean that all the 
steps in the regression are standardised in the "transfer", in this example, as [+].  
Once again, from a's point of view, the fact that Steps 4-5 (a/b/a/b; a/b/a/b/a) match 
that of Steps 1-3 is incidental to a's satisfaction that CG has been established.   
 Why is it the case that b only needs a Step 1-2 match for establishing CG for 
(1) while a needs a Step 1-3 match for the same belief?  The reason is that for belief 
(1) 'a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics', although a is the source of information 
regarding the truth status of (1), it is b who is the receiver of the information.  By 
virtue of the fact that b is the receiver, she is by default the first to have both the 
I I I I I I I I I 
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information that she believes that (1) and the information that she believes that a 
believes that (1).  As such she would be the first to achieve CG.  In order for a to 
achieve CG after b for the same belief (1), a would have to "transfer" b's notion of CG 
(as reflected in her Step 1-2 match) to his own belief (as Steps 2-3).  a then has to 
match his belief (Step 1) with those of Steps 2 and 3 to ascertain if CG has been 
established.  Such a CG, if achieved, will necessarily involve a Step 1-3 match.   
 We shall term the CG achieved by b  for (1) as 1st Party CG, while that 
achieved by a as 2nd Party CG.  A 1st Party CG requires a minimum Step 1-2 
match, while a 2nd Party CG requires a minimum Step 1-3 match.  Take note that 
whoever achieves 1st Party or 2nd Party CG for (1) depends on who has control of the 
source of information regarding the truth status of that belief.   
 For belief (1) 'a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics', it is a who is the 
source of the information.  b, on the other hand, being the receiver of the information, 
will be the first to receive both the information regarding a's belief of (1) and her own 
belief of (1).  In other words, she is by default the first to be in a position to see if 
there is a Step 1-2 match, if CG is indeed established.  a, being the giver of the 
information, has to wait till he receives b's reply letter before he can have both 
information regarding his belief of (1) and b's belief of (1). 
 Note that for both 1st Party and 2nd Party CGs, the regression of (1) is 
arrested.  This is indicated on Table 6.8 above by the dotted lines at the end of Step 4 
for b and at the end of Step 5 for a.   
 Recall that when a establishes 2nd Party CG for (1) after b, the values of the 
"transferred" steps in excess of the minimum Step 1-3 match are normalised.  The 
reason for this, as we have stated above, is that there is no need for a to retain the 
uncertainty once he knows that both he and b have established CG for (1).  Our claim 
here is that the normalisation of the values accompanies the establishment of 2nd 
Party CG. 
 The final issue remaining is the question of what happens to (1) after it has 
been established as CG.  As we have said briefly above, the belief itself persists in the 
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sense that it remains at the back of the individual’s mind.  (We reiterate that the 
regression, however, does not persist.)  b, for example, has to continue to bring to 
bear the truth of (1) in evaluating the sharedness and truth of the other beliefs (2a) - 
(3f).  We represent this persistent belief which continues to be relevant to the 
exchange of letters in the following way. 
 
Table 6.9: b’s state of belief (1) after reading A3 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A2 1       + + ? ?   
A3 1             
 
Beyond letter A2, we indicate the persistence of (1) at the back of b’s mind by 
representing it in light shade in A3.  Note that we have taken out the values to 
emphasise that it is the belief (1) which persists and not its regression. 
 Having looked in detail at the case history of (1), let us move on to consider 
(2a) and (3a). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
5 a's and b's regressions of beliefs (2a) and (3a) 
 
 (2a) 'The Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a'  
 (3a) 'b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a'  
 
 In Sections 2 and 3, we have examined a’s and b’s configuration of beliefs (1) 
- (3f) in writing/reading the first letter A1.  We have argued that when b reads a’s first 
letter, common ground for (2a) and (3a) is established (see discussion of Table 6.3a 
above).  We draw your attention to the relevant information from Sections 2 and 3 in 
the following table. 
 
I I I I I I I I I 
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Table 6.10: b’s regression of beliefs (2a) and (3a) after reading A1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A1 2a +      + +     
 3a +      + +     
 
 As we have discussed previously, the fact that a writes to b to ask her to be his 
supervisor shows that a believes that across department supervision is permissible (a; 
Step 1; [+]).  Otherwise, why should a ask b to consider being his supervisor in the 
first place.  We also know that b believes (2a) 'The Linguistics Department is 
permitted to let b supervise a' and (3a) 'b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a' 
(b; Step 1; [+])  We know that this is so because b is familiar with the Linguistics 
Department's regulations.  (This observation is confirmed via personal 
communication by the author with b.)  When b reads A1, b realises that a believes 
(2a) and (3a) (b/a; Step 2; [+]), and that this matches her beliefs (b; Step 1; [+]).  It is 
on this basis that b establishes a Step 1-2 match for these beliefs, i.e., 1st Party CG of 
(2a) and (3a) is established by b.  This is a desirable and resolved state of affairs and 
is therefore potentially stable.  Once CG for (2a) and (3a) has been established by b, 
the regression of the beliefs is arrested, since it is no longer necessary for b to pursue 
the matter further.   
 At this juncture, b has no reason to suppose that anything is amiss, and will 
therefore expect a to establish 2nd Party CG for (2a) and (3a) after her.  But as we 
will see later in a’s reply in A2, a does not establish 2nd Party CG because a thinks 
that b does not believe that across department supervision is permissible.  This is why 
he quotes from the Linguistics Department’s prospectus in A2, explaining the 
permissibility of across department supervision.  But we must keep in mind that this 
misunderstanding on a’s part is not apparent to b yet at the point of her reading A1.  
As far as b is concerned at this juncture, potentially stable CG of (2a) and (3a) has 
I I I I I I I I I 
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been established for her after reading A1.  Let us now look in detail at a’s regression 
of beliefs for (2a) and (3a), as shown in Table 6.11 below. 
 
Table 6.11: a's regression of beliefs (2a) and (3a) after reading B1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A1 2a +      + +     
 3a +      + +     
B1 2a + - +          
 3a + - +          
 
 In Table 6.11 above, a's Steps 2 and 3 (a/b, a/b/a; heavy shade) are in fact a's 
representation of (or "transferred" from) b's beliefs (b, b/a; Steps 1 and 2; heavy 
shade).  Notice, however, b's beliefs (b; Step 1) are not "transferred" unaltered to a as 
a's beliefs (a/b; Step 2).  What this faulty “transference” amounts to is an inaccurate 
representation (see Section 3 for an explanation) on a’s part of b’s beliefs about (2a) 
and (3a).  This constitutes a misunderstanding on a's part since b has all along held 
that (2a) and (3a), while a mistakenly believes that b does not believe them. 
 Notwithstanding this inaccurate representation (or faulty “transference”), the 
final problem is that a's beliefs (Step 1) of (2a) and (3a), and a's belief about b's 
beliefs (Step 2) about the same do not match (conflicting resultant beliefs; see 
Section 3 for an explanation).  This constitutes a lack of CG because a now believes 
(2a) and (3a), but mistakenly believes that b does not believe them.  As we will see 
below, this failure on a’s part to establish 2nd Party CG for these beliefs has 
ramifications on b’s 1st Party CG which he has already achieved so far. 
 Let us now consider b's regression in the next letter.  When b reads a’s next 
letter A2 where a quotes from the prospectus in a bid to convince b of the 
permissibility of across department supervision, b has to reactivate the CG which she 
has already established for (2a) and (3a) previously in A1 (see Table 6.10 above for 
A1), in order to take into account a’s misunderstanding (see Table 6.12 below). 
I I I I I I I I 
 221 
 
Table 6.12: b’s regression of beliefs (2a) and (3a) after reading A2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
B1 2a + - +          
 3a + - +          
A2 2a       + + - +   
 3a       + + - +   
 
 When b reads a’s unsolicited affirmation that across department supervision is 
permissible in A2, she forms a mental representation of a’s Step 1-3 beliefs.  In the 
above table, this representation is shown by the "transference" of a’s Step 1-3 beliefs 
to b as b’s Step 2-4 beliefs (see heavy shade).  b establishes CG for (2a) and (3a) 
again with the "transference" after reading A2, and updates a’s latest position on these 
beliefs as part of her Steps 3-4.  This brings b's regression of beliefs of (2a) and (3a) 
to Step 4.  Because CG is established, the regression is arrested at Step 4. 
 The question arising is that if b has already established potentially stable CG 
for (2a) 'The Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a' and (3a) 'b is 
constitutionally permitted to supervise a' by the time she reads A1, and that the 
regression has been arrested at Step 2 then, why is it the case that (2a) and (3a) 
regress further to Step 4 in A2?  Recall that we said that the [+ +] CG established by b 
after reading A1 is considered potentially stable and desirable because (2a) and (3a) 
are held to be true by b.  b has no reason to suspect at the point of reading A1 that a is 
going to misunderstand her subsequently.  As far as b is concerned at the point of 
reading A1, (2a) and (3a) are no longer an issue for further discussion.  Therefore the 
1st Party CG established by b then must have been held to be potentially stable - not 
in the sense that, say, (2a)’s truth and CG is objectively/unequivocally stable, but that 
it is held to be stable in b’s mind.  This solipsistic notion of CG and stability is 
consistent with our argument in Section 3 above and in Chapter 2.  It is only after b 
has read a's next letter A2 that she realises that a hasn't established 2nd Party CG after 
I I I I I I I I I 
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her.  After reading a's reiteration of the permissibility of across department 
supervision (which b already believes), b establishes CG again, this time taking on 
board a's misunderstanding (represented as b's Step 3; b/a/b; [-]) as well. 
 Hence when b replies to A2, she writes in her reply B2 that I would have 
really have nothing against supervising you ...; I merely think that it might be felt by 
the linguistics department that they are well able to supervise you themselves (B2P2), 
suggesting to a that it is not that she believes that across department supervision is not 
permissible, rather that the Linguistics Department may be unwilling to let an outside 
expert like her supervise a  (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of this interpretation of the 
utterance).  In writing this, b assures a of her awareness of the permissibility of across 
department supervision.  From a’s point of view, a realises now in reading B2 that b 
does believe (2a) and (3a).  This is shown in the following table. 
 
Table 6.13: a’s regression of beliefs (2a) and (3a) after reading B2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A2 2a       + + - +   
 3a       + + - +   
B2 2a + + + + +        
 3a + + + + +        
 
 When a reads b’s response in B2P2, a realises now that b, like him, believes 
(2a) and (3a), and that b believes that a believes the same too.  In other words, he 
realises that b has established 1st Party CG for (2a) and (3a).  In the above table, this 
is shown by the “transference” of b’s Step 1-2 [+ +] match to a as a’s Steps 2-3.  a 
realises too that now his Step 2-3 values match his Step 1 value which is also [+].  It 
is on this basis that a establishes CG for (2a) and (3a) too.  In other words, for a to 
establish 2nd Party CG for (2a) and (3a), he requires a Step 1-3 match.  (We know 
that CG has been established for a because a does not pursue this matter further in his 
next letter.)  This confirms our earlier observation that a 2nd Party CG requires a 
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minimum Step 1-3 match (see Section 4 above for a discussion of 1st and 2nd Party 
CGs in relation to (1)).   
 Similar to the 2nd Party CG achieved for (1) discussed in Section 4 above, b’s 
Step 3 [-] value of (2a) and (3a) is normalised in the “transfer” to a as a’s Steps 4 [+].  
Since a realises that b has already achieved 1st Party CG for (2a) and (3a) prior to 
him, there is no need for a to retain the disbelief [-] when he establishes 2nd Party 
CG.  (Recall that in Section 4, we explained that by 'normalised', we mean that all the 
steps in the regression are standardised in the "transfer", as in this example, as [+].)   
 We reiterate that whoever achieves 1st Party or 2nd Party CG for a particular 
belief depends on who has control of the source of information regarding the truth 
status of that belief.  In the case of (2a) and (3a), it is a who first introduces them into 
the discourse.  b, being the receiver of a’s information, will by default be the first 
party to have access to both information regarding a’s belief about (2a) and (3a) and 
regarding her own belief about the same.  The receiver b is thus in the position to 
establish CG first after (2a) and (3a). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6 a's and b's regressions of belief (3b) 
 
 (3b) ‘b is interested in supervising a’ 
 
 When a first writes to b in A1, asking b to be his supervisor, a has no idea 
whether b is interested in supervising him.  This is shown in the table below by the [?] 
value of a’s Step 1 for (3b) ‘b is interested in supervising a’. 
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Table 6.14: b’s regression of belief (3b) after reading A1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A1 3b ?      - ?     
 
 When b reads a’s letter A1, she decides that she is not interested in 
supervising a (b’s Step 1; [-]) and she believes that a doesn’t know yet if she is 
interested in supervising him (b’s Step 2, “transferred” from a’s Step 1; heavy shade).  
Evidence of b's reluctance to supervise a lies in b’s reply in B1P2 ... you say you have 
applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics ....  If that is the case, I am afraid that it would 
not really be the done thing for me to supervise you ....  This seems to us to be a rather 
firm 'No' to a's request that b supervises a. 
 When a reads b’s response in B1P2, a now does not believe (3b) (a's Step 1; [-
]; see Table 6.15 below).   
 
Table 6.15: a’s regression of belief (3b) after reading B1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A1 3b ?      - ?     
B1 3b - - ?          
 
We know that this is so because a goes on in his next letter to persuade b to supervise 
him by quoting from the prospectus, etc.  a's realisation/representation of b's position 
on (3b) is also indicated on Table 6.15 above by the "transfer" of b's Steps 1-2 to a as 
a's Steps 2-3 (see heavy shade).  Note that by this time, a’s belief of (3b) would have 
regressed to Step 3.  Since there is a Step 1-2 [- -] match, a has now established a state 
of shared disbelief for (3b).  Like the state of shared doubt, the state of shared 
disbelief is an unresolved state since it is not the desired state of affairs.  Surely a's 
desire is for b to be interested in supervising him.  To be consistent with our treatment 
I I I 
I I I I I I I I I I 
I 
 225 
of shared belief and shared doubt, the regression of (3b) is similarly arrested once 
sharedness has been established.  Note however that because sharedness of disbelief is 
not the desired state of affairs, it is potentially unstable, as we shall see later. 
 Let us now consider b's regression of beliefs in the next letter.  When a writes 
to b next in A2 to clarify his department affiliation (A2P2, As you presume I have 
applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics) and the permissibility of across department 
supervision (A2P3, I hope that my belonging to a different department ... would not 
be an obstacle for you to supervise me with the prospectus ... stating ....), b relents 
from her previous position which was a firm 'No'.  Evidence of this lies in her reply 
B2 where she writes I would really have nothing against supervising you, provided 
that I have time and so on; I merely think that .... (B2P2).  (See Chapter 3 for a 
discussion of the interpretation of utterance B2P2.)  This change is indicated in the 
revision of b’s Step 1 value from [-] in A1 (see table above) to [+] in A2 (see Table 
6.16 below). 
 
Table 6.16: b’s regression of belief (3b) after reading A2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
B1 3b - - ?          
A2 3b       + - - ?   
 
 Next, when a reads b’s reply in B2P2 I would really have nothing against 
supervising you, a now believes (3b) 'b is interested in supervising a’ (see Table 6.17 
below). 
 
Table 6.17: a’s regression of belief (3b) after reading B2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A2 3b       + - - ?   
B2 3b + + - - ?        
I I I I I I I I I 
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 As you can see in the table above, a’s Step 1 has also been revised to [+] after 
reading B2.  a's Step 1 was [-] in B1 previously.  This means that a now believes (3b).  
Having read and understood b's letter B2, a represents b’s beliefs (Steps 1-4) as his 
Step 2-5 beliefs (see heavy shade; “transfer” from b to a).  Notice that with this 
"transfer", a now believes that b believes (3b) too (a's Step 2;[+]).  It is on this basis 
of a Step 1-2 [+ +] match that a is satisfied that CG for (3b) has been established for 
him.  The regression is thus arrested.  We know that this is so because a doesn’t 
pursue this matter further with b.  Note that because a achieves CG first (1st Party 
CG) for (3b), it only requires a Step 1-2 match.  The fact that the regression has gone 
on to Step 5 is incidental to a’s CG.  Steps 3-5 seem to be secondary to a’s notion of 
CG and merely an incidental occurrence resulting from the regression of beliefs with 
each turn taken in the exchange of letters in order to clarify b’s interest in supervising 
a (see Section 4 above for a similar discussion of belief (1)). 
 Finally, when b reads a’s reply A3 where he writes Thank you very much for 
your letter ... in which you tell me that you would be willing to supervise me ... in 
A3P1, b realises that a believes (3b) 'b is interested in supervising a', and that a 
believes that b believes (3b) (but subject to certain conditions; see Chapter 3 for a 
discussion of these conditions).  This means that a’s Step 1-2 match is “transferred” to 
b as b’s Steps 2-3 (see Table 6.18 below).  
 
Table 6.18: b’s regression of belief (3b) after reading A3 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
B2 3b + + - - ?        
A3 3b       + + + + + + 
 
 Because b already believes (3b) (Step 1) since reading A2 previously (see 
Table 6.16 above), this means that b now has a Step 1-3 match, thus establishing 2nd 
Party CG for (3b).  The regression is arrested at Step 6.  Once again the fact that the 
I I I I I I I I I 
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regression has gone on to Step 6 is incidental to the 2nd Party CG established and is 
the result of the extended number of letters exchanged in order to clarify b’s interest 
in supervising a.  Because b establishes 2nd Party CG for (3b) after a, b's Steps 4-6 
configurations are normalised [+] in the "transfer" from a's Steps 3-5, since there is no 
point in b representing a’s previous disbelief/doubt in the wake of a’s prior 
establishment of 1st Party CG in B2. 
 Note that because the truth status of (3b) ‘b is interested in supervising a’ is 
determined by b, who alone decides if she is interested in supervising a, a will by 
default have access to both b’s belief about (3b) as well as his own belief about (3b) 
first.  This means that a will be in a position to establish CG first for (3b).  This 
explains why b (as seen in Table 6.18 above) establishes 2nd Party CG for (3b) after 
reading A3.   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
7 a’s and b's regressions of beliefs (3e), (2b) and (3f) 
 
 (3e) ‘b is willing in principle to supervise a‘ 
 (2b) ‘The Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a‘ 
 (3f) ‘b is willing in fact to supervise a‘ 
 
 In this section, we shall consider the last three beliefs of (3e), (2b) and (3f) to 
see if CG is established for them.  These three beliefs are listed above. 
 We have already seen in Sections 2 and 3 what a’s and b’s positions on (3e), 
(2b) and (3f) are at the point of writing/reading A1.  The following Table 6.19 
(extracts from Table 6.3, Section 3) summarises what has been said so far. 
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Table 6.19: b’s regression of beliefs (3e), (2b) and (3f) after reading A1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A1 3e ?      - ?     
 2b +      - +     
 3f ?      - ?     
 
Recall that when a writes his opening letter A1, he is not sure about (3e) and (3f) 
regarding b’s willingness (in principle and fact) to supervise him.  This is to be 
expected since he has no prior contact with b.  a however believes (2b) ‘The 
Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a‘.  This is so because it would 
otherwise seem pointless to us for a to ask b to supervise him if a doesn’t believe that 
his future department is willing at all to let b supervise him in the first place.  We 
confirmed this observation with a (personal communication) who claimed that he 
indeed believed (2b) when he first wrote A1.  According to a, across department 
supervision in the universities is routinely practised in his country.  a assumes that the 
university he is applying to do his M.A. has the same policy.   
 Recall next that when b reads a’s letter, a’s Step 1 beliefs (3e), (2b) and (3f) 
are “transferred” to b as b’s Step 2 beliefs (heavy shade).  Notice however that these 
Step 2 beliefs (b's beliefs about a's beliefs) conflict with b’s actual position (Step 1) 
on these beliefs, showing a lack of sharedness.  We know that b does not believe (3e), 
(2b) and (3f) based on the evidence of her reply B1 where she writes in B1P2 I am 
afraid that it would not really be the done thing for me to supervise you, since the 
Applied Linguistics Department is a separate department ....  
 In the next table, we configure a's beliefs after he has read b's reply B1, in 
particular b's utterance in B1P2 (see Table 6.20 below). 
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Table 6.20: a’s regression of beliefs (3e), (2b) and (3f) after reading B1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A1 3e ?      - ?     
 2b +      - +     
 3f ?      - ?     
B1 3e - - ?          
 2b ? - +          
 3f - - ?          
 
 When a reads b's remarks in B1P2 I am afraid that it would not really be the 
done thing for me to supervise you, a doesn't believe (a's Step 1) (3e) 'b is willing in 
principle to supervise a' and (3f) 'b is willing in fact to supervise a' anymore.  a also 
realises that b does not believe (a's Step 2) (3e) and (3f) either.  Because a Step 1-2 [- 
-] match has been achieved for (3e) and (3f), we can say that a has now established a 
state of shared disbelief for (3e) and (3f).  This state of shared disbelief (like the state 
of shared doubt) is obviously not a resolved state in that it is not the desired state of 
affairs.  Surely, a's purpose is to establish CG, i.e., shared belief of the [+ +] kind, and 
not a state of shared disbelief of (3e) and (3f).  Once sharedness of disbeliefs has been 
established by a for (3e) and (3f), the regression is similarly arrested (cf. Table 6.15; 
see discussion of how the regression of shared disbelief (3b) is arrested at B1).  This 
arresting of a's regression of (3e) and (3f) is indicated on the above table by the dotted 
lines. 
 We should reiterate that although the regression is arrested, the state of shared 
disbelief is a non-desired and unresolved state of affairs.  This makes the sharedness 
potentially unstable.  It is potentially unstable in the sense that further clarification of 
the unresolved state of affairs is likely to be actively sought by a, and that this further 
clarification, if forthcoming, is likely to reactivate the regression of (3e) and (3f) until 
another state of sharedness is established (this time, hopefully of the [+ +] kind).  And 
as we will see below, this quest for clarification comes in the form of a countering b's 




reasons for not believing (3e) and (3f) (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of a's point-for-
point rebuttal style of writing).   
 In a's reply to B1, a counters b's reluctance to supervise him in A2 with I 
hoped that my belonging to a different department would not be an obstacle for you to 
supervise me with the prospectus stating ... (A2P3) and with Since your academic 
work covers my field of interest to the full, I should really be happy, if I could benefit 
from your supervision (A2P3). 
 Let us now look at b's configurations after reading a's counter-points in A2.  
When b reads a's rebuttal in A2, she "relents" in part from her previous position 
expressed in I am afraid that it would not really be the done thing (B1P2).  We know 
that this is so because b writes in her reply I would really have nothing against 
supervising you provided I have time and so on; I merely think that it might be felt by 
the linguistics department that they are well able to provide supervision ... themselves 
(B2P2), showing that she no longer rejects (3e) 'b is willing in principle to supervise 
a' and (3f) 'b is willing in fact to supervise a' categorically (see B1P2 I am afraid it 
would not really be the done thing for me to supervise you in her previous letter).  
Note, however, that b is not saying 'yes' either to a's request.  She is unsure at this 
juncture because the truth of (3e) depends on the condition provided I have time and 
so on which she has just stipulated in the same utterance (B2P2).  This condition has 
not been met by a.  As a result, she is unsure of (3f) too because the truth of (3f) 
depends on (3e) being established as true first (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of this 
sequential arrangement of the beliefs/conditions in her pragmatic reasoning schema).  
This revision of b's beliefs is indicated on Table 6.21 below (see b's Step 1).  After 




Table 6.21: b’s regression of beliefs (3e), (2b) and (3f) after reading A2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
B1 3e - - ?          
 2b ? - +          
 3f - - ?          
A2 3e       ? - - ?   
 2b       ? ? - +   
 3f       ? - - ?   
 
Note that whereas previously (i.e., after reading A1) b does not believe (2b) 'The 
Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a', b now (after reading A2) is 
uncertain about (2b).  We know that b is uncertain about (2b) because she suggests to 
a that he should try to find out the Linguistics Department's preference, as the 
utterance I am sure you will be able to discover their preference when you visit in 
April in B2P3 shows.  If b didn't believe (2b) at all, she wouldn't have hinted to a to 
check the Linguistics Department's preference first. 
 Having looked at how b's Step 1 configurations above have changed when b 
reads A2, let us see if sharedness has been established for any of the beliefs.  When b 
reads a's letter A2, b would have formed a representation of a's Steps 1-3 as b's own 
Steps 2-4 ("transference" indicated by the heavy shade).  After reading A2, b realises 
that her own doubt (b's Step 1) about (2b) matches her representation (b's Step 2) of 
a's doubt about (2b), thus establishing a state of shared doubt.  Once again, this 
regression is arrested at Step 4 (see dotted line on the table above); but note that this 
state of affairs regarding (2b) is far from resolved.  As such, we expect the shared 
doubt to be potentially unstable.  Like 1st Party CG which requires a Step 1-2 match, 
1st Party shared doubt requires a minimum Step 1-2 match too. 
 In the following table, let us consider a's regression of beliefs after he has read 
B2.  When a reads b's reply B2, he realises that b has already established 1st Party 
shared doubt for (2b) (see Table 6.22 below).   
 






Table 6.22: a’s regression of beliefs (3e), (2b) and (3f) after reading B2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A2 3e       ? - - ?   
 2b       ? ? - +   
 3f       ? - - ?   
B2 3e ? ? - - ?        
 2b ? ? ? ? ?        
 3f ? ? - - ?        
 
In the above table, b's Steps 1-4 are "transferred" to a as a's Step 2-5 (heavy shade).  
As for (2b), a realises now that his Step 2-3 [? ?] configuration ("transferred" from b) 
matches his existing doubt (a's Step 1) regarding (2b).  With this Step 1-3 match, a 
therefore establishes shared doubt (2nd Party) as well.  Like 2nd Party CG, 2nd Party 
shared doubt requires a Step 1-3 match.  Note that when a establishes 2nd Party 
shared doubt [? ? ?] for (2b), a's Step 4-5 values for (2b) are normalised in the 
"transfer". 
 Note that whereas for (2b) where a establishes 2nd Party shared doubt; for 
(3e) 'b is willing in principle to supervise a' and (3f) 'b is willing in fact to supervise 
a', a establishes 1st Party shared doubt (see Table 2.22 above).  We are not surprised 
that a establishes sharedness for (3e) and (3f) first because a, being the receiver of the 
information has access to both information regarding his own belief and b's belief 
about the same first.  b, on the other hand, alone determines the status of (3e) and (3f) 
regarding her willingness to supervise a and has to give this information to a, the 
receiver.  When a reads b's letter B2, he realises that b is unsure of (3e) and (3f) 
("transference of b's Step 1 to a as a's Step 2).  a too becomes unsure of b's 
willingness (in principle and fact) to supervise him (a's Step 1).  With this Step 1-2 [? 
?] match, a thus establishes 1st Party shared doubt for (3e) and (3f). 
 We have argued in Chapter 3 that although a is aware that b is unsure of (3e) 
and (3f) regarding her willingness (in principle and fact) to supervise a because a has 




not fulfilled all the conditions she has laid down for her consent, a persists in 
repeating his request that she supervises him in letter A2, and even goes as far as to 
thank b in letter A3 for "agreeing" to supervise him even though he surely knows full 
well that this is not the case (see A3P1 Thank you for your letter ... in which you tell 
me that you would be willing to supervise me ...).  This, we have argued, exemplifies 
very clearly what it means for a to be able to dissociate his actual beliefs regarding 
(3e) and (3f) and what he chooses to say in his letter A3.  (See Section 3 of Chapter 3 
for a parallel discussion of a's ability to dissociate his own reasoning schema from his 
assumptions about b's reasoning schema in pursuing his goal of getting b to agree to 
supervise him.)   
 By repeating his request in A2 and thanking b in A3 subsequently, he gives 
the impression that he assumes the truth of (3e) and (3f).  We have also argued that 
this phenomenon is the result of a's argumentative style of writing which is driven by 
his obligation mode of reasoning (see Chapter 3, Section 3 on his pragmatic reasoning 
schema).  a tries to impose on b a certain obligation to accede to his request by 
showing how he has "fulfilled" (some of) her conditions.  Therefore, we conclude that 
although a has only established shared doubt for (3e) and (3f) after reading B2, in his 
reply in A3 (where he thanks b for "agreeing" to supervise him), he writes as though 
(3e) and (3f) have already been established as CG by both b and him. 
 Finally, let us move on to discuss b's reading of letter A3.  When b reads A3, 
a's Steps 1-5 for (3e) and (3f) are "transferred" to b as b's Steps 2-6 (see Table 6.23 
below; heavy shade).  b finally establishes 2nd Party shared doubt for (3e) and (3f).  




Table 6.23: b’s regression of beliefs (3e), (2b) and (3f) after reading A3 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
B2 3e ? ? - - ?        
 2b ? ? ? ? ?        
 3f ? ? - - ?        
A3 3e       ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 2b             
 3f       ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Because b has already established 1st Party CG for (2b) previously in A2 (see 
discussion of A2 of Table 6.21 above), its regression has also been arrested then.  As 
we don't expect any further change in the configuration of (2b) on b's part in reading 
the current letter A3 and since its regression has already been arrested previously, we 
indicate the previously arrested configuration by the light shade without values (cf. 
Table 6.9 for a similar discussion of (1)'s configuration (light shade) at A3).  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
8 Goals, pragmatic reasoning schemas and the establishment of sharedness  
 
 We have seen in the above sections a detailed account of how the various 
beliefs are established as shared beliefs (CG), shared doubts or shared disbeliefs by a 
and b.  We have shown that a has to establish his own sense of sharedness, while b 
has to establish her own, i.e., the sense of sharedness established is solipsistic.  There 
is no sense in which the sharedness is established in some publicly available space 
independent of the minds of these two individuals.  In developing the configurations 
of both interactants' regressions separately, we are able to identify and demonstrate 
various concepts/notions not previously discussed in the literature. 
 In Chapter 3 (Section 3), we argue that b's reasoning schema, for example, is 
organised in terms of various conditions which a is supposed to fulfil before she can 
consent to being a's supervisor.  The ordering of these conditions coincides with the 





ordering of the beliefs of (1), (2a), (3a), (3b), (3e), (2b) and (3f) which we have 
analysed systematically in this chapter.  What this means is that the order in which 
these beliefs are established as shared corresponds with the order in which the 
conditions of the reasoning schema are arranged.  As we have argued in Chapter 3, 
the terminal "condition" (3f) 'b is willing in fact to supervise a' is the eventual goal of 
a in the correspondence.  Before goal (3f) can be achieved, a realises that the other 
conditions have to be satisfied first.  
 Table 6.24 below pulls together all that we have said so far regarding a's 
configurations of all seven beliefs after reading B2.  In the table below, the heavily 
shaded regions indicate those beliefs which have been established as CG (shared 
beliefs) by a.  The lightly shaded regions indicate those which have only been 
established as shared doubts.  In other words, only the first four beliefs on the table 
(and hence the first four conditions of b's reasoning schema which a is fully aware of) 
have been established as CG.  The last three have not been established as CG.  This 
means that while sharedness (of doubt) of the last three conditions has been 
established, truth has not been established. 
 
Table 6.24: a's  configuration of all seven beliefs after reading B2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
B2 1 + + + + +        
 2a + + + + +        
 3a + + + + +        
 3b + + - - ?        
 3e ? ? - - ?        
 2b ? ? ? ? ?        
 3f ? ? - - ?        
 
Notes:  
Heavy shade : CG (Shared belief) established 
Light shade : Shared doubt/disbelief established 
 
 1 a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
  2a The Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a  
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  3a b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 
  3b b is interested in supervising a  
  3e b is willing in principle to supervise a  
  2b The Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a  
  3f b is willing in fact to supervise a  
 
 We should be careful to distinguish between holding the propositional content 
expressed by the three conditions of (3e), (2b) and (3f) as shared and holding the 
propositional content expressed by these conditions as true.  Sharedness of the 
propositional content expressed by these three conditions is shown in the fact that a is 
aware that these conditions are stipulated and required by b, and that a is aware that b 
is aware that these three conditions are stipulated by b herself.  For a, the awareness 
that these conditions are shared constitutes sharedness of the existence of these 
conditions; it does not necessarily mean that a, for example, is actually committed to 
the truth of the propositional content expressed by these conditions.   
 This shouldn't surprise us as we have already shown and discussed in Chapter 
3, Section 3, that the three conditions of (3e), (2b) and (3f) have not been met by a.  
Condition (2b) 'Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a' has not been 
met by a since a has, at the point of reading B2, still not visited the Linguistics 
Department to find out their preference.  Because condition (2b) has not been met, the 
eventual goal (3f) 'b is willing in fact to supervise a' cannot be attained either.  By the 
time a reads B2, he realises that these conditions have not been met, and he is aware 
that b realises the same.  This is indicated on the table below by the state of shared 
doubt for (3e), (2b) and (3f).  We have argued in the above sections that although 
sharedness of doubt has been established, this is a non-desired and unresolved state of 
affairs, precisely because the final goal (3f) has not been achieved. 
 Having looked at a's situation, let us consider b's position.  b's configuration of 
these beliefs shows a similar lack of CG established for (3e), (2b) and (3f) (see Table 
6.25 below).  Considering the fact that a has not satisfied all her conditions, we would 
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expect b to be able to only establish shared doubt for (3e), (2b) and (3f) at most, and 
not CG. 
 
Table 6.25: b's  configuration of all seven beliefs after reading A3 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter Belief St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A3 1             
 2a             
 3a             
 3b       + + + + + + 
 3e       ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 2b             
 3f       ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Notes:  
Heavy shade plus values : CG (Shared belief) established 
Light shade plus values : Shared doubt/disbelief established 
Heavy shade minus values : CG (Shared belief) established previously 
Light shade minus values : Shared doubt/disbelief established previously 
 
 1 a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
  2a The Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a  
  3a b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 
  3b b is interested in supervising a  
  3e b is willing in principle to supervise a  
  2b The Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a  
  3f b is willing in fact to supervise a  
 
 In the above table, by the time b reads A3, she establishes 2nd CG for (3b).  
As for (1), (2a) and (3a), recall that b has already established CG for them previously 
in the last letter A2.  (This is shown by the heavy shade above without the values 
added to indicate a previously established CG whose regression has been arrested 
then.)  As expected, (3e), (2b) and (3f) are only established as shared doubts by b 
(showing only an awareness of the existence of these conditions and that a is also 
aware of the existence of these conditions).  For them to be established as CG, b will 
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have to be satisfied that the truth of (3e), (2b) and (3f) has been determined as well 
(presumably by a's proposed and forthcoming visit to the Linguistics Department). 
 Finally, as we have just discussed in the previous section (and in Chapter 3, 
Section 3 as well), a is able to dissociate his lack of attainment of conditions (3e), 
(2b) and (3f) with that which he projects in letter A3 Thank you very much for your 
letter ... in which you tell me that you would be willing to supervise me ... (A3P1) 
which seems to suggest the contrary situation that conditions (3e), (2b) and (3f) have 
been satisfied.  This dissociation strategy, as we have argued in Chapter 3, suits a's 
argumentative style of writing, which he uses to persuade b to agree to supervise him 
even though he knows full well that he hasn't met all of b's conditions in b's reasoning 
schema.  It therefore shouldn't surprise us that the use of this dissociation strategy is 
only supported by a state of shared doubt (rather than CG) for (3e), (2b) and (3f). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
9 Shared beliefs and written correspondence 
 
 In this section, we return to some of the issues raised in Chapter 2 regarding 
the distinction between mutual knowledge, shared beliefs and common ground.  We 
shall also offer an account of the how the configuration of CG in written 
correspondence differs from that of spoken interaction.  (See Chapter 2 for a general 
discussion of the distinction between written and spoken discourse.) 
 We have seen how the notion of mutual knowledge is not psychologically 
viable since it requires an infinite regression of knowledge to be processed in an 
infinite amount of time.  Arguing that mutual knowledge is needed for successful 
communication also presupposes a model of communication which is essentially risk-
free.  We acknowledge the substantial contribution of Clark and his colleagues, in 
particular, in addressing the Mutual Knowledge Paradox and their novel way of 
accommodating the exact requirements of mutual knowledge in their theory of 
communication.  But as we have argued in Chapter 2, their solution to the paradox is 
fundamentally flawed in two major respects.   
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 Firstly, their solution to the Mutual Knowledge Paradox raises another 
paradox - that of a potentially infinite regression of gazes and counter gazes in their 
conceptualisation of physical co-presence which is supposed to act as the secure 
ground for establishing mutual knowledge (see Chapter 2, Section 2 for a discussion).  
In spite of the psychological underpinnings/motivation of Clark's et al solution, their 
account is still essentially untenable from a human-sized memory and processing 
point of view.   
 Secondly, and drawing from Brown's (1995) analysis and empirical evidence, 
we have argued in Chapter 2 that this regression can be demonstrated to be limited to 
a few steps, thus disproving further the need to appeal to the notion of mutual 
knowledge to explain common ground in successful communication.  This is a vast 
improvement over the claims (arising from invented examples) made by other 
scholars regarding this limited regression (cf. Bach and Harnish, 1979; Harder and 
Kock, 1976; and Kaspar, 1976; see discussion in Chapter 2).  
 However, in spite of its ingenuity, Brown's (1995) account of the recursion of 
steps is based on the examination of only a few short extracts from her data.  This is 
understandable, considering the fact that the configuring of shared belief is not the 
focus of her book.   
 Our discussion above also shows that practically all that has been said so far 
regarding common ground is either based on invented data or on authentic spoken 
data only.  Authentic written data has not been explored.  Our detailed analysis of 
written data in this chapter shows that the notion of shared belief, rather than mutual 
knowledge, is at the heart of the issue of establishing common ground in written 
correspondence.  The question then is whether our findings arising from written 
correspondence is generalisable to spoken interaction as well.  
 We shall now make an initial and brief attempt at applying the details of our 
method of configuration to spoken data.  We shall not look at a substantial amount of 
data.  This in itself can be a fruitful area of study for an extended research project in 
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the future.  We do, however, wish to make some preliminary observations of the 
generalisibility of our findings to spoken data.  
 We shall attempt to do this rapidly by re-analysing a small fragment of 
Brown's (1995) data.  Recall that her account of her spoken data (Map Task) shows 
that it is shared belief, rather than mutual knowledge, which is established in spoken 
interaction.  We shall now re-analyse Brown's (1995: 221) data from example (7f) 
using our method of configuring shared beliefs.  The purpose is to standardise the 
method of analysis used for both written and spoken data so as to ensure greater 
comparability.  We should point out that although the underlying principle of our 
method of configuring shared beliefs is based on Brown's (1995) pioneering work, 
our method of configuring shared beliefs differs from hers in two crucial ways.   
 Firstly, in analysing the data of example (7f), Brown limits her analysis of the 
speaker's/listener's recursion of beliefs to two steps; whereas in our analysis to follow, 
we configure the whole course of the regression until it is arrested.  Secondly, 
Brown's analysis considers the speaker's and listener's (i.e., both giver's and 
receiver's) point of view simultaneously for each utterance; whereas in our analysis, 
we only consider the reader's (i.e., the receiver's) point of view.  The advantage of 
Brown's dual perspective analysis is that it captures very vividly the sense in which 
the configurations are constantly evolving on-line in spoken interaction.  In our 
analysis, the exclusive focus on the reader (the receiver) makes it possible for us to 
tease out the exact details of the solipsistic nature of establishing shared beliefs, thus 
making it possible for us to distinguish between 1st and 2nd Party sharedness. 
 We digress from the task at hand if we go on to make further comparison of 
Brown's pioneering work and of our extension of her work.  Our immediate concern 
here in this section is to explore the intricacies of the distinction between spoken and 
written discourse in relation to the issue of the regression of beliefs in establishing 
sharedness.  Our concern here is not with comparing the two methods of configuring 
shared beliefs.  By standardising the method of configuration used, we allow for 
greater comparability of the difference between written and spoken interactions.  We 
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shall therefore employ our method of analysis to Brown's (1995: 221) example (7f), 
reproduced below as Eg. 1. 
 
 (Eg. 1)  A. do you have the start marked 
   B. yes 
   A. all right 
    + do you have palm trees? 
   B. + yes 
   A. right 
    + the swamp? 
   B. ++ what swamp 
   A. + to the - left of the palm trees 
   B. no 
 
Note: A '+' in the text above indicates a short pause of half a second.  '++' indicates a 
slightly longer pause. 
 
 In the above data, it seems to us that there are essentially three "issues" 
discussed.  The point of A's line of questioning seems to be to establish the status of 
three items of propositional content, which we shall label as: 
 
 (11) 'B has the start marked on her map' 
 (12) 'B has the palm trees marked on her map' 
 (13) 'B has the swamp marked on her map' 
 
A's immediate concern in asking the three questions is to establish whether (11), (12) 
and (13) are true and shared information, i.e., whether B has the three features marked 
on her map.  A's overall purpose in establishing (11), (12) and (13) is to enable 
himself to guide B through the Map Task.  Using our system of configuring shared 
beliefs, we produce the following results which we shall present in Tables 6.26 - 6.28.  
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 In Table 6.26 below, we configure A's and B's regression of (11) 'B has the 
start marked on her map'.  Once again we shall only configure the receiver's (in this 
case, the listener's) point of view, except for the first row where we have indicated the 
configuration of the speaker A as well (in parenthesis) since he introduces the 
proposition into the discourse.  We shall refer to A as he and B as she. 
 
Table 6.26: A's  and B's configurations of belief (11) 'B has the start marked on her 
map' 
 
Spea  A's beliefs (Steps) B's beliefs (Steps) 
-ker Utterance St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 
A Do you have the 
start marked 
(?)      + ?    
B yes + + ?         
A all right       + + + +  
 
Note that the lightly shaded regions indicate that sharedness has not been established.  
The heavily shaded regions with dotted lines indicate that shared belief (CG) has been 
established and the regression is arrested. 
 When A utters Do you have the start marked, A is uncertain about the status 
of (11) 'B has the start marked' (A's Step 1; [?]).  When B hears this utterance, B 
realises that A does not know whether (11) (B's Step 2; B/A; [?]).  B, however, has 
the start marked on her map.  We therefore configure B's Step 1 as [+].  We know that 
B has the start marked on her map because she says yes in her reply on the next line.  
As there is no Step 1-2 match established by B at this stage, CG is not established.   
 When A hears B's reply yes, A believes (11) (A's Step 1; [+]).  A also forms a 
representation of B's beliefs ("transfer" from B's Steps 1-2 to A's Steps 2-3).  As there 
is a Step 1-2 [+ +] match now, B establishes 1st Party CG for (11) and the regression 
is arrested.  A indicates his satisfaction that CG has been established by uttering all 
right. 
 When B hears A say all right, B realises that A has established (11) as 1st 
Party CG.  B in turn establishes 2nd Party CG.  Note that A's Step 3 [?] is normalised 
in the "transfer" to B as B's Step 4 [+] since there is no point in B retaining the doubt 




once 1st Party CG has already been established prior to her.  The regression is 
arrested at Step 4. 
 In Table 6.27 below, we offer A's and B's configurations of (12) 'B has the 
palm trees marked on her map' at the onset of A's next question do you have palm 
trees?  The analysis of how (12) is established as CG is very similar to the analysis 
for (11) above.  In fact the configurations for (11) and (12) are identical.  We shall not 
repeat our explanation here, except to offer a summary of our analysis in Table 6.27 
below for your reference. 
 
Table 6.27: A's  and B's configurations of belief (12) 'B has the palm trees marked 
on her map' 
 
Spea  A's beliefs (Steps) B's beliefs (Steps) 
-ker Utterance St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 
A + do you have 
palm trees? 
(?)      + ?    
B +yes + + ?         
A right       + + + +  
 
 In Table 6.28 below, the analysis is complicated by the fact that (13) 'B has 
the swamp marked on her map' is not established as CG.  Consider the analysis 
below. 
 
Table 6.28: A's  and B's configurations of belief (13) 'B has the swamp marked on 
her map' 
 
Spea  A's beliefs (Steps) B's beliefs (Steps) 
-ker Utterance St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 
A + the swamp? (?)      ? ?    
B ++ what swamp ? ? ?         
A + to the - left of 
the palm trees 
      - ? ? ?  
B no - - ? ? ?       
 
 In the above sequence, A's goal is to determine the truth status of (13) 'B has 
the swamp marked on her map' and to establish it as shared information.  When A 
asks B whether she has the swamp, B realises that she is not sure whether she has the 
I I I I I I I I I 
I 
I 




swamp on her map.  (Perhaps B has more than one swamp on her map, or perhaps she 
can't locate the swamp yet because she hasn't given herself enough time to look 
through her map carefully.  If B is aware that she has no swamp at this juncture, she 
would have said 'No'.)  We configure B's Step 1 as [?].  B also realises that A is not 
sure whether she has the swamp on her map (B's Step 2; [?]).  At this juncture, B 
establishes a state of shared doubt (1st Party) for (13) and the regression is arrested.   
 When B answers What swamp, A realises that B is not sure about (13), and 
that B believes that A is not sure about (13) either, establishing a Step 1-3 [? ? ?] 
match.  A thus establishes 2nd Party shared doubt and the regression is arrested.  But 
surely, establishing a state of shared doubt is not A's desired state of affairs.  We have 
evidence of this because A continues in his pursuit for the truth of (13) by offering 
more information to B to help her locate the swamp.   
 When A offers further information/clue to the location of the swamp by 
uttering to the left of the palm trees, B realises that she doesn't have the swamp after 
all.  We mark this as [-] in B's Step 1 column.  Note that the sharedness of doubt 
previously established is no longer maintained in the light of B's realisation.  B 
indicates her lack of a swamp with no in her reply.   
 When A hears B's no, A does not believe (13) any more (A's Step 1), and A 
believes that B does not believe (13) either (A's Step 2), thus establishing 1st Party 
shared disbelief.  Unfortunately for us, Brown's data stops short here and we are 
unable to determine if 2nd Party shared disbelief is established by B after A. 
 Our analysis of Brown's spoken data above seems to support most of the 
claims we have made earlier regarding our set of written data.  Firstly, our analysis of 
the spoken data above shows that sharedness for certain propositions/beliefs is 
established by one interactant at a time; hence we are able to make the distinction 
between 1st Party and 2nd Party sharedness.  This observation agrees with the 
analysis of the written data, and confirms our view of the solipsistic nature of shared 
belief.   
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 Secondly, the analysis of the spoken data above shows that 1st Party 
sharedness requires a minimum Step 1-2 match while 2nd Party sharedness requires a 
Step 1-3 match.  Again, this concurs with our findings for written correspondence.   
 Thirdly, we have evidence from our analysis of the spoken data that shared 
doubt is not a desired state of affairs and is potentially unstable, judging by the 
clarification strategy used by B (as in what swamp; see Table 6.28 above) to resolve 
the non-desired state of affairs.   
 However, in our analysis of the spoken data above, we are unable to find an 
example to demonstrate that shared disbelief is also a non-desired state of affairs 
since the data ends prematurely with B's no (see belief (13) 'B has the swamp marked 
on her map' of Table 6.28 above).  Our guess is that A is unlikely to pursue the status 
of 'the swamp' any further since he is likely to use another "entity" on his map as his 
next strategy in helping B to advance further on her map.  In other words, once shared 
disbelief is established, the entity under discussion is of no further use to A anymore 
in helping A to guide B through the Map Task.  Obviously, establishing the existence 
of the swamp on B's map is not crucial to A in his attempt to guide B through the task.  
He can use other entities to help him achieve his goal which is to guide B successfully 
through the task.   
 In written discourse (at least of the type reported here), however, the truth of a 
shared disbelief is pursued actively.  For example, shared disbelief of (3b) 'b is 
interested in supervising a' established by a after reading B1 (see Table 6.15).  Recall 
that a continues to pursue the matter until the truth of (3b) has been established as 
well.  The reason for this persistent pursuit obviously lies in the importance of 
establishing the truth of (3b) in helping a to establish CG for the other beliefs, in 
particular, his final goal which is to establish the truth of (3f) 'b is willing in fact to 
supervise a'. 
 In other words, for both Brown's spoken data and our written data, it is equally 
important to consider the participants' goals in establishing sharedness.  What differs 
is the effect different goals have on the way participants treat an unresolved state of 
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shared disbelief.  In our data, a shared disbelief is an unresolved state of affairs to be 
pursued actively.  In Brown's spoken data, the need to resolve the state of shared 
disbelief of (13) is less pressing.  This difference appears to us to be caused more by 
the nature of the demands of the Map Task, than by a difference between written and 
spoken data.  In the Map Task, A uses different entities on the map to achieve his goal 
which is to guide B through the task.  If a particular entity is not available, he can use 
another entity easily .  In our set of written correspondence, each proposition to be 
established is considered to be important in b's chain of reasoning in reaching the goal 
and cannot be disposed of without repercussions on the attainment of the goal.  
Therefore we conclude that for both Brown's spoken data and our written data, it is 
equally important to consider the participants' goals in establishing sharedness. 
 This utilitarian view of the pursuit of sharedness and truth also ties in very 
well with Brown's (1995) notion of establishing an adequate interpretation (see 
Chapter 3, Section 1.2 for the details).  In discussing the issue of whether an 
interpretation is adequate (as opposed to correct), Brown asks the question: adequate 
for what?, drawing our attention to the need to consider the purpose of interpretation 
in considering what an adequate interpretation is.  This distinction points to the need 
to not only look at how an interpretation may be constructed based on a particular 
context but also how the interpretation thus constructed can be utilised further by the 
person to achieve a further goal in the communicative situation.  This view concurs 
with our account of the role played by goals and pragmatic reasoning schemas in 
interpretation (see Chapter 3, Section 3). 
 Summing up what we have said so far, our analysis of the spoken data above 
shows that our method of analysis can be employed quite readily for spoken data .  
We are able to identify similar minimum configurations for 1st and 2nd Party shared 
beliefs/doubts/disbeliefs. The only complication so far to our analysis of the spoken 
data above is that it shows that we need to consider further the participant's goal in the 
discourse in determining whether truth is pursued in addition to sharedness. 
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 Our analysis of the spoken data above also shows that there are other 
important differences between the way CG is established in interactive spoken and 
written discourse.   
 In the spoken data reported above, we note that A's and B's positions on the 
status of each of the three propositions (11), (12) and (13) are negotiated one at a 
time.  Only one propositions/belief may be considered and established as shared 
during a single turn in the exchange.  This may be due to the constraints on short term 
memory in spoken interaction which makes it necessary for the interactants to 
consider only one belief at a time (but see discussion below of how speakers can take 
long turns too). 
 On the other hand, the constant to-ing and fro-ing of short turns (and the ease 
with which this takes place) between the interactants in spoken discourse also makes 
it possible for the interactants to choose to consider only one belief at a time during 
each turn taken in the interaction/exchange.  However, for written data, and as we 
have argued in Chapter 1, the goal of the writer may be to cover as much ground as 
possible in as few letters (or turns) as possible.   
 In the written data we have considered, the visual permanence/record allowed 
for in written discourse makes it easier for the interactants to co-ordinate their 
positions on several beliefs within each turn.  Each lengthy letter in the exchange may 
be construed as a mega-turn, the contents of which would normally take several turns 
in spoken discourse to be established as common ground (see Chapter 2, Section 5 for 
further discussion of this point).  In our written data, we note that a's and b's positions 
on all seven beliefs (1), (2a), (3a), (3b), (3e), (2b) and (3f) are considered together 
within each letter/turn.  This "collective" consideration of the various propositions 
within each letter affects the way CG is established.  As we have shown in the earlier 
sections of the current chapter, this chunking of information within each letter makes 
it possible for several beliefs to be established as shared within each turn.   
 This is not to suggest that the speaker, like the writer, cannot take an extended 
turn in discourse.  It would be interesting to see how this extended turn of spoken 
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interaction (as when a politician takes an extended turn to answer a question from 
another politician of the opposition party) compares with written correspondence.  We 
would expect the extended turn of spoken interaction of the above nature to exhibit 
similar effects of chunking of information and of establishing sharedness of several 
propositions/beliefs within each turn.  However we should add the caveat that we 
would also assume a more liberal interpretation of co-operative behaviour (in terms of 
the desirability of establishing a state of sharedness) in wilfully confrontational and 
"uncooperative" discourse of some political debates.  Certainly, in written 
correspondence of the type reported here, we do not expect the kind of interruptions 
(nor is it possible) typical of face-to-face discourse of live political debates to take 
place. 
 Our final comment regarding the difference between the configurations of 
sharedness established for written and spoken discourse is that in our analysis of the 
spoken data, we have not made allowance for the effect of paralinguistic 
cues/feedback on the configurations of the regression of beliefs.  In spoken 
interaction, surely the verbal input is not the only source of information the listener 
depends on in determining if CG has been established.  For example, verbal 
confirmation (e.g., when A hears B's yes to confirm that she has established CG for 
proposition (12); see Table 6.27 above) may have been supplemented by 
paralinguistic cues (e.g., perhaps, B's nodding and action of drawing on her map?).  
How are we to configure these additional cues in spoken interaction?  Consider the 
data from Table 6.27 again, here reproduced and renumbered as Table 6.29 below. 
 
Table 6.29: (Renumbered) A's and B's configurations of belief (12) 'B has the palm 
trees marked on her map' 
 
Spea  A's beliefs (Steps) B's beliefs (Steps) 
-ker Utterance St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 
A + do you have 
palm trees? 
(?)      + ?    
B +yes + + ?         
A right       + + + ?  





When B answers yes, A's regression would have regressed to Step 3 (see Table 6.29 
above).  If B has nodded in addition to saying yes, what is the effect of this nodding 
on A's regression?  Intuitively we would assume that the effect of B's nodding is to 
strengthen A's certainty that he has established CG for (12) 'B has the palm trees 
marked on her map'.  But is this enhanced certainty of truth and sharedness to be 
expressed in quantitative terms (by adding an additional step) or in qualitative terms 
(by representing the [+] in bold [+])?  Or perhaps, we should postulate a second but 
parallel regression of (12) arising from paralinguistic cues to this effect (see Table 
6.30 below): 
 
Table 6.30: A hypothetical and parallel representation of A's and B's 
configurations of belief (12) 'B has the palm trees marked on her map' based on 
paralinguistic cues 
 
Spea  A's beliefs (Steps) B's beliefs (Steps) 
-ker Utterance St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 
A + do you have 
palm trees? 
(?)      + ?    
B [nod] + + ?         
A [smile]       + + + ?  
 
 Admittedly, there are no easy answers to the questions raised above.  For our 
purpose here, we merely wish to highlight the complexities of the nature of the 
difference between establishing CG in written and spoken interactions.  This  appears 
to us to be another fruitful line of investigation if we wish to explore the spoken-




 In this chapter we offer for the first time a detailed case study of how seven 
key beliefs/assumptions (called Base Propositions in Chapters 1 and 3) come to be 
established as shared beliefs/doubts/disbeliefs in interactive written discourse.  Using 




the method of configuring which we have developed in this chapter, we are able to 
demonstrate that it is the notion of shared belief, rather than mutual knowledge, which 
is relevant to establishing common ground.  Our key finding is that the regression of 
beliefs is limited to a few steps - the minimum being two steps for 1st Party 
sharedness and three steps for 2nd Party sharedness - and that this regression is 
distinct for each interactant.  There is no sense in which the sharedness established is 
available in some publicly available space.    
 By analysing the establishment of the seven beliefs in the same order in which 
they are ordered as conditions in the pragmatic reasoning schema, we are also able to 
show the relationship between the reader's goal and reasoning and the establishment 
of sharedness.  Conditions stipulated by b which are met by a, for example, are 
eventually established as shared beliefs (CG), while those conditions which are not 
met are only established as shared doubts at best.   
 In the last section, we apply our method of analysis to a small sample of 
spoken data.  Our comparative analysis highlights some interesting similarities and 
differences between the way CG is established in interactive written discourse of our 
nature and Brown's Map Task spoken data. 
 
 











 We continue our discussion in the previous chapter by looking more closely at 
the configurations in order to make further generalisations about the nature of 
common ground (see Appendix 2, Tables 8.1 - 8.5, for a summary of the 
configurations of all seven beliefs).  We shall take into account the configurations of 
those beliefs which have been established as shared beliefs (CG) as well as those 
beliefs which are held as shared doubts/disbeliefs.  The key technical terms used in 
this chapter are the same as those found in Chapter 6, except for one.  This is defined 
below. 
 We have seen in the previous chapter that once CG (shared beliefs) or shared 
doubts/disbeliefs have been established, the regression is arrested.  We have argued 
that only CG is potentially stable since it is based on a resolved and desired state of 
affairs.  Shared doubts/disbeliefs, however, are potentially unstable in that they are 
based on an unresolved and non-desired state of affairs.   
 You will recall that by the time a reads letter B2, he has established 
CG/shared doubts for all seven beliefs.  This final state of a's configurations in B2 is 
what we shall call Eventual State CG/Shared doubt configurations.  We should 
point out that a actually arrived at a certain state of sharedness for some of the beliefs 
earlier on after reading the previous letter B1.  But these configurations, as we have 
demonstrated and argued in Chapter 6, are not his final configurations since they have 
been modified further after reading B2.  Likewise for b, she has her own set of 
Eventual State CG/Shared doubt configurations.  In the following sections, we shall 
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be careful to point out to you when we are referring to this eventual or non-eventual 
state of configurations and when we are not. 
 In the rest of this chapter, we shall do the following.  Firstly, we shall make 
certain generalisations arising from our detailed analyses of the seven beliefs in 
Chapter 6 regarding who (a or b) achieves Eventual State CG/shared doubts first for 
the various beliefs.  Secondly, we shall move on to discuss the order in which these 
beliefs are established as shared by the two interactants.  Thirdly, we shall identify 
generic patterns of Eventual State CG/shared doubt configurations.  The purpose is to 
offer a taxonomy of the various configurations.  Fourthly, we present a cognitive 
model of the process of establishing potentially stable CG.  In our model, we assume 
that what drives the reader in his search for CG (shared beliefs) is his dual concern for 
sharedness and truth.  This dual concern for sharedness and truth has been discussed 
in detail in Chapter 6.  The explanatory value of our model will be defended, in 
particular, against the claims made by Clark and his colleagues (see Chapter 2 for a 
critique of their position).  
 Finally, we end this chapter by summarising our current study.  We draw your 
attention to the major findings of our study and to the possible areas of future 
research. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Who achieves Eventual State CG/shared doubts first for different beliefs? 
 
 As we have seen in Chapter 6, b achieves CG first for beliefs (1), (2a) and 
(3a).  a, on the other hand, achieves CG first for belief (3b).  As for the rest of the 
beliefs, b arrives at a state of shared doubt for (2b) first, whereas a arrives at a state of 
shared doubt for (3e) and (3f) first.  We list the beliefs/assumptions again below for 
ease of reading (here renumbered as Table 7.1, previously Table 6.1). 
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Table 7.1:  (renumbered) Assumptions/beliefs made/held by a, the writer, in writing 
letter A1 (including those which a is unsure of; marked by [?] ) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
a believes that: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 (regarding a) 
 
1 a applied to take the M.A. in Linguistics 
 
 (regarding the world: University regulations, prospectus, etc.) 
 
2a The Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a  
2b The Linguistics Department is willing to let b supervise a  
 
 (regarding b) 
 
3a b is constitutionally permitted to supervise a 
3b b is interested in supervising a  [?] 
3e b is willing in principle to supervise a  [?] 
3f b is willing in fact to supervise a  [?] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 The reason why b achieves CG first for (2a) and (3a) is because a is the source 
of the information related to these beliefs.  By source of information, we mean that it 
is a who introduces this information in his opening letter and/or that it is he who is 
aware of the truth status of the propositions expressed.  The originator a of these 
beliefs has access to Step 1 belief first naturally, but it is the receiver b who is in the 
position to match her Step 1 beliefs with the incoming beliefs (which become her 
Step 2 beliefs) first.  In contrast, for belief (3b) where b is the source of information 
(i.e., she determines the truth of it), the reader a achieves CG first.  Likewise, a 
similar account can be given to explain why b arrives at a state of shared doubt for 
(2b) first, while a arrives at a state of shared doubt for the other beliefs (3e) and (3f) 
first (see Chapter 6 for detailed discussions of the above). 
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 What is the significance of the order in which the interactants achieve CG?  
Firstly, there is a simple inverse correlation between the party who achieves CG first 
and her control of the information exchanged.  Notice that it is the 2nd party who 
achieves CG who actually has control of the information and determines if the 
recipient can attain CG.  In our case, although b achieves CG first regarding a's  
prospective departmental affiliation (i.e., (1)), it is a who controls and releases the 
information (1) and makes possible b's attainment of CG. 
 Secondly, there is no simple correlation between one party's control of the 
information and her control of the whole exchange of letters.  While a may control 
the flow of information (e.g., (1)) and the means by which b's information needs are 
satisfied, he is constrained by his overarching need/goal to effect a particular action 
on b's part which is ultimately to a's advantage, i.e., a gets b to agree to supervise 
him.  In other words, the giver a has more to gain from releasing the information to 
the receiver b, than b to gain in receiving the information.  But note that for beliefs 
(3b) 'b is interested in supervising a' and (3e) 'b is willing in principle to supervise a', 
the situation is different.  b controls the information while a receives the information.  
In this situation, it is the receiver a who has more to gain than the giver b in the 
exchange. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2 Which beliefs are established as Eventual State CG/shared doubts first? 
 
 We will address this question by looking first at the beliefs which have been 
established as CG (regressions arrested).  We will then examine those beliefs which 
are held as shared doubts (regressions arrested).  We should emphasise that we 
concerned here with the eventual states of the configurations of the beliefs.   For this 
reason, we shall not discuss the CG/shared doubt configurations of the beliefs 
established in the earlier letters of A1 and B1 since they do not represent the eventual 
states. 
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 From b's point of view, two sets of beliefs are established as Eventual State 
CG in two stages. 
 
      b's beliefs: CG established 
 Stage 1 By A2    1, 2a, 3a 
 Stage 2 By A3                  3b 
 
Compare this with a's point of view where there seems to be only one stage in which 
his beliefs are established as Eventual State CG. 
 
      a's beliefs: CG established 
 Stage 1a By B2    1, 2a, 3a, 3b 
 
 Why is it the case that b's arrested CGs are established in two stages while 
those of a are established in one?  It seems to us that b's two stages are more a result 
of who has control of the information rather than any inherent difference in the 
hierarchical organisation of the two sets of beliefs.  Hence, belief (3b) is established 
in Stage 2 simply because b has control of the information and as such has to wait for 
a to establish CG for it first in the preceding letter B2.  Further evidence of the impact 
which the control of the information has on the sequence in which CG for different 
beliefs is established lies in the observation that for a, the same set of beliefs (both 
Stages 1 and 2 of b's) are established in a single stage.  In real time, a's Stage 1a is 
sandwiched between b's Stages 1 and 2. 
 
 Stage 1 By A2  b achieves CG for 1, 2a, 3a 
 Stage 1a By B2  a achieves CG for 1, 2a, 3a, 3b 
 Stage 2 By A3  b achieves CG for       3b 
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a establishes 2nd Party CG for  (1), (2a) and (3a) one letter later than b because a is 
the source of information for these beliefs.  On the other hand, a establishes 1st Party 
CG for (3b) one letter earlier than b because a is now the recipient of the information.  
It is a matter of coincidence that a's 2nd Party CG of (1), (2a) and (3a) and a's 1st 
Party CG of (3b) occur at the same time in B2.  But for b, her 1st Party and 2nd Party 
CGs occur in two separate letters A2 and A3. 
 What about those beliefs which are established as shared doubts?  For both a 
and b, beliefs (2b), (3e) and (3f) are held as shared doubts. 
 
      b's beliefs: shared doubt established 
 Stage 1 By A2          2b 
 Stage 2 By A3    3e        3f 
 
      a's beliefs: shared doubt established 
 Stage 1a By B2    3e, 2b, 3f 
 
We see a similar pattern here with those beliefs which have been established as CG in 
that the above shared doubts are "established" in two stages for b but in one stage for 
a.  In real time, a's Stage 1a  is again sandwiched between b's Stages 1 and 2. 
 
 Stage 1 By A2  b holds as shared doubt       2b 
 Stage 1a By B2  a holds as shared doubt 3e, 2b, 3f 
 Stage 2 By A3  b holds as shared doubt 3e        3f 
 
The reasons are the same as that of the beliefs discussed previously.  The sequence is 
once again the product of control of information.  We summarise the above 
information in Table 7.2 below. 
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Table 7.2: Sequence in which Eventual State CG/shared doubts are established by 




b's beliefs a's beliefs 


















By B2 1st   
 




  1, 2a, 3a 2b 
By A3 1st   
 
  





3 A taxonomy of CG/shared doubts according to their eventual state configurations 
 
 In this section, we will attempt to classify the different types of CG/shared 
doubt not according to who achieves them first or according to which beliefs are 
established as shared first, but according to their eventual state of configurations of 
values.  In the following table, we list all the different possible configurations first 
(both eventual and non-eventual states) which we have identified in our analyses of 
b's beliefs in Chapter 6.  In our discussion to follow, we shall isolate the eventual 
states from the non-eventual states. 
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Table 7.3:  b's CG/shared doubt configurations 
 















?  ? 1st 
A2 2a, 3a 
 
+  +  -  + 1st 
 1 
 
+  +  ?  ? 1st 
 2b 
 






+  +  +  +  +  + 2nd 
 3e, 3f 
 
?   ?  ?   ?   ?  ? 2nd 
 
Note: Eventual State CG /shared doubt configurations are shaded 
 
 The above table shows the evolving configuration of b's beliefs with each 
letter he reads.  The Eventual State CG (or shared doubt) configuration refers to the 
final configuration of the beliefs achieved in the correspondence; and it is this final 
configuration that we shall now focus on in our discussion.   
 For beliefs (1), (2a) and (3a), their final configurations are achieved in A2 
where the regression of beliefs is arrested.  Belief (3b)’s regression is arrested in A3.  
The arrested state, as we have argued in Chapter 6, remains unchanged till the end of 
the correspondence.  For shared doubts (2b), (3e) and (3f), their regression is 
similarly arrested although this is an unresolved state and potentially unstable. 
 If we look closely at the eventual configuration of the various beliefs (see 
shaded rows only), we observe several possible generic patterns.  For beliefs (1), 
(2a) and (3a), we find the following pattern: 
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    [ + + n ] 
 
where:  ( + + ) shows a Step 1-2 match and that both steps are (+); 
 ( n ) refers to the few number of steps beyond Steps 1 and 2, 
whatever their values, (+), (-) or (?), may be 
 
 In the above scheme of categorising, the [ + + n ] CG configuration depicts a 
1st Party CG whose regression has been arrested.  As we have already discussed 
previously, this type of CG requires a minimal Step 1-2 match.  The occurrence of 
Steps 3 and 4 is incidental to the CG, and the values of Steps 3 and 4 can vary.  The 
arrest of the regression suggests that the eventual status of the belief is potentially 
stable and that the party holding this belief is sufficiently satisfied with its truth 
status. 
 Since a Step 1-2 match is sufficient for a 1st Party CG, the question which 
arises is why the regression doesn't stop at Step 2 at A1 for, say, beliefs (2a) and (3a) 
(see Table 7.3 above). 
 Technically speaking, if a [ + + ] CG is achieved by letter A1, there is no 
reason why these beliefs should continue to regress beyond A1.  As we have argued 
in Chapter 6 (see discussion of Tables 6.10 & 6.12), the regression of (2a) 'The 
Linguistics Department is permitted to let b supervise a'  and (3a) 'b is 
constitutionally permitted to supervise a' has been arrested and the state of affairs is 
considered resolved and potentially stable since b has no reason to believe, at this 
stage, that anything is amiss.  However in reading A2, b realises that a has 
misunderstood her, causing her to re-evaluate her CG in A2.  Because of this further 
change to her configurations in A2, the configurations in A1 are not considered 
eventual CG states.  (Technically speaking, in another set of data, we may well be 
able to identify an eventual state [+ +] CG.) 
 For a 2nd Party CG, a minimal Step 1-3 match is required.  For belief (3b), 
where 2nd Party CG for b has been established, the configuration is: 
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    [ + + + ... etc. ] 
 
where: ( + + + ) shows a Step 1-3 match and that all three steps are  
 ( + ); and 
[ + + + ... etc. ] shows that the few steps beyond the first three 
have been normalised/standardised 
 
 Another possible Eventual State configuration found in our analysis arises 
from a state of shared doubt.  The generic pattern of such a shared doubt (1st Party) 
(see (2b) from Table 7.3 above) is: 
 
    [ ? ? n ] 
 
where: ( ? ? ) shows a Step 1-2 match and that both steps are ( ? ); and 
 ( n ) refers to the few number of steps beyond Steps 1 and 2, 
whatever their values, (+), (-) or (?), may be 
 
 The 2nd Party version of an Eventual State configuration arising from a 
similar state of shared doubt is evident from the configuration of (3e) and (3f).  Recall 
that because they are 2nd Party shared doubts, the configuration beyond the Step 1-3 
match have been normalised.  This generic pattern is indicated below: 
 
    [ ? ? ? ... etc. ] 
 
where: ( ? ? ? ) shows a Step 1-3 match and that all three steps are  
 ( ? ); and 
 [ ? ? ? ... etc. ] shows that the few steps beyond the first three 
have been normalised 
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 We should reiterate that only the first two steps (for the 1st Party) or three 
steps (for the 2nd Party) of the regression are paid attention to, as we have argued in 
Chapter 6.  The steps exceeding the minimum number required for sharedness are 
incidental to the CG/shared doubt established, resulting entirely from the continued 
exchange of letters in the process of clarification.  If further clarification hasn't been 
sought, there wouldn't be any need to configure the regressions beyond the minimum 
number of steps.  Note that we do not claim here that the interactants actually keep 
track of the steps beyond the minimum required.  This seems to us a sensible position 
to adopt; otherwise, the process of establishing sharedness would be too mind-
boggling for the interactants  (see discussion of Table 6.6 in Chapter 6). 
 
 If we look at a's beliefs (see Table 7.4 below), we can identify the same 
generic configurations of 1st and 2nd Party Eventual State CG/shared doubts.  The 
table below is self-explanatory.   
 
Table 7.4:  a's CG/shared doubt configurations 
 









-   -   ? 
 
1st 
B2 1, 2a, 3a 
 
+  +  +  +  + 2nd 
 3b 
 
+  +   -  -   ? 1st 
 2b 
 
?   ?   ?  ?  ?   2nd 
 3e, 3f 
 
?   ?   -  -   ? 1st 
 
Note: Eventual State CG/shared doubts are shaded 
 
 Based on our discussion so far, we offer a preliminary classification/taxonomy 
of Eventual State CG/Shared doubt/Shared disbelief configurations (see Table 7.5 
below and explanatory notes).  In the table, we shall include those patterns we have 
identified above in our data as well as those patterns which we have argued to be 
technically possible and which may be found in another set of data. 
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Table 7.5:  A taxonomy of Eventual State CG/Shared doubt/Shared disbelief 










+  + Not found in our data, but theoretically 
possible. 
 
Type 1a +  +  n Regression occurs in excess of Step 2 
(minimum); caused by initial uncertainty 
with truth; a few number of n beyond Step 2 
possible; any value of n possible. 
 
Resolved 2nd Party CG 
 
Type 2 +  +  + Not found in our data, but theoretically 
possible. 
 
Type 2a +  +  +  ...  etc. Regression occurs in excess of Step 3 
(minimum); caused by initial uncertainty 
with truth; a few number of steps beyond 









?  ?  n Regression in excess of Step 2 caused by 
uncertainty with truth; a few number of n 






Unresolved 2nd Party Shared doubt 
 
Type 4 ?  ?  ?  ...  etc. Regression in excess of Step 3 caused by 
uncertainty with truth; a few number of steps 
beyond Step 3 possible; all values beyond 
Step 3 are normalised. 
 
 
Unresolved 1st Party Shared disbelief 
 
Type 5 -  -  n Not found in our data, but theoretically 
possible.  Regression in excess of Step 2 
caused by disbelief; a few number of n 
beyond Step 2 possible; any value of n 
possible. 
 




-  -  -  ...  etc. Not found in our data, but theoretically 
possible.  Regression in excess of Step 3 
caused by disbelief; a few number of steps 
beyond Step 3 possible; all values beyond 
Step 3 are normalised. 
 
 
 For completeness, we postulate Type 1, Type 2, Type 5 and Type 6 as 
possible Eventual State configurations relating to the sharedness of disbelief although 
this is not supported by our data (but see our analyses of Brown's (1995) data in Table 
6.28, Chapter 6 for an example of Type 5 [ - - n ] Eventual State configuration).  Note 
too that a non-regressive terminal two-step [ ? ? ] or [ - - ] configuration is not a 
possible Eventual State shared doubt/disbelief configuration in this taxonomy because 
we assume that what drives the correspondence is a search for truth.  Hence, a non-
regressive terminal two-step [ + + ] configuration is the only desirable two-step 
eventual state.  We also assume that the correspondence is not terminated prematurely 
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after the 1st letter because this will take away the opportunity for either party to arrive 
at the desired outcome. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4 A model of the process of establishing potentially stable CG 
 
 In this section, we shall attempt to pull together some of the comments made 
earlier regarding the reader's concern for sharedness and truth in his quest for CG.  
This dual concern for sharedness and truth can be expressed in a processing model for 
establishing potentially stable common ground.  Such a model may be represented in 
a flow chart depicting various stages in the decision making process of interactants as 
they attempt to interpret relevant utterances and build upon their existing beliefs (see 
Figure 7.1 below).  But before we do that, we should add that the model to be 
presented applies only under certain conditions.  The assumptions are: 
 
1. The model is intended to represent the reader's point of view only. 
2. The processing model only holds for goal-driven written discourse where the 
objective of the reader is to establish potentially stable ( + + ) CG of Types 
1, 1a, 2 & 2a (see Table 7.5).  (Route A; to be explained below) 
3. A potentially unstable shared doubt/disbelief is not the final objective.  Where 
potentially unstable shared doubt/disbelief has been established, we assume 
that the reader will want to seek further clarification.  (Route B) 
4. Where sharedness (Step 1-2/3 match) has not been established, we assume 
that the reader will want to seek clarification.  (Route C) 
5. The reader may, of course, choose to opt out by not seeking further 
clarification even when sharedness and/or truth have/has not been established.  
(See discussion below for possible reasons.)  (Route D) 
6. The model does not make any claims about the nature of the distinction 
between on-line and off-line inferences in reading comprehension.  It also 
doesn't make any claims about whether the sequence of the different levels of 
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processing indicated in the model can be distinguished in real time processing 
when an interactant is reading a letter. 
7. The model does not represent the process of establishing CG in a single 
reading/sitting.  Rather with each subsequent letter read, the status of each 
relevant belief is reconsidered and updated until a potentially stable CG has 
been achieved or when the correspondence has been terminated (whichever 
comes first).  The recursive nature of the process of establishing CG is 
represented in our model by the arrows which lead back into the box at the top 
of the flow chart. 
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Figure 7.1:  A model of the process of establishing potentially stable CG: Reader's 
point of view 
 
              
 
 
Write !or/seek An individunl receives and 
clnrilicmion/ ~---.i reads a/another letter 
further 
Write for/sec 
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Do I have control or the ~ourcc 
of the belief(s)? 
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Has the other party 
achieved I SI Party CG? 
I 
Do I haven 




Do I hold the 
belief as true? 
'® Yes 




Do I have a 




Do I hold the 
belief as true? 
'® Yes 
I 
S table 2 nd 
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 Having listed the assumptions, let us describe the model.  Starting from the 
top, an individual receives a letter, reads it and begins to process the input/utterances.  
In reading the letter, the reader generates certain beliefs (as discussed in Chapter 3) 
arising from certain utterances in the letter which are relevant to the goal at hand.  In 
our case, a's goal is to find out whether b is willing to supervise a and to persuade b 
to do so if the situation calls for it.  Likewise, b's complementary goal (assuming that 
b is co-operating) is to ascertain if she has sufficient reasons to be willing to supervise 
a.  
 In the next level of processing, the reader asks the question Do I have control 
of the source of the beliefs? or a similar question which helps him to distinguish 
between a potential 1st or 2nd Party CG.  This is not to suggest that it is all done 
consciously.  Every level outlined in this process is probably subconscious.  If the 
reader realises that the other party has control of the status of the information, he 
takes the 1st Party CG route on the left side of the model.  Alternatively, if the reader 
has control of the status of the information, he may decide that the incoming belief 
has 2nd Party CG potential instead, and therefore takes the other CG route on the 
right. 
 If the goal is to establish 1st Party CG (see left column), the reader may move 
on to ask two questions.1  The first question Do I have a Step 1-2 match? reflects the 
reader's concern for sharedness.  The second question Do I hold the belief as true? 
reflects the reader's concern for truth.2  At any level of questioning, the answer may 
well be No.  Assuming that the reader's goal is to achieve a potentially stable CG (as 
indicated in the most direct and vertical route (Route A) down the box), a No answer 
to any of the two questions will drive the reader to ask for clarification or further 
information from the other interactant in his reply letter (Routes B & C).  The 
clarification offered by the other interactant features as another letter and will again 
feed into the top of the process as clarified input.  The number of cycles of 
clarification depends on the number of letters exchanged.  This recursive process 
results in the regression of beliefs/doubts as the correspondence progresses.  The 
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reader can, of course, choose to opt out (Route D) for various reasons (see discussion 
below). 
 Alternatively, a 2nd Party CG (see right column) may be the reader's goal 
instead.  Achieving a 2nd Party CG is similar to the above, except for an additional 
complication.  Because a 2nd Party CG requires a three-step match, the reader will 
have to first discern if the other interactant has already achieved 1st Party CG for the 
same belief under consideration.  The subsequent levels of processing for 2nd Party 
CG are the same as those for 1st Party CG. 
 Assuming Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle to be in operation, both 
parties want to establish potentially stable CG.  In reality of course, people engaging 
in written correspondence do choose not to co-operate for various reasons.  This, 
however, doesn't mean that the CG processing model is any more invalid than, say, 
Grice's Co-operative Principle is invalid just because a particular maxim has been 
flouted.  If the reader does indeed choose to opt out, it can occur at any stage of the 
process (see Route D).  Some possible reasons for opting out are: the belief has 
ceased to be salient/relevant to the reader and in which case, the reader may not care 
to seek clarification; the belief cannot be resolved until another belief has been 
established as shared first; protocol/politeness/courtesy may dictate that certain 
beliefs are more appropriately left hanging than discussed explicitly; there may be a 
muddle in either interactant's memory; etc. 
 In the above model, we observe that whether the interactant's goal is to 
achieve 1st Party or 2nd Party CG, both goals require the reader to ask two key 
questions if potentially stable CG is to be established.  These two cruces pertain to the 
reader's two concerns for sharedness and truth.  The different combinations of 
concerns are represented in the following table (based on a 1st Party perspective). 
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Table 7.6:  Characterising the reader's view of 1st Party Eventual and Non-eventual 
























































    
 
Note: n.a. stands for "Not Applicable". 
We use a Yes/No dichotomy to indicate the status of the reader's two concerns 
for sharedness and truth. 
For there to be CG, the values of the Sharedness and Truth columns must be 
both 'Yes'. 
 
 The left most column refers to the various routes (A-D) a reader can take in 
his search for potentially stable CG.  These routes are indicated in the model for 
processing potentially stable CG (please refer to Figure 7.1 to trace the routes).  If the 
reader takes the A-route, he will establish potentially stable CG (non-regressive) of a 
minimal Step 1-2 match, while satisfying the dual concerns of [+ Sharedness, + 
Truth].  If he takes the B-route, he arrives at a potentially unstable state of shared 
doubt/disbelief [+ Sharedness, - Truth].  The C-route results in a total failure at 
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establishing any form of sharedness.  The D-route refers to a situation where the 
reader chooses to opt out of the process of establishing CG. 
 Having just presented our processing model, we shall explore the explanatory 
value of our model against the claims made by other scholars, in particular, Clark and 
his colleagues.  We begin our discussion by making three general points about the 
basis of our current study.   
 Our first general remark is that our model is based on our analysis of shared 
phenomenon arising directly from interaction.  The set of correspondence we draw on 
as our data is authentic and uninfluenced by prior theories of common ground in its 
composing process.  On this basis alone, the claims we can make arising from an 
analysis of this data are likely to be more reliable than those claims made on the basis 
of analysis of invented data.  In the process of composing such invented data, the 
author is likely to be influenced by her own pre-existing notion of what common 
ground ought to be like and how it is likely to be established.  This in-built bias 
means that any such claims arising from an analysis of the invented data should be 
treated with caution.  Our authentic data has no such in-built bias. 
 Our second remark is that our model of how common ground is established is 
also based on the psychologically plausible notion of shared belief arising from 
interaction.  This is in contrast with other theories based on the psychologically 
implausible notion of mutual knowledge. 
 On the two strengths of the authenticity of our data and our use of the 
psychologically plausible notion of shared belief, we are well placed to make stronger 
claims about the way common ground is established based on our analysis of the data. 
 Our final general remark concerns the replicability of our results and the 
falsifiability of our claims.  In our detailed analysis of the configurations of the 
shared beliefs/doubts/disbeliefs, we have employed a fairly sophisticated and rigorous 
method of analysis based initially on Brown's (1995) method.  This is an important 
point because it means then that further analyses of a whole range of different kinds 
of data arising from interactive discourse can be done to see if our present claims 
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about the process of establishing CG are generalisable to other types of data.  We 
have shown, in an initial attempt in our re-analysis of Brown's spoken data, that the 
method we have developed here can be applied successfully to interactive spoken 
data as well (see Chapter 6, Section 9 for a discussion).  More importantly, we have 
demonstrated that the claims we make about the solipsistic nature of establishing CG 
(as in the distinction between 1st and 2nd Party CGs) and the minimum number of 
steps in establishing CG are generalisable to another type of interactive discourse 
(spoken).  Future research may well prove the resilience of our claims and method of 
analysis.  We acknowledge, however, that future research may also prove that some 
of our claims are inaccurate.  This is not necessarily a bad thing, since claims made 
by way of empirical research based on a rigorous, transparent and replicable method 
of analysis should be inherently falsifiable anyway.  An unfalsifiable claim/theory is 
as good as blind faith.  But for the time being, our method of analysing shared belief 
has proven to be fairly effective in analysing spoken data as well. 
 How does Clark's et al views of CG stand up to the three "tests" above?  Here, 
we shall rehearse our criticisms of Clark's et al position again (see Chapter 2 for the 
full discussion).  Firstly of all, their claims are based on invented data which we 
believe are not entirely uninfluenced by pre-existing notion of what common ground 
ought to be like.  Their intuitive claim that common ground is not based on an infinite 
regression of beliefs is probably right, but the evidence is based on rather informal 
reasoning.  Clark's (1996: 93 ff.) anecdotal example of the way he and his son 
establishes common ground of the conch shell between them against the backdrop of 
a Californian beach on a sunny afternoon is hardly reliable evidence on which to base 
his notion of CG-shared basis (based on his Mutual Knowledge Induction Schema) 
and CG-reflexive (based on the inference rule associated with the mental primitive ).  
Note the similarity of his conch shell example with Schiffer's candle example.  
 Secondly, although Clark (1992: 5-6) claims that his notion of common 
ground is not based on the psychologically untenable notion of an infinite regression, 
the similarity of his induction schema with Schiffer's finite set of conditions (which 
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constrains the infinite regression) is uncanny.  Clark too writes about how his 
induction schema can be used to constrain the regression and in the process infer 
mutual knowledge.  We note earlier in Chapter 2 that Clark's interchangeable use (up 
to 1992) of the term mutual knowledge with common ground reflects more than a 
terminological confusion.  It may be symptomatic of a deeper underlying conceptual 
confusion as well.  We remain to be convinced that Clark's notion of mutual 
knowledge and common ground is conceptually consistent and plausible. 
 Thirdly, his Induction Schema and inference rule associated with the mental 
primitive are, in principle, unfalsifiable.  They are unfalsifiable because his reflexive 
conceptualisation of mutual knowledge includes circular self-reference (Clark, 1996: 
100) (see Chapter 2 for a discussion).  In devising such a circular conceptualisation of 
common ground, we suspect that Clark is in fact trying to strike some sort of middle 
ground between a notion of common ground which is based on mutual knowledge 
(philosophical sense; involving an infinite regression and certainty of knowledge) and 
a notion of common ground based on a truncation heuristics which limits the 
regression to a few steps (a position we adopt; except we wouldn't call our method of 
configuration a truncation heuristic which has connotations of arbitrary judgements). 
Clark rejects both notions of CG, hence the need to develop a "third" notion of CG 
based on a reflexive conceptualisation of mutual knowledge.  As we have pointed out 
above, Clark's reflexive conceptualisation also bears a striking resemblance to 
Schiffer's approach which is based on the notion of mutual knowledge (philosophical 
sense). 
 In Clark's defence, we should add that his view of common ground (Clark, 
1996) is by far the most developed currently and his influence can be seen in the 
many references in the psychology literature to his notion of common ground, in 
particular, his physical co-presence heuristics (see Chapter 2 for the details).  Clark 
claims that the outcome of his co-presence heuristics is the mental primitive from 
which people can then infer mutual knowledge.  We suspect that what they postulate 
to be the basis of physical co-presence, for example, may be demonstrated to be 
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nothing more that the establishment of shared beliefs (our definition).  Although we 
have no firm suggestions at the moment as to how this can be demonstrated 
experimentally, we certainly think that this line of investigation based on tracking the 
establishment of shared beliefs will be more productive than a line of investigation 
based on proving the mental primitive.  As we have pointed out above, we don't think 
his notions of a mental primitive and the induction schema are plausible.  For all the 
above reasons, we are cautious about embracing Clark's view of common ground. 
 Other studies done so far, with the exception of Brown (1995), on truncation 
heuristics have been based on informal arguments about the limited number of steps 
involved in the regression.  Most notably, Harder and Kock's (1976) informal analysis 
uses the fourth level as the arbitrary cut-off point in the regression.  This is hardly 
satisfactory.  We note that the other studies (Bach and Harnish, 1979; Kaspar, 1976) 
are also based on informal arguments arising from invented data (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2 for a discussion). 
 Brown (195) offers, to the best of our knowledge, the only empirical account 
(other than the present study) of how CG is established based on a limited regression.  
This is made possible by the novel method of analysis which she has devised.  
Although her method has only been applied to a few short extracts of her spoken data 
so far, the strength of her method lies in its simplicity of application, transparency of 
principle and the replicability of her results.  In Chapter 6 and the present chapter, we 
have sought to extend her pioneering technique by adding more details to the method, 
making it possible for us to make more sophisticated claims about the process of 
establishing common ground. 
 Our current method of analysing the configurations of CG is of course not 
without limitations (see, for example, the list of assumptions which constrains the 
application of our model in Figure 7.1).  The method of analysis is arguably in need 
of further refinement to take into account the different goals participants may have in 
various types of written and spoken interactions (see, for example, our discussion of 
the application of our method to the Map Task data in Chapter 6, Section 9).  But we 
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have provided sufficient rigour to the development of our method and our analyses 
that we are optimistic that they can be applied, with modifications, to other types of 




 Let us close our current study by restating our contribution to the field of 
study related to common ground.  Our first area of contribution is theoretical.  We 
have examined the notions of common ground from various angles.  Our study is 
driven by a close analysis of authentic written data.  We start our discussion by 
identifying the notion of shared belief as our basis for discussing CG.  We place the 
notion of background knowledge under the category of assumed CG.   
 We then explored the reader's use of his CG in interpreting utterances and 
how this interpretation in turn builds upon his existing CG. 
 Our excursion into the writer's point of view shows that her packaging of 
utterances is also influenced by what she perceives to be her reader's existing CG or 
assumed CG or that information which she assumes her reader is willing to treat as 
though it is already part of his CG (as though CG). 
 Our final angle of investigation is to configure this common ground.  Our 
configurations reveal several important insights into the nature of CG, particularly in 
relation to its solipsistic nature, a taxonomy of the Eventual State CG/Shared 
doubt/disbelief configurations and a cognitive model of the process of establishing 
potentially stable CG.  The model we have developed, to the best of our knowledge, 
is the only one available based on empirical findings related to the notion of shared 
belief. 
 Our second area of contribution to the field of research in CG is 
methodological.  We have developed a package of methods of analysis relating to: the 
process of interpretation, the reader's reasoning schema, the writer's three-tier 
conceptualisation of information structure, the interaction of the two levels of 
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information structure, and the configuration of shared beliefs/doubts/disbeliefs.  
Armed with this package of novel methods, we are able to make several important 
claims about various aspects of CG. 
 This leaves us with the question What next?.  For a start, more empirical 
studies involving written (and spoken) data need to be done in the future.  Obviously, 
the methods and models developed in our current study need further refinement.  The 
refinement of some of these methods will necessarily involve a more systematic 
incorporation of certain pragmatic factors into the discussion.  Some of these 
'pragmatic' considerations concern: politeness, appropriateness, prudence, evasion, 
clarity, economy, truth, coherence, goal/motive and reasoning. 
 Our study places a high premium on explaining and expressing the core issues 
involved in establishing CG in an economical and elegant way.  It is hoped that 
deeper consideration of the pragmatic factors in future studies will build upon the 









1   In fact, no claims are made as to the order in which the various questions are raised subconsciously.  
The point here is that at the subconscious level, all the questions must have been considered at some 
point in order for stable CG to be secured.  The different concerns may well have been interactive 
and/or simultaneous. 
2   We use the expression to hold something true in the sense of Davidson (1984; Radical 
Interpretation).  The attitude of holding an utterance true is analogous with accepting in one's mind 
that the utterance (and the beliefs it embodies) is true, and with accepting in one's mind that the 
writer/speaker's intention is that the utterance be accepted as true.  This of course doesn't mean that one 
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 Dear b 
 
1  For two years I studied English, French, American Studies, 
Education and Foreign Language Teaching at Y University (Germany) and 
at this moment I am doing the 'licence' in French and German Studies at Z 
University (France).  During this time I have taken part in twelve courses of 
linguistics and my studies of Foreign Language Teaching cover applied 
linguistics to a great extent. 
 
2  To extend my knowledge on this field, I applied through the German 
National Scholarship Foundation scheme to take the M.A. in Linguistics in 
the academic year 1993/94.  Within this one-year course I would like to 
follow my interest in sociolinguistics, especially in critical linguistics.  
Accordingly, I will submit a title on critical language study in educational 
contexts for the thesis.  This educational aspect is rooted in my interest in 
foreign language teaching and in my desire to enter the teaching profession.  
Besides, I have a two-month teaching experience in English at a German 
Waldorf school. 
 
3  Therefore I would like to read two core courses of the M.A. in 
addition, 'Meaning in English' and 'Methods and Materials in English 
Language Teaching'.  Furthermore, I wish to take part in the Research 
Design Course because I want to go on to undertake research. 
 
4  b, I certainly share your interest for sociolinguistics and discourse 
analysis.  In fact, one of the main reasons why I want to study at X 
University [Britain] is because I would like to have the  opportunity to 
benefit from your expertise.  I really hope that you can be my supervisor, if 
it is at all possible. 
 
5  I should be happy to get a positive reply at your convenience and I 
thank you very much in advance for your help. 
 










 Dear a 
 
1  Thank you for your letter of 17 November 1992, in which you ask 
me to be your supervisor in 1993/4. 
 
2  I cannot quite work out from your letter exactly what you  are 
going to be doing here during 1993/4;  you say you have  applied to take 
the M.A. in Linguistics, and I presume that that means what it says, i.e., 
that you will be a student of the Linguistics Department.  If that is the 
case, I am afraid that it would not really be the done thing for me to 
supervise you, since the Applied Linguistics Department is a separate 
department in a different faculty (Education). 
 
3  Of course that doesn't mean that I would not be happy to talk to 
you from time to time, and you might also be able to follow some courses 
here, provided that your Linguistics timetable allowed it. 
 
4  Or, do you mean that you have applied to take the M.A. in Applied 
Linguistics here in the Applied Linguistics Department?  If so, we have 
not received your application yet.  However, if such an application were 
successful (and competition for places is severe), then I see no reason why 
I shouldn't supervise you, provided that our interests continue to coincide. 
 
5  Please don't hesitate to contact me again if you want any more 
information. 
 









 Dear b 
 
1  Thank you very much for your letter of 25 November, in which 
you tell me that I may follow some courses at the Applied Linguistics 
Department.  I am very glad that you are willing to see me occasionally 
during 1993/4. 
 
2  For one point, I would like to clear up a possible 
misunderstanding:  As you presume I have applied to take the M.A. in 
Linguistics at the Faculty of Languages.  Lacking the  teaching experience 
of four years I am not eligible for the M.A. in Applied Linguistics anyway. 
 
3  As to the problem of supervision I hoped that my belonging to a 
different department of the University would not be an obstacle for you to 
supervise me with the prospectus of the M.A. in Linguistics stating on 
page 2: 
" ... Students taking the M.A. in Linguistics benefit from this 
interdisciplinary environment.  They ... may in some cases be supervised 
for the research components of the degree by a specialist from outside the 
Department." 
 
4  Since your academic work covers my field of interest to the full, I 
should really be happy, if I could benefit from your supervision.  Would 
you consider it useful to talk things over with c [gloss: Head of Linguistics 
Department]? 
 
5  In any case I am going to visit X University during my Easter 
holiday in April where I hope to settle this question on the spot. 
 
6  I thank you very much in advance for any benevolence and I am 
looking forward to your reply at your convenience. 
 









 Dear a 
 
1  Thank you for your letter of 3 December in which you clarify your 
future affiliation in the University. 
 
2  I would really have nothing against supervising you, provided I 
have the time and so on; I merely think that it might be felt by the 
linguistics department that they are well able to provide supervision in 
your areas of interest themselves. 
 
3  Anyway, I am sure that you will be able to discover their 
preference when you visit in April. 
 












 Dear b 
 
1  Thank you very much for your letter of December in which you 
tell me that you would be willing to supervise me during 1993/4. 
 
2  I already told you that I intend to visit X University during my 
Easter holiday in April.  I should be happy to talk things over with you on 
this occasion.  So, would it be possible to see you within the period from 
13 to 16 April? 
 
3  I thank you very much in advance for your help and I am looking 
forward to your reply at your convenience. 
 
       Yours sincerely, a 
 
 
 Letter B3  (10 February 1993) 
   
Paragraph Text 
 
 Dear a 
 
1  Thank you for your letter of 7 February. 
 
2  Unfortunately I shall be away from the university at a  conference 
(TESOL) between the 13th and 17th of April, so I'm afraid I won't be able 
to meet you then. 
 
3  I hope you have a pleasant visit to X University and useful 
discussions with the Linguistics Department, and that we will meet in the 
autumn. 
 








 Dear b 
 
1  Thank you for your letter of 10 February.  Considering the fact that 
neither you nor c [Head of Linguistics Department] will be available from 
13th-16th April, I decided to postpone my visit to X University to 19th-
23rd of April. 
 
2  I hope that I'll be able to see you at your convenience during this 
period. 
 








 Dear a 
 
1  Thank you for your letter of 10 March. 
 
2  I'm glad that it looks as if we'll be able to meet after all in April.  I 
suggest you try to visit c before you come to see me.  You can telephone 
or visit the Applied Linguistics Department to find a suitable time. 
 













    _____________________________________________ 





Notes:  Shading with values added 
 
  Light shade : Shared doubt/disbelief established 
  Heavy shade : CG (shared belief) established 
 
  Shading without values added 
 
  Light shade : Shared doubt/disbelief established previously 
  Heavy shade : CG (shared belief) established previously 
 




Table 8.1: b's configuration of beliefs after reading A1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter BPs St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A1 1 +      ? ?     
 2a +      + +     
 3a +      + +     
 3b ?      - ?     
 3e ?      - ?     
 2b +      - +     




Table 8.2: a's configuration of beliefs after reading B1 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter BPs St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
B1 1 + ? ?          
 2a + - +          
 3a + - +          
 3b - - ?          
 3e - - ?          
 2b ? - +          
 3f - - ?          
 
 
I I I I I I I I I 





Table 8.3: b's configuration of beliefs after reading A2 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter BPs St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A2 1       + + ? ?   
 2a       + + - +   
 3a       + + - +   
 3b       + - - ?   
 3e       ? - - ?   
 2b       ? ? - +   




Table 8.4: a's configuration of beliefs after reading B2  
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter BPs St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
B2 1 + + + + +        
 2a + + + + +        
 3a + + + + +        
 3b + + - - ?        
 3e ? ? - - ?        
 2b ? ? ? ? ?        




Table  8.5: b's configuration of beliefs after reading A3 
 
  a's beliefs (Steps) b's beliefs (Steps) 
Letter BPs St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 St 1 St 2 St 3 St 4 St 5 St 6 
A3 1             
 2a             
 3a             
 3b       + + + + + + 
 3e       ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 2b             




I I I I I I I I I 
I 
I I I I I I I I I 
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